Clerk's stamp:

COURT FILE NUMBER	2201-09578
COURT	COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH OF ALBERTA
JUDICIAL CENTRE	CALGARY
PLAINTIFF	ROYAL BANK OF CANADA
DEFENDANTS	SEAMA SHALCHI-MOGHADDAM PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION, SEAMA SHALCHI-MOGHADDAM
DOCUMENT	**BENCH BRIEF OF ROYAL BANK OF CANADA**
ADDRESS FOR SERVICE AND CONTACT INFORMATION OF PARTY FILING THIS DOCUMENT	Dentons Canada LLP Bankers Court 15th Floor, 850 - 2nd Street S.W. Calgary, Alberta T2P 0R8 Attn: Sam Gabor Ph. (403) 268-3048 Fx. (403) 268-3100 File No.: 125665-9250

BENCH BRIEF OF THE APPLICANT ROYAL BANK OF CANADA

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. This Brief of Law and Argument is submitted on behalf of Royal Bank of Canada ("**RBC**"), in support of its application seeking an Order for the following relief:

   (a) declaring that the time for service of this application be abridged, that this application is properly returnable, and that further service of this application be dispensed with;

   (b) appointing MNP Ltd. ("**MNP**"), as receiver and manager (the "**Receiver**") of all of the assets, undertakings, and properties of Seama Shalchi-Moghaddam Professional Corporation ("**Seama PC**") pursuant to section 243 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, RSC 1985 c B-3 ("**BIA**"), section 13 of the *Judicature Act*, RSA 2000 c J-2 and section 49(1) of the *Law of Property Act*, R.S.A. 2000, c.L-7; and

   (c) granting costs of this application to RBC on a solicitor and client, full indemnity basis; and

   (d) such further and other relief as counsel may advise and this Honourable Court may permit.

II. FACTS

2. Seama PC is a corporation operating a dental office in Calgary, Alberta.[1]

3. RBC extended various credit facilities to Seama PC (the "**Credit Facilities**") pursuant to a RBC credit agreement dated January 6, 2022 (the "**Credit Agreement**"), a RBC Royal Bank Visa Business Card Agreement dated February 7, 2018 (the "**Visa Agreement**"), a Master Lease Agreement dated March 9, 2018 and Leasing Schedule dated September 10, 218 (together the "**Lease Agreement**") and together with the Credit Agreement and Visa Agreement the "**Loan Agreements**").[2]

4. In support of the indebtedness owing to RBC under the Credit Agreement, Seama PC provided among other things, a general security agreement dated February 7, 2018 charging all of its present and after acquired personal property (the "**GSA**"), a mortgage dated February 7, 2018 in the principal sum of $355,00.00 (the "**Unit 304 Lands**"), and a mortgage dated February 7, 2018 in the principal sum of $320,00,000.00 (the "**Unit 305 Mortgage**" and together with the GSA, and Unit 304 Lands the "**Security**").[3]

5. Seama PC has defaulted under the Loan Agreements, and Security for, among other reasons:

   a) failing to pay principal, interest or other amounts when due;

   b) Alireza Shalchi-Moghaddam ("**Alireza**"), a guarantor of the Loan Agreements, filing a consumer proposal;

   c) failing to provide reporting to RBC, including but not limited to, the status of Seama PC's accounts receivables and whether Seama PC is operating as a going concern;

[1] Affidavit of Jocelyn Beriault, sworn August 24, 2022 (the "**Beriault Affidavit**") at para 7.
[2] Beriault Affidavit at paras 8-13.
[3] Beriault Affidavit at para 15.

d) making misleading statements to RBC;

e) diverting Seama PC's funds and accounts receivables to an account with CIBC, which is RBC's collateral, and failing to deposit the accounts receivables with RBC.[4]

6. RBC's legal counsel served Seama PC a formal demand letter and the applicable Notice of Intention to enforce RBC's Security (collectively the "**Demands**").[5]

7. The ten (10) day notice period under section 244(1) has expired.

8. As at August 22, 2022, the indebtedness owing to RBC by Seama PC under the Loan Agreements is $1,597,16.27, plus accrued and accruing interest, costs and expenses (including legal costs) (the "**Indebtedness**").[6]

9. Seama PC's principal, Dr. Seama Shalchi-Moghddam ("**Seama**") and Alireza have made misleading statements to RBC and generally, namely:

a) Seama and Alireza previously refused to advise RBC the reason for the removal of $27,500 on July 7, 2022 from Seama PC's RBC deposit account, other than the removal was "part of the project we are executing to increase cash flow/revenue".[7] The removal of approximately $27,500 from Seama PC's RBC deposit account in fact occurred in order to "protect the business" after RBC returned two prior loan payments into Seama PC's RBC deposit account on July 6, 2022.[8] Seama understood that Seama PC was required to keep all of Seama PC's accounts and funds with RBC as part of Seama PC's loan agreement with RBC.[9] $20,000 of the $27,500 is merely sitting in the CIBC account and $7,500 is being used for everyday operating expenses.[10] It was both Seama and Ali's idea to move the $27,500 to the CIBC account to protect the business.[11]

b) Alireza filed a consumer proposal in March, 2022. In his consumer proposal it is indicated that "There are a number on contingent debts listed on the debtor's Statement of Affairs, all of which relate to potential personal guarantees to the debtor's ex-spouses company. The debtor is no longer involved with the business which is continuing to operate".[12] Alireza does not include any income from the dental clinic in his consumer proposal or his status with the dental clinic. However, Alireza has always been involved with Seama PC's business, including in March, 2022.[13]

10. Seama made several admissions in cross-examination that give RBC no confidence in the state of the business or it being able to repay RBC:

[4] Beriault Affidavit at para 27; Statement of Claim filed August 23, 2022 at para 23.
[5] Beriault Affidavit at para 29.
[6] Beriault Affidavit at para 37.
[7] Affidavit of Jocelyn Beriault #2, sworn August 29, 2022 (the "**Beriault Affidavit #2**") at para 20, Exhibit 8.
[8] Transcript of Examination of Seama Shalchi-Moghddam, dated August 31, 2022 ("**Seama Transcript**"), page 18, lines 17-27; page 19, lines 1-14; Affidavit of Izzy Kowalcze, sworn September 1, 2022 ("**Kowalcze Affidavit**"), Exhibit 1.
[9] Seama Transcrit, page 20, line 25-27, page 21, line 1.
[10] Seama Transcript, page 24, lines 9-16.
[11] Seama Transcript, page 21, lines 2-6.
[12] Beriault Affidavit, Exhibit 14.
[13] Seama Transcript, page 39, lines 10-13; page 40, lines 14-18.

a) Seama swore in her affidavit that monthly revenues of the business were increasing and attached an exhibit as support.[14] However, she did not prepare that document and Alireza did[15]. RBC has no confidence statements made by Alireza or information prepared by Alireza are true. Furthermore, the document provides no clear information. There is no first hand verifiable information before the Court regarding Seama PC's revenues, costs or profit or other financial information in Seama's affidavit.

b) Seama swore in her affidavit that the clinic has approximately 2000 patients[16]. However, on cross-examination she advised that she has no knowledge whether the clinic has 2000 patients.[17]

c) Seama advised in her questioning that the clinic is providing 1-2 free services a day[18] in the r ange of $80-$300 a service.[19] Accordingly, the business is expending costs for no revenue as a result.

11. Seama PC's 2018 year end financial statements provide that over a ten month period in 2018, Seama PC had retained earnings of $6,315.[20] Seama PC's 2019 year end financial statements providing that Seama PC had a retained earnings loss of $77,760 for 2019. The COVID-19 lockdowns began in March, 2020.[21] Seama PC's 2020 year end financial statements providing that Seama PC had a revised retained earnings loss of $85,935 in 2019 and a retained earnings loss of $167,399 in 2020.[22] Seama PC's 2021 year end financial statements provide that Seama PC had a retained earnings loss of $153,310.[23]

12. Information provided by Seama PC to RBC in April and July 2022 for Seama PC's revenues, salaries, supplies and net profit for the months of January, 2022 to June, 2022 provided that there was no material increase in revenues or production by Seama PC.[24]

13. Based on the foregoing, RBC has lost complete faith in Seama PC, including that it can repay the Indebtedness. RBC also believes that its security, namely the accounts receivable of Seama PC, is in jeopardy as it has no control over the accounts receivable following Seama PC opening a new account with CIBC for the reception of accounts receivable and payment of expenses.

14. RBC further has no faith in the conduct of Seama or Alireza.[25]

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[14] Affidavit of Seama Shalchi-Moghaddam, sworn August 25, 2022 ("**Seama Affidavit**"), para 10.
[15] Seama Transcript, page 9, lines 20 to 27.
[16] Seama Affidavit, para 10.
[17] Seama Transcript, page 10, lines 1-19.
[18] Seama Transcript, page 12, lines 8-10,
[19] Seama Transcript, page 12, lines 21-22.
[20] Beriault Affidavit #2, at para 15, Exhibit 5.
[21] Beriault Affidavit #2, at para 16, Exhibit 6.
[22] Beriault Affidavit #2, at para 17, Exhibit 7.
[23] Beriault Affidavit #2, at para 18; Beriault Affidavit, Exhibit 13.
[24] Beriault Affidavit #2, Exhibits 3 and 8.
[25] Beriault Affidavit at paras 39-40.

15. The appointment of a receiver and manager over the assets, properties, and undertakings of Seama PC is necessary, just and convenient in order to protect the interests of RBC and to preserve and realize upon the assets in order to repay the Indebtedness.

16. Without a receiver, RBC has no other means to preserve the remaining assets of Seama PC to adequately reduce its credit exposure and realize on its collateral, while at the same time protecting patient records and safeguarding narcotics onsite.

III. ISSUE

17. Is it just and convenient to appoint a receiver and manager over the assets, undertakings and properties of Seama PC?

18. Is it appropriate to adjourn this Application?

IV. LAW AND ARGUMENT

A. Is it just and convenient to appoint a receiver and manger over the assets, undertakings and properties of Seama PC?

19. Each of section 243 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, as amended and section 13(2) of the *Judicature Act*, 2000 c. J-2 vest in this Honourable Court, authority to appoint a Receiver where it is just and convenient to do so.

20. In *Paragon Capital Corporation Ltd. v. Merchants & Traders Assurance Co.*, 2002 ABQB 430, Justice Romaine held that the following factors may be considered by the court in determining whether it is just or convenient to appoint a receiver:

> 27 The factors a court may consider in determining whether it is appropriate to appoint a Receiver include the following:
>
> a) whether irreparable harm might be caused if no order were made, although it is not essential for a creditor to establish irreparable harm if a receiver is not appointed, particularly where the appointment of a receiver is authorized by the security documentation;
>
> b) the risk to the security holder taking into consideration the size of the debtor's equity in the assets and the need for protection or safeguarding of the assets while litigation takes place;
>
> c) the nature of the property;
>
> d) the apprehended or actual waste of the debtor's assets;
>
> e) the preservation and protection of the property pending judicial resolution;

> f) the balance of convenience to the parties;
>
> g) the fact that the creditor has the right to appoint a receiver under the documentation provided for the loan;
>
> h) the enforcement of rights under a security instrument where the security-holder encounters or expects to encounter difficulty with the debtor and others;
>
> i) the principle that the appointment of a receiver is extraordinary relief which should be granted cautiously and sparingly;
>
> j) the consideration of whether a court appointment is necessary to enable the receiver to carry out its' duties more efficiently;
>
> k) the effect of the order upon the parties;
>
> l) the conduct of the parties;
>
> m) the length of time that a receiver may be in place;
>
> n) the cost to the parties;
>
> o) the likelihood of maximizing return to the parties;
>
> p) the goal of facilitating the duties of the receiver.
>
> Bennett, Frank, *Bennett on Receiverships*, 2nd edition, (1995), Thompson Canada Ltd., page 130 (cited from various cases)[26]

21. Where the security instrument governing the relationship between a debtor and secured creditor provides for a right to appoint a receiver upon default, this has the effect of relaxing the burden on the moving party seeking to have the receiver appointed. While the receiver is generally regarded as an extraordinary equitable remedy, courts do not regard the nature of the remedy as extraordinary or equitable where the relevant security document permits the appointment of a receiver. This is because the moving party is merely seeking to enforce a term of an agreement that was assented to by both parties.[27]

22. The Court will appoint a receiver and manager in situations where accounts receivables are in peril and more difficult to collect as time passes.[28]

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[26] *Paragon Capital Corporation Ltd. v. Merchants & Traders Assurance Co* ("**Paragon**"), 2002 ABQB 430 at para 27 [**TAB 1**]. See also, *Lindsey Estate v Strategic Metals Corp,* 2010 ABQB 242 at para 32 aff'd by 2010 ABCA 191 [**TAB 2**] and *Re Schendel Management Ltd*, 2019 ABQB 545 at para 44 [**TAB 3**].
[27] *Textron Financial Canada Ltd v Chetwynd Motels Ltd*, 2010 CarswellBC 855
at paras 55 and 75 [**TAB 4**]. *Enterprise Cape Breton Corp v Crown Jewel Resort Ranch Inc*, 2014 NSSC 128 at para 27 citing *Bank of Montreal v Sherco Properties Inc*, 2013 ONSC 7023 [**TAB 5**].
[28] *Cardinal Insurance Co v Mendez Holdings (Canada)Co*, 1984 CarswellOnt 3555 [**TAB 6**].

23. RBC respectfully submits that this Honourable Court ought to exercise its discretion to appoint MNP as Receiver by reason of it being just, convenient and otherwise appropriate that a receiver and manager of the undertaking, property and assets of Seama PC be appointed.

24. Having regard to the factors listed in *Paragon*, RBC notes that:

a) the Security granted by Seama PC authorizes the appointment of a receiver and manager;

b) the risk to RBC is significant with the indebtedness in excess of $1,597,16.27;

c) the appointment of a Receiver is necessary for the preservation and protection of the property;

d) the appointment of a Receiver is necessary to ensure medical records and narcotics at the clinic are dealt with accordingly pursuant to provincial laws and regulations;

e) the balance of convenience is clearly in favour of RBC, Seama PC is indebted to RBC and is in default of its obligations to RBC;

f) as noted above, RBC has the right under its security documentation to appoint a Receiver;

g) RBC has lost total confidence in the ability of the management of Seama PC to continue to operate its business, repay the Indebtedness and be honest with RBC;

h) RBC is no longer prepared to fund the operations of the business and the business is solely reliant on accounts receivables to operate, with said accounts receivable being RBC's collateral;

i) RBC's collateral in the form of Seama PC's accounts receivable, are in jeopardy based on Seama and Alireza's prior conduct removing all funds from RBC, opening a new bank account with CIBC, refusing to advise RBC where the funds were placed, and providing a misleading statements to RBC for the purpose of their removal;

j) the accounts receivables in this case will become impossible to collect if the business continues to operate since they are being used by Seama PC to pay ordinary course expenses;

k) while the appointment of a Receiver is extraordinary relief and should be granted cautiously and sparingly, as noted previously, the granting of a receivership order is not so extraordinary where the relevant security document permits the appointment of a receiver like the case at hand;

l) a court appointment is necessary to enable the Receiver to carry out its duties more efficiently;

m) RBC respectfully submits that the conduct of the parties is supportive of the granting of the Order requested;

n) the duration of the appointment of a Receiver is at this juncture incapable of being determined with specificity;

o) it is likely that the value of the property of Seama PC will be maximized by establishing a level and transparent sales process of the entire business or its assets as administered by this Honourable Court; and

p) having regard to the nature of the property, being a dental clinic, that will be under the administration of the Receiver, a Receivership Order is necessary to facilitate the duties of the Receiver, including any facilitation with the dental college.

25. RBC respectfully submits that there are no other remedies short of the appointment of a Receiver available to RBC that will adequately protect its interests. The security granted by Seama PC to RBC allows for the appointment of a Receiver. The balancing of the interests of the parties favours RBC and the appointment of a Receiver.

B. Is it appropriate to adjourn this Application?

26. RBC understands that Seama PC will be requesting an adjournment of 60 days to pay out RBC through the marketing of the dental clinic as a going concern.

27. Firstly, an adjournment to market the clinic as a going concern is unnecessary. A court appointed receiver will need to assess the business as a whole and its assets to determine an appropriate realization strategy. A receiver may determine that a going concern sale is the best method for maximizing realization value. If such a decision is made by the receiver, the receiver may choose to retain the services of Seama to perform dental services while the clinic is operated during the marketing process implemented by the receiver.

28. Secondly, Seama PC does not seek an adjournment of this application with clean hands, including that Seama and Alireza have provided misleading statements to RBC regarding the removal of funds from Seama PC's RBC deposit account and have deliberately opened up an account with CIBC to collect accounts receivables in breach of Seama PC's loan agreement with RBC.

29. Thirdly, RBC is not prepared to allow its collateral to be used to fund appraisals of the business or pay the salaries of Seama and Alireza. Alireza in particular provided information for his consumer proposal that he has no affiliation to the dental clinic when such information is untrue. RBC is not prepared to have Alireza be paid over 60 days using its collateral, as such amounts would be paid to Alireza contrary to his consumer proposal. Alternatively, if such amounts were paid to him as part of his consumer proposal, such amounts would likely be subject to his surplus income requirements, of which RBC would be funding Alireza's unsecured creditors using its collateral. RBC is not prepared for its collateral to be used in such a manner.

30. Fourthly, adjournments have been given on receivership applications when the parties require time to cross examine on affidavits, need further time to submit materials, and for granting a limited period of time to pay off a lender.[29]

31. There are no steps required that warrant an adjournment in this case. Seama PC through its counsel cross examined on RBC's affidavit. Seama PC filed an affidavit in reply to the one filed by RBC. Seama has been cross-examined on her affidavit. Seama PC has not demonstrated that a short period of time will permit repayment of RBC and its attempt to repay RBC is speculative.

32. In the bankruptcy context requests for an adjournment which ends up being unreasonable and motivated by a desire for delay have been refused.[30]

[29] *White Oak Commercial Finance, LLC v Nygård Holdings (USA) Limited et al*, 2020 MBQB 58 at paras 2, 29 [**TAB 7**].
[30] *Re Karataglidis*, 2003 CarswellOnt 5794, 47 CBR (4th) 246 [**TAB 8**].

33. Seama PC ‘s request for adjournment is unreasonable and motivated by a desire to delay. RBC issued a demarketing letter to Seama PC on May 18, 2022 to give Seama PC time to find new financing.[31] RBC then attempted unsuccessfully to enter into a forbearance agreement with Seama PC where Seama PC could attempt to find new financing.[32] RBC attempted to work with Seama PC on a resolution and strategy to repay the Indebtedness. RBC’s efforts were wasted as Seama PC delayed the negotiations and ultimately refused to enter into an agreement, while further jeopardizing RBC’s risk of repayment. RBC then discovered that Seama and Alireza were dishonest to it. Seama PC is now using RBC’s collateral without its permission to continue to operate after RBC has made demand for repayment.

34. Finally, Seama PC has no record of financial success since receiving funding from RBC in 2018, with significant year-over-year losses both before and after the COVID-19 lockdowns. Seama PC has submitted no compelling evidence to this Honourable Court that it can in fact sell its business as a going concern at all, or in an amount that can payout the Indebtedness.

35. RBC submits that only a receiver, funded by RBC if necessary, can maximize the value of the assets of Seama PC in order to repay the Indebtedness owing to RBC.

36. Based on the foregoing, RBC submits it is not appropriate to grant an adjournment of this Application.

V. CONCLUSION

37. RBC respectfully submits having regard to the circumstances it is just and convenient to appoint MNP, as receiver and manager of the undertaking, property and assets of Seama PC.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED at Calgary, Alberta this 1st day of September 2022.

DENTONS CANADA LLP

Per: _____

Sam Gabor

Counsel for Royal Bank of Canada

[31] Beriault Affidavit #2, para 14, Exhibit 4.
[32] Beriault Affidavit, paras 30 and 31.

VI. TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Tab	Authority
1.	*Paragon Capital Corporation Ltd. v. Merchants & Traders Assurance Co*, 2002 ABQB 430
2.	*Lindsey Estate v. Strategic Metals Corp*, 2010 ABQB 242
3.	*Re Schendel Management Ltd*, 2019 ABQB 545
4.	*Textron Financial Canada Ltd. v. Chetwynd Motels Ltd*, 2010 CarswellBC 855
5.	*Enterprise Cape Breton Corp v Crown Jewel Resort Ranch Inc*, 2014 NSSC 128
6.	*Bank of Montreal v Sherco Properties Inc*, 2013 ONSC 7023
7.	*Cardinal Insurance Co v Mendez Holdings (Canada)Co*, 1984 CarswellOnt 3555
8.	*White Oak Commercial Finance, LLC v Nygård Holdings (USA) Limited et al*, 2020 MBQB 58
9.	*Re Karataglidis*, 2003 CarswellOnt 5794, 47 CBR (4th) 246

Tab 1

2002 ABQB 430
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

Paragon Capital Corp. v. Merchants & Traders Assurance Co.

2002 CarswellAlta 1531, 2002 ABQB 430, 316 A.R. 128, 46 C.B.R. (4th) 95

PARAGON CAPITAL CORPORATION LTD. (Plaintiff) and MERCHANTS & TRADERS ASSURANCE COMPANY, INSURCOM FINANCIAL CORPORATION, 782640 ALBERTA LTD., 586335 BRITISH COLUMBIA LTD. AND GARRY TIGHE (Defendants)

Romaine J.

Judgment: April 29, 2002
Docket: Calgary 0101-05444

Counsel: Judy D. Burke for Plaintiff
Robert W. Hladun, Q.C. for Defendants

Headnote

Receivers --- Appointment — General

Ex parte order was granted in 2001 appointing receiver and manager of property and assets of two of defendant companies, including certain assets pledged by those companies to plaintiff creditor — Defendants brought application to set aside, vary or stay that order — Application dismissed — Evidence at time of ex parte application provided grounds for believing that delay caused by proceeding by notice of motion might entail serious mischief — Evidence existed that assets that had been pledged to plaintiff as security for loan were at risk of disappearance or dissipation — Plaintiff did not fail to make full and candid disclosure of relevant facts in ex parte application — Security agreement provided for appointment of receiver — Conduct of primary representative of defendants contributed to apprehension that certain assets were of less value than was originally represented to plaintiff or that they did not in fact exist — Balance of convenience favoured plaintiff.

Annotation

This decision canvasses the difficult issue of the appropriateness of granting *ex parte* court orders in an insolvency context. Specifically, the facts of this case revolve around the proper exercise of Romaine J.'s jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 387 of the *Alberta Rules of Court* [1] to grant an *ex parte*, without notice, order appointing a receiver over the assets of two debtor companies. This rule provides that an order can be made on an *ex parte* basis in cases where the evidence indicates "serious mischief". Such jurisdiction is also granted to courts in Ontario [2] and in the context of interim receivership orders under the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*. [3] The guiding principles that govern the granting of *ex parte* orders generally were summarized in *B. (M.A.), Re* [4] where it was concluded that the court's discretion to grant such orders should only be exercised in cases where it is found that an emergency exists and where full disclosure has been provided to the court by the applicant. It is generally considered that an emergency is a circumstance where the consequences that the applicant is attempting to avoid are immediate [5] and that such consequences would have irreparable harm. [6] Insolvency situations are, by their very nature, crisis oriented. Debtors and creditors alike are typically faced with urgent circumstances and must move quickly to preserve value for all stakeholders. The special circumstances encountered in insolvency proceedings have been acknowledged by the Ontario Court of Appeal in *Algoma Steel Inc., Re* [7] where it was recognized that *ex parte* court orders and the lack of adequate notice is often justified in an insolvency context due to the often "urgent, complex and dynamic" nature of the proceedings. However, there is nonetheless a recognition that despite the "real time" nature of insolvency proceedings, the remedy of appointing a receiver is so drastic that

doing so without notice to the debtor is to be considered only in extreme cases. In *Royal Bank v. W. Got & Associates Electric Ltd.*,[8] the Alberta Court of Appeal cited the following passage from *Huggins v. Green Top Dairy Farms*[9] with approval:

Appointment of a receiver is a drastic remedy, and while an application for a receiver is addressed in the first instance to the discretion of the court, the appointment ex parte and without notice to take over one's property, or property which is prima facie his, is one of the most drastic actions known to law or equity. It should be exercised with extreme caution and only where emergency or imperative necessity requires it. Except in extreme cases and where the necessity is plainly shown, a court of equity has no power or right to condemn a man unheard, and to dispossess him of property prima facie his and hand the same over to another on an ex parte claim.

The courts in Ontario have also been mindful of this need to be extra vigilant in granting *ex parte* orders in an insolvency context. It is generally recognized that in cases where rights are being displaced or affected, short of urgency, applicants should be given advance notice. In *Royal Oak Mines Inc., Re*,[10] Farley J. stated the following:

I appreciate that everyone is under immense pressure and have concerns in a CCAA application. However, as much advance notice as possible should be given to all interested parties ... At a minimum, absent an emergency, there should be enough time to digest material, consult with one's client and discuss the matter with those allied in interest — and also helpfully with those opposed in interest so as to see if a compromise can be negotiated ... I am not talking of a leisurely process over weeks here; but I am talking of the necessary few days in which the dedicated practitioners in this field have traditionally responded. Frequently those who do not have familiarity with real time litigation have difficulty appreciating that, in order to preserve value for everyone involved, Herculean tasks have to be successfully completed in head spinning short times. All the same everyone is entitled the opportunity to advance their interests. This too is a balancing question.

In light of this balancing of interests, the practice in Ontario has developed to a point that, short of exceptional circumstances, the parties affected by the applicant's proposed order, whether an order pursuant to *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*[11] or receivership orders, are typically given some advance notice of the pending application. This is particularly true in cases where there is a known solicitor of record for the interested party. In the present case, it is difficult to say whether sufficient and adequate evidence was proffered to demonstrate that urgent circumstances and a real risk of dissipation of assets existed. As Romaine J. indicated in her reasons, "...it [was] regrettable that the application did not take place in open chambers so that a record would be available."[12] Accordingly, in such circumstances, deference is accorded to the trier of fact. Romaine J. was in the best position to determine whether the test to grant an *ex parte* receivership order was met. Also, it is not clear from Romaine J.'s reasons why given the existence of a solicitor of record for the debtors that prior notice, of any kind, was not given to the debtors in this case. The granting of a receivership order is a serious remedy and those subject to it should, to the extent possible, have a right to due process.

Marc Lavigne[*]

***Romaine J.*:**

INTRODUCTION

1 On March 20, 2001, I granted an *ex parte* order appointing a receiver and manager of the property and assets of Merchants & Traders Assurance Company ("MTAC") and 586335 British Columbia Ltd. ("586335"), including certain assets pledged by MTAC and 586335 to Paragon Capital Corporation Ltd. MTAC, 586335 and the other defendants in this action brought an application to set aside this *ex parte* order. I declined to set aside, vary or stay the *ex parte* order and these are my written reasons for that decision.

SUMMARY

2 The *ex parte* order should not be set aside on any of the grounds submitted by the Defendants, including an alleged failure to establish emergent circumstances, a lack of candour or any kind of non-disclosure or misleading disclosure by Paragon.

Hearing the motion to appoint a receiver and manager *de novo*, I am satisfied that the receivership should continue on the terms originally ordered, and that the Defendants have not established that a stay of that receivership should be granted.

FACTS

3 On March 15, 2000, Paragon loaned MTAC $2.4 million. The loan was for a term of six months with an interest rate of 3% per month, and matured on September 15, 2000. MTAC was to make interest-only payments to Paragon in the amount of $72,000.00 per month.

4 The purpose of the loan was to allow MTAC to acquire 76% of the shares of Georgia Pacific Securities Corporation ("Georgia Pacific"), a Vancouver-based brokerage business. That transaction was completed. As security for the loan, MTAC pledged the following:

> a) an assignment of all of the property of MTAC and 586335, including the Georgia Pacific shares;
>
> b) a general hypothecation of the shares of Georgia Pacific owned by MTAC;
>
> c) a power of attorney granted by MTAC to Paragon appointing an agent of Paragon to be the attorney of MTAC with the right to sell and dispose of any shares held by MTAC;
>
> d) an assignment of mortgage-backed debentures;
>
> e) an assignment of a $200,000 US term deposit, which was stated to be held in the trust account of a lawyer by the name of Jamie Patterson;
>
> f) $250,000 to be held in trust by Paragon's counsel; and
>
> g) $986,000 in an Investment Cash Account at Georgia Pacific.

Paragon filed a General Security Agreement executed by MTAC by way of a financing statement at the Personal Property Registry on March 15, 2000. In addition, Paragon obtained personal guarantees of the loan from Garry Tighe, Insurcom Financial Corporation, 586335 and 782640 Alberta Ltd.

5 The loan was not repaid and, pursuant to the terms of the General Security Agreement, Paragon appointed a private receiver in January, 2001.

6 Subsequently, the parties entered into discussions resulting in a written Extension Agreement. The Extension Agreement acknowledged the balance outstanding under the loan on January 9, 2001 of $2,629,129.99 with a then per diem rate of $2,528.28 and acknowledged delivery of numerous demands and a Notice of Intention to Enforce Security pursuant to Section 244 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c.B-3, as amended

7 MTAC agreed pursuant to the Extension Agreement that all monies due and outstanding would be repaid by February 22, 2001. If the funds were not repaid, Paragon would be at liberty to enforce its security and take all steps it deemed necessary to collect the debt. MTAC agreed it would not oppose Paragon's realization of its security, including the appointment of a receiver over its assets, and that it would, if requested, work with Paragon and any person designated by Paragon to attempt to realize on the value of the Georgia Pacific shares in a commercially reasonable manner.

8 Pursuant to the terms of the Extension Agreement, the shares of Georgia Pacific owned by MTAC were delivered to counsel for Paragon.

9 It was also a term of the Extension Agreement that a discontinuance of the pending action would be filed and the appointment of the private receiver would be revoked. Both of these actions were undertaken by Paragon.

10 The loan was not repaid by February 22, 2001. As of June 26, 2001, $2,850,192.62 was outstanding. Paragon issued a new Statement of Claim on March 2, 2001. On March 16, 2001 counsel for MTAC, Insurcom, 782640, 586335, and Tighe filed a Statement of Defence and served it upon Paragon's counsel.

11 On March 20, 2001, Paragon applied for and was granted an *ex parte* order appointing Hudson & Company as receiver and manager of all of the assets and property of MTAC and 586335, including, specifically, the mortgage-backed debentures, $986,000 in a cash account, $200,000 in trust with a lawyer, the $250,000 paid to Paragon's counsel and the Georgia Pacific shares. The application was made in private chambers, and no court reporter was present. However, counsel for Paragon made his application based on affidavit evidence of Mr. Hudson and others and supported by a written "Bench Brief", all of which has been disclosed to the Defendants. All of the above-noted facts and additional information contained in the affidavits and Bench Brief were disclosed to me at the time of the *ex parte* application.

ANALYSIS

Should the ex parte receivership order have been granted?

12 Rule 387 of the *Alberta Rules of Court* provides that the court may make an *ex parte* order if it is satisfied that the delay caused by proceeding by notice of motion might entail serious mischief. The applicant must act in good faith and make full, fair, and candid disclosure of the facts, including those that are adverse to his position: *Hover v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.* (1999), 237 A.R. 30 (Alta. C.A.) at paragraph 23, referring to *Royal Bank v. W. Got & Associates Electric Ltd.* (1994), 150 A.R. 93 (Alta. Q.B.), at 102-3; (1997), 196 A.R. 241 (Alta. C.A.); leave to appeal granted (S.C.C.).

13 The Defendants submit that there was no urgency requiring an *ex parte* application. There was, however, affidavit evidence that led me to believe that the assets of MTAC and 586335 that had been pledged as security for the loan to Paragon were at risk, and that mischief could occur if an *ex parte* order was not granted.

14 There was, by way of example, evidence that the mortgage-backed debentures were not what they seemed.

15 There was evidence that Mr. Hudson had been advised by Mr. Tighe that his intention was to pay out the Paragon loan by transactions involving Georgia Pacific. Without elaborating on the status of Georgia Pacific at the time, as it is not a party to this litigation, the evidence with respect to potential activities involving this company was troubling, and justified a concern that the shares that comprised this asset may be at risk.

16 Further, Mr. Hudson deposed that Mr. Tighe was at first agreeable to Mr. Hudson and Paragon's counsel speaking to various parties, including officers of Georgia Pacific and Deloitte & Touche, to gather information. However, he withdrew that consent when Mr. Hudson and Paragon's counsel were actually in Vancouver, intending to speak to those parties.

17 There were also concerns arising over whether or not there actually was $200,000 held in trust by Mr. Patterson, who had ceased practising law and left the country.

18 There was evidence that the shares of Insurcom Financial Corporation, one of the guarantors of the Paragon loan, had been halted in trading and that the $986,000 that was supposed to be held in a Georgia Pacific cash account as security for the Paragon loan was missing.

19 The Defendants also submit that Paragon and its counsel and the proposed receiver failed to be candid and make full disclosure of the facts in the application. However, it is clear from the affidavits filed and from the Bench Brief that the disclosure given at the time of the *ex parte* order was extensive. It included reference to the fact that the proposed receiver, Mr. Hudson, had previously been appointed a private receiver for Paragon under the loan documentation, and that he and Paragon's counsel had been involved in negotiating and finalizing the Extension Agreement. In addition, counsel to Paragon disclosed that a defence to the Statement of Claim had been filed by counsel for the Defendants, and described the nature of the defences. I cannot find that there was any breach by the applicant for the *ex parte* order of its obligation of candour and frankness.

20 In hindsight, it is regrettable that the application did not take place in open chambers so that a record would be available. However, on the basis of the strength of the evidence before me, including evidence of the loan documentation and events that had transpired since the loan was put in place, together with the extensive affidavits and Bench Brief, I was satisfied that there was a reasonable basis on which I could hear the application on an *ex parte* basis. I was satisfied that there was reasonable apprehension of serious mischief and risk of disappearance or dissipation of assets. These concerns included the concern of interference with the activities of a regulated firm in a sensitive industry, where third party rights may well be affected. I therefore chose to exercise my discretion to grant the order *ex parte*, as is "within the prerogative of a judge to do in Alberta under our rules": *Canadian Urban Equities Ltd. v. Direct Action for Life*, [1990] A.J. No. 253 (Alta. Q.B.) at pages 7 and 8.

21 The *ex parte* order contains the usual provision allowing any party to apply on two clear days notice for a further or other order. The Defendants' right to bring their position before the court on very short notice was therefore reasonably protected. The Notices of Motion seeking orders to set aside or stay the *ex parte* order were not filed until May 8, 2001, and the motions were heard on their merits at the earliest time available to counsel to the parties and the court.

Should the receiver and manager appointed under the ex parte order been precluded from acting in this case due to conflict?

22 This issue is moot, given that on June 8, 2001 an order was granted replacing Hudson & Company as receiver and manager with Richter Allen and Taylor Inc. This was done with the consent of all parties other than the Defendants, who objected to the replacement, while continuing to maintain that Hudson & Company had a conflict. The Defendants make the same complaint about counsel to the former receiver and manager, who did not continue as counsel for the new receiver.

23 Despite the complaint of conflict of interest, the Defendants have not raised any evidence that the former receiver and manager or its counsel preferred Paragon to other creditors, or failed in a receiver's duty as a fiduciary or its duty of care, other than to submit that the receiver should not have been granted the power in the *ex parte* order to sell the assets covered by the order. This power of sale was, of course, subject to court approval, and also subject to review at the time the application was heard on its merits. It was not exercised during the time the *ex parte* order was in place, and representations were heard on its propriety for inclusion in the affirmed receivership order. While there may have been a potential for conflict in Hudson & Company's appointment, there is no evidence that Hudson & Company showed any undue preference to Paragon while serving as a receiver, or failed in its duties as receiver in any way.

24 The Defendants also submit that the Bench Brief used by Paragon's counsel in making the application for the *ex parte* order showed that such counsel was not impartial, but acted as an advocate on this application. Paragon's counsel did indeed advocate that a receiver should be appointed by the court, as he was retained to do, and there was nothing improper in him doing so. I have already said that full disclosure was made of the material facts in that application, including the previous involvement of both the proposed receiver and Paragon's counsel in this matter.

25 I therefore find that there was nothing wrong or improper in the appointment of Hudson & Company as receiver or in Paragon's previous counsel acting as receiver's counsel, or in their administration of the receivership. It may be preferable to avoid an appearance of conflict in these situations, but a finding of conflict or improper preference requires more than just the appearance of it. In situations where it is highly possible that the creditors will not be paid out in full, the use of a party already familiar with the facts to act as receiver may be attractive to all creditors. I note that it is not the creditors who raise the issue of conflict in this case, but the debtors.

Should the ex parte order now be set aside?

26 The general rule is that when an application to set aside an *ex parte* order is made, the reviewing court should hear the motion *de novo* as to both the law and the facts involved. Even if the order should not have been granted *ex parte*, which is not the case here, I may refuse to set it aside if from the material I am of the view that the application would have succeeded on notice: *Edmonton Northlands v. Edmonton Oilers Hockey Corp.* (1993), 15 Alta. L.R. (3d) 179 (Alta. Q.B.) (paragraphs 30 and 31).

27 The factors a court may consider in determining whether it is appropriate to appoint a receiver include the following:

a) whether irreparable harm might be caused if no order were made, although it is not essential for a creditor to establish irreparable harm if a receiver is not appointed, particularly where the appointment of a receiver is authorized by the security documentation;

b) the risk to the security holder taking into consideration the size of the debtor's equity in the assets and the need for protection or safeguarding of the assets while litigation takes place;

c) the nature of the property;

d) the apprehended or actual waste of the debtor's assets;

e) the preservation and protection of the property pending judicial resolution;

f) the balance of convenience to the parties;

g) the fact that the creditor has the right to appoint a receiver under the documentation provided for the loan;

h) the enforcement of rights under a security instrument where the security-holder encounters or expects to encounter difficulty with the debtor and others;

i) the principle that the appointment of a receiver is extraordinary relief which should be granted cautiously and sparingly;

j) the consideration of whether a court appointment is necessary to enable the receiver to carry out its' duties more efficiently;

k) the effect of the order upon the parties;

l) the conduct of the parties;

m) the length of time that a receiver may be in place;

n) the cost to the parties;

o) the likelihood of maximizing return to the parties;

p) the goal of facilitating the duties of the receiver.

Bennett, Frank, *Bennett on Receiverships*, 2nd edition, (1995), Thompson Canada Ltd., page 130 (cited from various cases)

28 In cases where the security documentation provides for the appointment of a receiver, which is the case here with respect to the General Security Agreement and the Extension Agreement, the extraordinary nature of the remedy sought is less essential to the inquiry: *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek*, [1996] O.J. No. 5088 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), paragraph 12.

29 It appears from the evidence before me that the Georgia Pacific shares may be the only asset of real value pledged on this loan. Shares are by their nature vulnerable assets. These shares are in a business that is itself highly sensitive to variations in value. At the time of the application, the business appeared to have been suffering certain financial constraints. The business is situated in British Columbia, and regulated by the Investment Dealers Association of Canada and other entities, giving additional force to the argument of the necessity of a court-appointed receiver. I also note the possibility that there will be a sizeable deficiency in relation to the loan, increasing the risk to Paragon as security holder.

30 The conduct of Mr. Tighe, the primary representative of the Defendants, supports the appointment of a receiver. Although the Defendants submit that the assets that are the subject of the order are secure, there is troubling evidence that the mortgage-

backed debentures appear to have questionable value, that the $200,000 that was supposed to be in Mr. Patterson's trust account does not exist, that the Georgia Pacific cash account that was supposed to contain $986,000 is not actually a cash account at all, but rather a trading account. Mr. Tighe's affidavits and cross-examination on affidavits do little to clear-up these matters, and instead add to the apprehension that these assets are of less value than represented to Paragon or that they in fact do not exist.

31 The balance of convenience in these circumstances rests with Paragon, which is owed nearly $3 million. There is no plan to repay any of this indebtedness, and no persuasive evidence that the appointment would cause undue hardship to the Defendants. As stated by Ground, J. in *Swiss Bank Corp. (Canada) v. Odyssey Industries Inc.*, [1995] O.J. No. 144 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at paragraph 31, the appointment of a receiver always causes some hardship to a debtor who loses control of its assets and risks their sale. Undue hardship that would prevent the appointment of a receiver must be more than this usual unfortunate consequence. Here, any proposed sale of an asset by the receiver must be brought before the court for approval and its propriety and necessity will be fully canvassed on its merits.

32 I am satisfied that the order appointing a receiver and manager should continue to stand on the same terms as the initial order.

Should the order be stayed?

33 To be granted a stay of an order pending appeal, an applicant must establish:

> a) that there is a serious issue to be tried on appeal;
>
> b) that the applicant would suffer irreparable harm and no fair or reasonable redress would be available if the stay is not granted; and
>
> c) that the balance of convenience is in favour of granting the stay after taking into consideration all of the relevant factors.

RJR-MacDonald Inc. v Canada (Attorney General) (1994), [1994] S.C.J. No. 17 (S.C.C.); *Schacher v. National Bailiff Services*, [1999] A.J. No. 599 (Alta. Q.B.).

34 On the issue of whether there is a serious issue to be tried, the Defendants have filed a defence to the claim raising several issues, the major one being that the effective rate of interest under the loan exceeds 60% and is therefore usurious. Affidavit evidence purporting to indicate such an illegal rate of interest was filed and served on Paragon the day before this application was heard. Counsel for Paragon submitted that the evidence is defective on its face, but I was not able to make a determination of that question on the basis of the sworn evidence before me. Another factor affecting this issue is that Paragon has brought an application for summary judgment, which had not been heard at the time of this application. Given my decision on the second and third parts of the test, I have assumed that there is a triable issue relating to the loan and, therefore, to the appointment of a receiver, despite the uncertainty existing at the time of the application.

35 With respect to irreparable harm, the Defendants submit that company assets are being tied up while the order is in force, and that therefore no payments are being made, allowing liabilities to inflate. The main assets that are the subject of this order are assets that were already pledged as security for the loan to Paragon and therefore no irreparable harm can be said to arise from this factor. The Defendants also submit that irreparable harm has been, and continues to be done to, Georgia Pacific's assets as a result of the order. The order affects only the Defendants' shares in George Pacific, and counsel for the Defendants does not represent Georgia Pacific. No objection to the order has been taken by Georgia Pacific itself, although management for Georgia Pacific is aware of the receivership. There is no evidence that the order is responsible for any harm to Georgia Pacific, aside from harm that may have arisen from the Defendants' precarious financial situation and the current status of this regulated business with the IDA.

36 The balance of convenience in this case favours Paragon. The only asset that appears to have any real value at this stage in the proceedings is the shares in Georgia Pacific, an asset that is vulnerable by its nature, in a highly regulated business carried on

in another jurisdiction. The order serves to maintain the status quo of that asset and prevent mischief caused by the possibility of illegal or imprudent manipulation or interference with the affairs of Georgia Pacific.

37 Finally, the Defendants submit that, if a stay is not granted, the order be varied to maintain the status quo of the three major assets. By requiring court approval of a sale of any of the assets, the right of the Defendants to argue their position on a sale at an appropriate time is reasonably protected.

38 I therefore decline to grant a stay, or to vary the order as granted.

39 If the parties are unable to agree on the matter of costs, they may be spoken to.

Application dismissed.

Footnotes

1 Alta. Reg. 390/68.

2 See rule 37.07(3) of the *Rules of Civil Procedure*, R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194.

3 R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. See rule 77 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Rules*, C.R.C. 1978, c. 368.

4 (1992), 126 A.R. 276 (Alta. Prov. Ct.) at 286.

5 *John Doe v. Canadian Broadcasting Corp.*, [1993] B.C.J. No. 1875 (B.C. S.C.).

6 *Imperial Broadloom Co., Re* (1978), 22 O.R. (2d) 129 (Ont. Bktcy.).

7 (2001), 25 C.B.R. (4th) 194 (Ont. C.A.) at 196.

8 (1997), [1997] A.J. No. 373 (Alta. C.A.) at para. 21.

9 (1954), 273 P.2d 399 (Id. S.C.) at 404.

10 [1999] O.J. No. 864 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at para. 6.

11 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36.

12 Para. 20.

* Associate in the Insolvency and Restructuring Group of Torys LLP. The author wishes to thank Sean Keating, student-at-law, for his invaluable research assistance in the preparation of this annotation.

Tab 2

2010 ABQB 242
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

Lindsey Estate v. Strategic Metals Corp.

2010 CarswellAlta 641, 2010 ABQB 242, [2010] A.W.L.D. 2495,
[2010] A.W.L.D. 2496, 186 A.C.W.S. (3d) 988, 67 C.B.R. (5th) 88

Ann Nosratieh as Executrix on behalf of the Estate of Robert Laird Lindsey, and Helmut and Eugenie Vollmer, as Representative Plaintiffs (Applicants) and Strategic Metals Corp., Capital Alternatives Inc., The Institute for Financial Learning, Group of Companies Inc., Milowe Allen Brost, Gary Sorenson, Graham Blaikie, Heinz Weiss, True North Productions LLC, Merendon de Honduras S.A. de C.V., Merendon Mining (Nevada) Inc., Merendon Mining (Colorado) Inc., Merendon de Venezuela C.A., Merendon de Peru S.A., Merendon de Ecuador S.A., Arbour Energy Inc., Syndicated Gold Depository S.A., Base Metals Corporation, Evergreen Management Services LLC, 3Sixty Earth Resources Ltd., Ward Capstick, Thayer Jackson, Kristina Katayama, Quatro Communication Corporation, ABC Corp 1 to 9 and John Doe 1 to 9 and Jane Doe 1 to 9 and other entities and individuals known to the Defendants (Respondents)

G.C. Hawco J.

Heard: December 14, 2009
Judgment: April 9, 2010 *
Docket: Calgary 0801-08351

Counsel: Frank R. Dearlove, Michael D. Mysak for Applicants
Kenneth J. Warren, Q.C., Tanya A. Fizzell for Respondents, Gary Sorenson, Merendon Mining Corporation Ltd., Merendon de Honduras S.A. de C.V., Merendon de Venezuela C.A., Merendon de Peru S.A., Merendon de Ecuador S.A.
Victor C. "Dick" Olson, Christopher Archer for Respondent, Arbour Energy Inc.
Richard Glenn for Respondent, Milowe Brost

Subject: Corporate and Commercial; Securities; Insolvency; Civil Practice and Procedure
Related Abridgment Classifications
Debtors and creditors
III Garnishment
III.5 Attachability
III.5.a Prejudgment attachment orders
Debtors and creditors
VII Receivers
VII.3 Appointment
VII.3.b Application for appointment
VII.3.b.iii Grounds
VII.3.b.iii.D Irreparable harm
Headnote
Debtors and creditors --- Receivers — Appointment — Application for appointment — Grounds
Securities commission held hearing against B and others with respect to allegations of misrepresentations and fraud relating to S Corp. — Commission found that S Corp. and it representatives were responsible for false or misleading statements in offering memoranda and they engaged in course of conduct that amounted to fraud on shareholders of S Corp. — B and associates received $500 million but none was recovered — Commission found that S Corp. was shell of company whose main but

undisclosed function was to finance S's mining ventures — Investors alleged that S and his companies and A Inc. were complicit in fraud perpetrated by B — S Corp. was placed into receivership — Investors brought application to have same receiver appointed over assets and undertakings of A Inc. and companies owned by B and S — Application granted — Although S was not involved directly in proceedings before commission, his companies and A Inc. were subject of investigation in view of flow of monies — B's companies, S's companies and A Inc. were involved in receipt and transfer of tens of millions of dollars which flowed freely between B's companies and S's companies — There was no evidence put forward by S to lend any credence to position that he was conducting legitimate business at arm's length with B — There was evidence which suggested contrary — S and his companies received over $50 million directly or indirectly from B and his companies and there was no accounting for any of these monies — B was directing mind of A Inc. and A Inc. shared address and director with S Corp. — There was real risk of irreparable harm in wasting of proposed receivership companies' assets if no order was made — Appointment of receiver would allow assets to be preserved which was essential given nature of claim — Balance of convenience favoured placement of receiver — Receiver would be able to preserve assets and further investigate whereabouts of any other assets — There was no evidence of any harm to companies by placement of receiver.

Debtors and creditors --- Garnishment — Attachability — Prejudgment attachment orders

Securities commission held hearing against B and others with respect to allegations of misrepresentations and fraud relating to S Corp. — Commission found that S Corp. and it representatives were responsible for false or misleading statements in offering memoranda and they engaged in course of conduct that amounted to fraud on shareholders of S Corp. — B and associates received $500 million but none was recovered — Commission found that S Corp. was shell of company whose main but undisclosed function was to finance S's mining ventures — Investors alleged that S and his companies were complicit in fraud perpetrated by B — Investors brought application for attachment order against S — Application granted — In order to obtain attachment order, investors had to show that there was reasonable likelihood of success at trial — S and his companies received between $50 and 80 million in investor funds — There had been no accounting with respect to these funds — S had to do more than simply say he never had contact with investors and that he did not solicit funds from them directly — Looking at conclusions of commission, there was little doubt that S and his companies were key element in raising and dissipation of funds — S appeared to have been key element in fraud perpetrated by B.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *G.C. Hawco J.*:

Alberta (Securities Commission) v. Brost (2008), 2008 ABCA 326, 2 Alta. L.R. (5th) 102, 2008 CarswellAlta 1325, 440 A.R. 7, 438 W.A.C. 7 (Alta. C.A.) — considered

APPLICATION by investors for receivership and attachment orders.

***G.C. Hawco J.*:**

Introduction

1 This is another episode in the efforts of the Applicants (and others) to attempt to locate and salvage assets acquired by a number of the Respondents using monies obtained from the Applicants and other investors.

2 On September 25, 2008, I appointed Michael J. Quilling as Receiver of Strategic Metals Corp. ("Strategic"). The Applicants now seek to have the same Receiver appointed over the assets and undertakings of The Institute for Financial Learning, Group of Companies Inc. ("IFFL"), Arbour Energy Inc. ("Arbour"), Merendon Mining Corporation Ltd. ("MMCL") and Syndicated Gold Depository S.A. ("SGD"). In addition, the Applicants seek an order granting the Receiver an Attachment Order or Mereva Injunction against Gary Sorenson ("Sorenson").

3 Mr. Quilling is appointed Receiver over all of the above named companies.

4 Mr. Quilling is granted an Attachment Order against Mr. Sorenson.

Background

5 By way of brief background, in May and June of 2006, a hearing took place before the Alberta Securities Commission ("ASC") against Milowe Allen Brost, one of two Respondents, and others, with respect to allegations of misrepresentations and fraud, relating to Strategic and investors in Strategic. On February 16, 2007, the ASC found that Strategic and a number of their representatives, specifically Edna Forrest, Carol Weeks, Bradley Regier and Mr. Brost, were responsible for false or misleading statements in an Offering Memoranda and that all of those parties engaged in a course of conduct that amounted to a fraud on the shareholders of Strategic. Mr. Sorenson was not a named party to the ASC hearing and did not appear, but was featured prominently in the deliberations and findings of the ASC.

6 What appears to be fairly clear from the ASC hearings is that Mr. Brost and Strategic were involved in a massive fraudulent scheme whereby the Applicants and other investors were induced to trust Mr. Brost and his associates with large amounts of money to be invested on their behalf. The information which was provided to the investors has been determined to be false. The total amount of money received by Mr. Brost and his associates was upward of $500 million. None has been recovered.

7 The decision of the ASC was appealed to our Alberta Court of Appeal. On October 3, 2008, the Court dismissed the appeals by Mr. Brost, Strategic and others. *Alberta (Securities Commission) v. Brost*, 2008 ABCA 326 (Alta. C.A.).

8 In paragraph 20 and 21 of the Court of Appeal's decision, it stated:

> 20. The Commission summarized the fraudulent scheme, and the roles of each of the Appellants played in that scheme as follows (at para. 13 of the *Sanctions Decision):*
>
> > ... Brost was at the centre of the activities of Strategic and alternatives and ... when he developed Strategic and his business plan, he had in mind the involvement of Gary Sorenson ("Sorenson") and Art (Arthur) Wigmore ("Wigmore") [neither of whom were involved in the proceedings before the Commission] and the funding of mining ventures of either or both of them (as indeed incurred in respect of ventures within the Merendon orbit).... [The] plan was to lure public investor (with promises of high returns and safety along with tantalizing references to gold) into putting money into securities of Strategic - essentially a shell of a company whose main (but undisclosed) function was to finance Sorenson's mining ventures. ...
>
> 21. The Commission described the materials that Alternatives put out to market Strategic shares as "highly promotional", "factually weak" and "clearly designed to entice investors." It noted blatant untruths and misrepresentations in those materials. For example, it noted that Strategic's shares were touted as being secured by precious metals when that clearly was not the case. The Commission was convinced that Strategic investors would not see the returns they expected to realize on their investments and was doubtful that they would recover much of the money they paid.

9 In paragraph 42, the Court concluded that it was reasonable for the ASC to conclude that each of the Appellants engaged in conduct that amounted to regulatory fraud. It went on to say, at para. 47:

> We are of the view that there was evidence upon which the Commission could reasonably conclude, on a balance of probabilities, that Brost was responsible for making false and misleading statements to, and participating in a fraud on, investors.

The Court went on to dismiss the Appeals.

10 Pursuant to a Notice of Hearing dated May 17, 2009, the ASC has commenced proceedings against Arbour, Brost, IFFL, Sorenson, MMCL and a number of additional parties. The Notice of Hearing alleges, among other things, that the Respondents engaged in a course of conduct relating to the securities of Arbour that perpetrated a fraud on Alberta investors. That hearing is on-going.

Receivership

11 As mentioned, Strategic has been placed into receivership. Mr. Quilling has delivered two reports. The Applicants and others are, or were, investors who allege that the Respondents conspired and acted jointly together to defraud them of funds through the use of an investment scheme that operated in the same way as the investment scheme alleged and referred to in the ASC hearing in 2006 and in the Strategic action.

12 The hearing before the ASC and the matters heard by this Court and our Court of Appeal concerned Strategic and Mr. Brost. Mr. Sorenson and his companies (collectively referred to as the Merendon Companies) were not parties to those proceedings. Neither was Arbour a party.

13 The Applicants allege that Mr. Sorenson, the Merendon companies and Arbour are complicit in the fraud perpetrated by Mr. Brost. They seek to have Mr. Quilling appointed as Receiver of the Respondent companies and seek to have an injunction or attachment order against Mr. Sorenson.

14 Mr. Sorenson states that he was not a party to the original ASC hearings and denies even having anything to do with Mr. Brost's investment schemes. He admits to having been involved in "arm's length business dealings with Mr. Brost and certain of his corporate entities" but denies having been in business with Mr. Brost. I must assume he means that he has not conducted any nefarious business with Mr. Brost.

15 Mr. Sorenson objects to the evidence of Mr. Quilling being received because Mr. Quilling relies upon certain findings of the ASC. He argues that the ASC was not bound by the rules of evidence. Contrary to those rules, the ASC received and relied upon hearsay evidence. As neither Mr. Sorenson nor his companies were parties to that proceeding, the evidence ought not be relied upon. Nor should any of the ASC reasoning or findings be relied upon.

16 The argument of the Applicants is that their case is not founded upon any hearsay evidence which may be found in Mr. Quilling's affidavit, but rather upon the evidence of the financial documents which had been placed before the ASC and which have been examined by Mr. Quilling, as well as the affidavit of Mr. Sorenson and his cross-examination upon that affidavit.

17 What must be born in mind is that the Court of Appeal of this province has considered the decisions of the ASC in some detail and has upheld those decisions with respect to its findings relating to false and misleading statements and misrepresentations of Mr. Brost and others involved with Strategic and the related corporate vehicles. The ASC found that the Offering Memoranda "conveyed a thoroughly misleading picture of what investors were buying into and what was happening with their money". The ASC further found that fraud had been perpetrated on the investors, who include the Applicants.

18 The Court considered the grounds of appeal of Mr. Brost and the others and, in its analysis referred to the arguments of the Appellants which included the objection to the admission of the hearsay evidence. In paragraph 34, the Court stated:"The Commission acknowledged that transcripts of investigative interviews are not the same as live testimony in that hearsay evidence can be problematic. It treated the impugned hearsay evidence with caution when assessing its value and reliability." In paragraph 36, the Court concluded that the Appellant's arguments (including its arguments to exclude the hearsay evidence) were without merit.

19 Clearly, Mr. Sorenson was not involved directly, as a party, in the previous proceedings before the ASC. Just as clearly, however, his Merendon companies and Arbour were the subject of investigation in view of the flow of monies that went through Mr. Brost, Strategic and his related companies including IFFL and Capital Alternatives. Mr. Brost was the principle of Strategic, Capital Alternatives, IFFL and Merendon Mining (Colorado). These companies and Mr. Sorenson's Merendon companies, and Arbour were involved in the receipt and transfer of tens of millions of dollars which flowed freely between Mr. Brost's companies and Mr. Sorenson's companies.

20 MMCL received over $26 million from Mr. Brost's company - IFFL. MMCL purchased a mine in Tulameen, British Columbia for $1 million and sold it shortly after to Strategic for $9.6 million. That mine was held out by Strategic to be a prime property. It was information and belief of Sgt. Fuller that it was a sham. That appears to be confirmed from Mr. Quilling's investigation.

21 Arbour went from an insolvent company to one loaning $39 million in investors funds in a matter of months to MMCL. Mr. Sorenson claims that MMCL extinguished its obligation to Arbour by selling back to Arbour 25% interest in Tar Sand Recovery Limited. Nothing has been presented by Mr. Sorenson to justify Tar Sand's worth.

22 SGD was another Brost/Sorenson company which received money from Strategic and then directed huge sums of money (over $50 million) to MMCL. Again, no accounting is offered by Mr. Sorenson. Mr. Sorenson simply says that these were monies lent to MMCL and that the debt was retired. The documentation as to how it was retired and the documentation with respect to the value of any assets transferred is sadly lacking. There is simply no evidence put forward by Mr. Sorenson to lend any credence to his position that he was conducting a legitimate business at arm's length with Mr. Brost. There is evidence which suggests the contrary.

23 Mr. Quilling's report of August 26, 2008 states that as a result of information he has received, the Merendon Mining operation in Honduras is a sham as well. I have already determined that the Tulameen mine is basically a sham.

24 Both Mr. Brost and Mr. Sorenson were shareholders of SGD which provided funds to MMCL. Mr. Sorenson was aware that funds were being provided to MMCL through SGD and that they were being sourced from IFFL.

25 SGD existed for the sole purpose of channelling tens of millions of dollars of IFFL members' money to MMCL in exchange for no discernable value.

26 Mr. Sorenson argues he is being tarred by Mr. Brost's brush yet says that he does not have to disprove what is alleged. He continues to argue that he had no involvement in Strategic. Yet, it was Mr. Brost's evidence that Mr. Sorenson initially agreed to, and did become, a director of Strategic.

27 Mr. Sorenson continues to assert that the Honduran mine is continuing to produce gold while the evidence of Mr. Quilling, as fully set out in his report, is that the mine is a sham.

28 Serious allegations have been made against Mr. Sorenson and his companies in these proceedings. Mr. Sorenson has filed an affidavit and has been cross-examined on it. However, he has failed to produce any documentation which would speak to the value of any companies owned by him or that would answer in any manner the allegations of either fraud or dissipation of assets within the companies. Indeed, neither Mr. Sorenson nor MMCL have put forth any independent or reliable evidence of legitimate operations or value in MMCL or any of its subsidiaries or to account for any of the tens of millions of dollars of investors funds that Mr. Sorenson admits that his companies received. His position is that "only" $26 million went to his companies through Mr. Brost and that these were arm's length transactions which were legitimately retired.

29 I am satisfied that Mr. Sorenson and his companies have indeed received over $50 million directly or indirectly from Mr. Brost and his companies. There is no accounting for any of these monies. Mr. Sorenson's explanation of repaying the $26 million loan lacks credibility.

30 With respect to Arbour, Mr. Brost was its directing mind. Arbour and Strategic shared an address and had at least one common director. Arbour received $820,000.00 from Strategic and has accounted for none of it. Arbour was used as a flow-through to send investment funds to Mr. Sorenson's company, MMCL. Arbour appears to be insolvent at this time. It is not carrying on business presently. It has been the recipient of at least $28 million from the Applicants and other investors. It gave that to MMCL. I have already referred to the transfer by MMCL to Arbour of an interest in Tar Sands Recovery Limited. This is another example of failure to document or establish in any manner a value. There has been no accounting for funds received.

31 The only assets which Mr. Sorenson claims to have comprises mining properties in Honduras and Equator which, according to Mr. Quilling's report, have no value. He claims that his house in Honduras is in his wife's name. He had been receiving $50,000 per month from MMCL until September 2009. However, he refuses to disclose any bank accounts or any information relating to any assets which he might have anywhere.

32 In determining whether it is just and convenient to appoint a Receiver, a Court should consider various factors such as:

a. whether irreparable harm might be caused if no order is made;

b. the risk to the parties;

c. the risk of waste debtor's assets;

d. the preservation and protection of property pending judicial resolution; and

e. the balance of convenience.

33 There is a real risk of irreparable harm in the wasting of the proposed receivership companies' assets. The proposed receivership companies are experienced at transferring money. The Applicants' evidence is that over $80 million was transferred to corporations controlled by Mr. Brost, Mr. Sorenson and others. None of the companies has accounted for any of the monies received. None of the companies has given this Court assurances that assets will not be transferred. All of the assets of MMCL and the Merendon companies are in Central and South America, outside the ability of this Court to supervise absentee appointment of a Receiver. The purpose of this action is the recovery of funds for investors. Without protection in place, I am satisfied that the ability to manage the affairs of and further investigate the proposed companies, there is a real risk that very little, if any, recovery will be possible.

34 The appointment of a Receiver will allow assets to be preserved. Given the nature of the claim, the preservation of the assets is essential. On Mr. Sorenson's evidence, neither MMCL nor any of the Merendon companies have any operations or assets in North America. Absent Court supervision through a Receiver, they may freely dissipate and shield assets from the investors/creditors.

35 With respect to the balance of convenience, I am of the view that it favours the placement of a Receiver. The Receiver will be able to preserve assets and further investigate the whereabouts of any other assets. His investigative power is essential. Tens of millions of dollars have been raised from investors. The whereabouts of the money is unknown. Large flows of funds between a number of the companies have been identified but the ultimate uses to which those funds have been put have not been identified.

36 I am simply not satisfied that any of the on-going business activities which the companies might be involved will be thwarted by the appointment of a Receiver. I see no evidence of any harm to these companies by the placement of a Receiver. A receivership order will therefore issue, appointing Mr. Quilling as the Receiver.

Attachment Order/Mereva Injunction

37 In order to obtain an Attachment Order, the Applicants must show that there is a reasonable likelihood of success at trial.

38 Mr. Sorenson appears to have gone to great lengths to make himself judgment-proof. He claims that he has not dissipated assets yet refuses to answer specific questions on his cross-examination with respect to asset dissipation or the presence of any bank accounts he may have.

39 I am satisfied that Mr. Sorenson and his companies have received somewhere between $50-80 million in investor funds from SGD, Strategic, Arbour and IFFL. There has been no accounting with respect to those funds. Mr. Sorenson simply denies that he was a cohort of Mr. Brost and argues that he has to prove nothing. He is correct with respect to the latter statement, but when forced with rather over-whelming evidence of Mr. Quilling and the conclusions of the ASC, together with the statements of Mr. Brost, Mr. Sorenson must do more than simply say that he never had any contact with these Applicants and that he did not solicit funds from them directly. When I looked at the conclusions of the ASC there is little doubt but that Mr. Sorenson and his companies were a key element in the raising and dissipation of those funds. He appears to have been a key element in the fraud perpetrated by Mr. Brost.

40 In the end result, I am satisfied that an Attachment Order is appropriate and such Order will issue together with the Receivership Order as indicated.

Application granted.

Footnotes

* Affirmed at *Lindsey Estate v. Strategic Metals Corp.* (2010), 2010 CarswellAlta 1049, 2010 ABCA 191 (Alta. C.A.).

Tab 3

2019 ABQB 545
Alberta Court of Queen's Bench

Schendel Management Ltd., Re

2019 CarswellAlta 1457, 2019 ABQB 545, [2019] A.W.L.D. 3043, [2019] A.W.L.D. 3044, [2020] 10 W.W.R. 443, 1 Alta. L.R. (7th) 385, 308 A.C.W.S. (3d) 472, 73 C.B.R. (6th) 13

In the Matter of the Notice of Intention to Make a Proposal of Schendel Mechanical Contracting Ltd

the Notice of Intention To Make a Proposal of Schendel Management Ltd.

the Notice of Intention To Make a Proposal of 687772 Alberta Ltd.

M.J. Lema J.

Heard: July 16, 2019
Judgment: July 19, 2019
Docket: Edmonton BK03-115990, BK03-115991

Counsel: Jim Schmidt, Katherine J. Fisher, for Debtor Companies
Dana M. Nowak, for Proposal Trustee
Pantelis Kyriakakis, Walker MacLeod, for Applicant, ATB

Subject: Insolvency
Related Abridgment Classifications
Bankruptcy and insolvency
IV Receivers
IV.1 Appointment
Bankruptcy and insolvency
VI Proposal
VI.1 General principles
Headnote
Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Proposal — General principles
Three related companies, major construction conglomerate, hit rough patch when work on one of their major projects was halted — Work stoppage affected companies' profitability, and eventually caused it to default on amounts owing to Alberta Treasury Branches (ATB), its principal lender, and ATB issued demand letters to companies and notices of intention to enforce security — Companies filed notice of intention to file proposal under s. 50.4(1) of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), triggering stay of enforcement of action by ATB and other creditors — Companies filed proposal — ATB applied for orders deeming joint proposal refused, lifting proposal stay of proceedings, and appointing receiver and manager — Application granted — Pursuant to s. 50(12) of BIA, proposal would not likely be accepted by creditors, and was deemed refused — ATB had true veto, it intended to vote no, and proposal would necessarily fail — ATB would vote no because it regarded proposal as unsatisfactory — Focus was on existing proposal — None of identified ATB steps showed absence of good faith or showed commercial unreasonableness — ATB was not attempting to pursue improper purpose, and was pursuing its interests and asserting its rights within bounds of and for purposes squarely within Canadian insolvency system — Given its secured position, BIA provisions governing secured creditors and approval of proposals, and proposal itself, and ATB was entitled to oppose proposal and seek deemed refused ruling — ATB believed, on reasonable or defensible or arguable grounds, that it would fare better by receivership than under proposal — ATB was not acting perversely or vindictively or otherwise than in its own economic interests, and it was

not pursuing any ulterior purposes — ATB established that proposal was unlikely to be approved and that, in circumstances, proposal should be deemed refused Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, s 50(12).

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Receivers — Appointment

Three related companies, major construction conglomerate, hit rough patch when work on one of their major projects was halted — Work stoppage affected companies' profitability, and eventually caused it to default on amounts owing to Alberta Treasury Branches (ATB), its principal lender, and ATB issued demand letters to companies and notices of intention to enforce security — Companies filed notice of intention to file proposal under s. 50.4(1) of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA), triggering stay of enforcement of action by ATB and other creditors — Companies filed proposal — ATB applied for orders deeming joint proposal refused, lifting proposal stay of proceedings, and appointing receiver and manager — Application granted — Appointing receiver and manager was warranted — Companies were large enterprise with complex construction projects underway — Coordinating and managing pursuit of receivables required expertise and resources of experienced receiver-manager, and recovery that way was likely to be more efficient and effective — ATB's security documents contemplated court appointing receiver-manager on companies' default, companies had defaulted, and ATB was almost certain to experience shortfall — ATB's affidavit evidence clearly outlined extent of companies' default, state of its various projects, and complex nature of work required to complete, collect or otherwise harvest its receivables — ATB's conduct did not reflect commercial unreasonableness or absence of good faith.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *M.J. Lema J.*:

Enirgi Group Corp. v. Andover Mining Corp. (2013), 2013 BCSC 1833, 2013 CarswellBC 3026, 6 C.B.R. (6th) 32 (B.C. S.C.) — distinguished

Hypnotic Clubs Inc., Re (2010), 2010 ONSC 2987, 2010 CarswellOnt 3463, 68 C.B.R. (5th) 267 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — considered

Laserworks Computer Services Inc., Re (1998), 1998 CarswellNS 38, (sub nom. *Laserworks Computer Services Inc. (Bankrupt), Re)* 165 N.S.R. (2d) 297, (sub nom. *Laserworks Computer Services Inc. (Bankrupt), Re)* 495 A.P.R. 297, 6 C.B.R. (4th) 69, 37 B.L.R. (2d) 226, 1998 NSCA 42, 165 N.S.R. (2d) 296 (N.S. C.A.) — considered

Marine Drive Properties Ltd., Re (2009), 2009 BCSC 145, 2009 CarswellBC 285, 52 C.B.R. (5th) 47 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Murphy v. Cahill (2013), 2013 ABQB 335, 2013 CarswellAlta 1490, 88 Alta. L.R. (5th) 69, 568 A.R. 80 (Alta. Q.B.) — considered

Paragon Capital Corp. v. Merchants & Traders Assurance Co. (2002), 2002 ABQB 430, 2002 CarswellAlta 1531, 316 A.R. 128, 46 C.B.R. (4th) 95 (Alta. Q.B.) — followed

Promax Energy Inc. v. Lorne H. Reed & Associates Ltd. (2002), 2002 ABCA 239, 2002 CarswellAlta 1241 (Alta. C.A.) — considered

Sport Maska Inc. v. RBI Plastique Inc./RBI Plastic Inc. (2005), 2005 NBQB 394, 2005 CarswellNB 635, (sub nom. *RBI Plastic Inc. (Bankrupt), Re)* 290 N.B.R. (2d) 278, (sub nom. *RBI Plastic Inc. (Bankrupt), Re)* 755 A.P.R. 278, 17 C.B.R. (5th) 244 (N.B. Q.B.) — considered

The Bank of Nova Scotia v. 1934047 Ontario Inc. (2018), 2018 ONSC 4669, 2018 CarswellOnt 12568 (Ont. S.C.J.) — considered

Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Rismani (2015), 2015 BCSC 596, 2015 CarswellBC 991, 25 C.B.R. (6th) 127 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

West Coast Logistics Ltd. (Re) (2017), 2017 BCSC 1970, 2017 CarswellBC 3014, 53 C.B.R. (6th) 68 (B.C. S.C.) — considered

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

Generally — referred to

s. 50(4) — referred to

s. 50(12) — considered

s. 50.4(1) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — considered

s. 62(2)(b) — considered

s. 69.1 [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 36(1)] — considered

s. 69.4 [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 36(1)] — considered

s. 243 — considered

s. 244 — considered

Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-36

Generally — referred to

Judicature Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. J-2

s. 13(2) — considered

Personal Property Security Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-7

s. 66 — considered

APPLICATION by secured creditor for orders deeming refused joint proposal made by three related corporations, lifting proposal stay of proceedings, and appointing receiver and manager.

***M.J. Lema J.*:**

A. Introduction

1 A secured creditor applies under ss. 50(12) and s. 69.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) for orders deeming refused a joint proposal made by three related corporations, lifting the proposal stay of proceedings, and appointing a receiver and manager. The corporations oppose all aspects. The proposal trustee provided stage-setting submissions but did not take a position.

2 I find, under ss. 50(12) BIA, that the application is not likely to be accepted by the creditors (and is thus deemed refused), that the corporations are bankrupt as a result, and that Pricewaterhousecoopers (PwC) should be appointed as receiver and manager of them. My reasoning follows.

B. Facts

3 The key facts for the purpose of this application are that:

• Schendel Mechanical Contracting Ltd, Schendel Management Ltd and 687772 Alberta Ltd (collectively Schendel) is a major construction conglomerate in Alberta;

• after decades of business success, Schendel hit a rough patch in fall 2018, when work on one of its major projects (the Grande Prairie Regional Hospital) was halted by Alberta;

• the work stoppage affected Schendel's profitability, eventually causing it to default on amounts owing to Alberta Treasury Branches, its principal lender since 2016. That prompted ATB to conduct an up-close review of Schendel's financial affairs, culminating in a meeting between Schendel and ATB officials on March 13, 2019;

• Schendel's takeaway from the meeting was that, while ATB had some concerns, they were not pressing, and that Schendel would have between three and six months to formulate a plan to address its financial strains;

• however, later that day, ATB issued to Schendel demand letters and notices of intention to enforce security effective March 23, 2019;

• on March 22, 2019 and in response, Schendel filed a notice of intention to file a proposal under s. 50.4(1) BIA, triggering a stay (under s. 69.1 *BIA*) of enforcement action by ATB and other creditors;

• on April 18, 2019, Mah J. granted a 45-day extension and dismissed an application by ATB to lift the stay and appoint a receiver or interim receiver;

• on June 3, 2019, Little J. granted an interim extension to allow time for a further extension application;

• on June 11, 2019, Yamauchi J. granted a further extension, to July 11, 2019;

• on July 10, 2019, Schendel filed a proposal to ATB and its other creditors;

• the proposal treats ATB's claim (approximately $22 million) in two segments: it gauges the secured portion of ATB's claim at $11.2 million and the unsecured portion at $11 million. ATB's secured claim is the sole occupant of Secured Class; its unsecured portion joins other unsecured creditors in steerage. (Various other secured creditors are excluded from the proposal);

• by virtue of the solo nature of its secured claim, ATB has a veto over the proposal i.e. if it votes no to the proposal, it will fail, per para 62(2)(b) *BIA*. (ATB does not contest that aspect);

• for whatever difference it makes, ATB may also have a veto in the unsecured class, at least for Mechanical;

• ATB contends that, with no order consolidating the affairs of the three Schendel companies for proposal purposes, Schendel was not authorized to file a joint proposal;

• assuming that a joint proposal is authorized, the creditors' meeting to vote on it is set for July 31, 2019;

• on July 12, 2019, ATB applied for the deemed-refusal and stay-lifting orders described at the outset and heard at the application on July 16, 2019;

• ATB intends to vote no at the meeting, based on having lost confidence in Schendel's management, on Schendel's ongoing losses, on concerns about preferential payments having been made to certain pre-NOI creditors, on losing access (under the proposal) to personal guarantees, and on its perception that it will fare better in a bankruptcy or receivership than under the proposal (among other grounds);

• it argues that, in light of that position, which it maintains is fixed, the failure of the proposal on July 31, 2019 is a foregone conclusion and that, accordingly, the proposal should be "deemed refused" under ss. 50(12) or the s. 69.1 stay should be lifted (or both), followed the appointment of PwC as receiver-manager; and

• as noted, Schendel is opposed, citing the possibility of an amended (and enhanced) proposal between July 16 and 31 and, more fundamentally, based on what is perceives as the commercial unreasonableness of and inequitable and improper conduct by ATB. It believes the proposal process should continue until July 31 at which time the proposal (existing or amended) can be voted on by all of its creditors.

C. Issues

4 The issues are:

1. whether the proposal should be deemed refused under ss. 50(12), which has three separate triggers (any one of which is sufficient):

• the debtor has not acted, or is not acting, in good faith and with due diligence;

- the proposal will not likely be accepted by the creditors; or
- the creditors as a whole would be materially prejudiced if the application under this subsection is rejected;

2. in any case, whether the s. 69.1 stay should be lifted under s. 69.4, which has two separate triggers (either of which is sufficient):

- the creditor is likely to be materially prejudiced by the continued operation of s. 69.1; or
- it is inequitable on other grounds to make such a declaration; and

3. if ss. 50(12) is satisfied (in which case Schendel will be deemed bankrupt and ATB, as a secured creditor, will be free to enforce its security) or if the stay is lifted (permitting the same thing), ATB intends to enforce its security, and the issue becomes whether PwC should be appointed receiver and manager of Schendel.

D. Analysis

5 I start by examining the second branch of ss. 50(12), namely, whether the proposal will not likely be accepted by the creditors. (I see ss 50(12) as the more fundamental provision: if it applies, the proposal proceeding is eclipsed. The "stay lift" application contemplates an ongoing proposal.)

6 The answer is yes: the proposal will not likely to be accepted — in fact, it is almost *guaranteed* not to be accepted.

7 My reasoning is outlined below.

ATB veto

8 ATB has a true veto, which Schendel acknowledges: if ATB votes no, the proposal will necessarily fail. (ATB is the only creditor in the "Affected Secured Creditors" class, and the proposal require a yes vote by ATB for the proposal to succeed: Article 9.1.)

9 ATB intends to vote no. Its evidence is that that position will not change i.e. it would necessarily vote no at the July 31 meeting (if it occurs).

10 It would vote no because it regards the proposal as unsatisfactory, for reasons including:

- it is effectively being asked to take a 50 per cent discount on its claim;
- the "secured" portion of its claim will be replaced by two unsecured promissory notes, the payment of one of which depends on the (uncertain) outcome of certain events;
- the unsecured portion of its claim may be effectively blocked by the proposal mechanics;
- ATB already has first-position security on the assets out of which Schendel proposes to pay it under the proposal;
- it undercuts ATB's recourse against five guarantees provided by individuals associated with the Schendel; and
- overall, ATB believes it will fare better under a bankruptcy.

Uncertainty over possible amendments

11 While Schendel's evidence includes the details of a potential deal with a third party, which it described as "possibly" leading to a sweetened amended proposal, the evidence does not disclose the (even estimated) timing of the deal, its potential terms, the likelihood of consummation, or by how much the proposal's terms might be enhanced as a result.

12 Pointing to almost 40 possible deals or other lifelines disclosed by the Schendel's evidence, none of which came to fruition and the vague details of the latest potential deal, ATB sees next-to-no chance of an enhanced proposal coming forward at this stage.

Focus of ss 50(12) BIA on proposal "as is"

13 In any case, the focus is on the existing proposal. Subsection 50(12) refers to "the proposal" being deemed refused if the court is satisfied that "the proposal" will not likely be accepted i.e. nothing in the provision contemplates an amendment or how it might be received by the creditors.

14 Where a creditor seeks to have the proposal deemed refused, it is effectively saying that:

- it does not support the proposal; *and*
- it sees no prospect of an acceptable amended proposal.

15 Otherwise, the creditor would presumably be prepared to wait, through to the vote meeting, to see if worthwhile amendments might be proposed.

16 Subsection 50(12) allows a veto creditor in such circumstances (opposed to proposal; no prospect of acceptable amendments) to fast-forward to the inevitable result i.e. the proposal's termination.

17 The proposal proponent's reaction, as here, may be to say "wait, there may be a better proposal soon." The answer to that is:

- this is the proposal it made;
- the focus of the ss 50(12) exercise is the proposal *as filed*;
- the proposal cannot be withdrawn (ss 50(4) BIA);
- the applicant creditor had the option of waiting, until the vote meeting, for proposal "sweetening";
- if the applicant perceived the likelihood or even a real possibility of worthwhile amendments, it would not have brought the "deemed refused" application;
- even if it had seen such likelihood or possibility, it is entitled to balance the potential upside of waiting against the downside e.g. the costs associated with waiting;
- if the debtor had needed more time (i.e. to put forward a different, and better, proposal), it had the option (as here) of seeking another extension of the notice-of-intention period (six-month maximum had not been reached);
- having not done so (instead, filing the proposal now under review), the debtor must live with that proposal. For the ss. 50(12) exercise, *that* proposal is the only slide under the microscope. The possibility of a different, and better, slide is *not* a factor;
- in other words, by laying down a proposal, the proponent takes the risk that a creditor (or group of creditors) will say "this is not good enough" and move for termination under ss 50(12). The section weighs who is supporting and who is not and whether the outcome at the voting stage is "likely" refusal; and
- here, with ATB having an effective veto, its "opposed" stance is determinative: *this* proposal will fail. The possibility of a different proposal down the road does not enter into the equation.

Subsection 50(12) exists for a reason

18 If Parliament had intended an "unabridgeable" period between the proposal filing and the vote meeting (whether to ensure "full consideration" by the creditors, an opportunity for the debtor to propose amendments, or otherwise), it would not have included the "deemed refused" element in ss 50(4).

Case law recognizes impact of veto in "deemed refused" scenarios

19 In materially identical circumstances to those here, LaVigne J. held in *Sport Maska Inc. v. RBI Plastique Inc./RBI Plastic Inc.* [1] :

> *Sport Maska* [the veto-position creditor] asserts that the Proposal will not succeed, as there is no chance [it] will accept this Proposal, or any Proposal made by RBI. It therefore submits that it is not necessary or indeed practical, that a meeting of creditors be held, since it is already known that [it] will vote to defeat the Proposal.
>
> *It is obvious that no plan of arrangement can succeed without [its] approval. There is no useful purpose to be served in putting a plan of arrangement to a meeting of creditors if it is known in advance it cannot succeed.*
>
> *It is apparent that Sport Maska is overwhelmingly opposed to the plan. No persuasive argument was put forward as to why the vote should proceed in those circumstances.*
>
> *I am of the view that it is fruitless to proceed to a further stage with this Proposal.*
>
> RBI argues that while it may be appropriate for the Court to use its discretion when the Proposal has not yet been tabled, the Court should not use its discretion in the present case since RBI has made its Proposal and a meeting date has been set. I find that *it is easier for the Court to make a finding as to what the creditors are likely to do when the terms of the Proposal are known, and the meeting of the creditors is set to occur in the very near future such as in situations contemplated in subsection 50(12)*, then when the terms of the Proposal are unknown and the date of the meeting of creditors is to happen sometime later.
>
> RBI also argued that it may obtain sufficient financing to pay off completely the debt actually owed to Sport Maska. In my view, that is highly unlikely considering the evidence presently before this Court.
>
> *A creditor does not have to show beyond certainty that a Proposal would be rejected in order to be successful on a Motion under subsection 50(12). A creditor simply has to show that the Proposal would not likely be accepted by the creditors.*
>
> Therefore, on a balance of probabilities, based on the evidence before this Court, I am satisfied that the Proposal that was filed by RBI will not likely be accepted by the creditors. [emphasis added]

20 *Sport Maska* is anchored on a body of case law (reviewed in the decision) taking the same approach: where the writing is on the wall (with a veto-position creditor steadfastly opposed), the proposal may be, and has been, deemed refused or the proceedings otherwise terminated.

Same approach taken under CCAA

21 The same approach has been taken under the *Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act*: see, for example, the analysis of Butler J. in *Marine Drive Properties Ltd., Re* [2] :

> The purpose of the ***CCAA*** is to facilitate the making of a compromise or arrangement between an insolvent debtor company and its creditors to enable the company to stay in business or to complete the business that it was undertaking. The court must play a supervisory role, preserving the status quo until a compromise or arrangement is approved, or until it is evident that it is doomed to failure: ***Chef Ready Foods Ltd. v. Hongkong Bank of Canada*** (1990), 1990 CanLII 529 (BC CA), 51 B.C.L.R. (2d) 84, 4 C.B.R. (3d) 311 (C.A.).

> *In this case, it is evident at this stage that a compromise or arrangement is very unlikely to be acceptable to the respondents who would have to vote in favour of any arrangement if it is to be approved*. The Petitioners ran out of money more than a year ago; they have been attempting, without any success, to sell their land holdings, arrange financing, and find a new partner during that time. Their inability to find financing, the subsequent falling real estate market in B.C. and the global credit crunch, have seriously impacted the Petitioners. There can be no doubt that the situation is worse now than it was six months ago. At that time, the Petitioners and the Syndicate could not get subsequent chargeholders to agree to a proposed arrangement regarding some of the Wyndansea Lands. The chances of any kind of agreement now being reached are much less. In addition, all of the first mortgagees are now opposed to any compromise. A number have brought motions to set aside the Order, while others have indicated their support for this application. They represent well over two-thirds of the secured creditors. *In these circumstances, there is no reason to continue the Order. I am satisfied that any arrangement is doomed to fail.* [emphasis added]

Good faith

22 Schendel argues that ATB has not acted in good faith or in a commercially reasonable way during their dealings relating to the fall-out of the halting, in September 2018, of work on the Grande Prairie Hospital project, through to mid-March 2019, when ATB demanded repayment. In particular it says that "ATB's conduct . . . was not consistent with it proposing to take immediate steps to enforce its security" (Schendel brief, p 4). On that aspect, it points to:

- its ATB account manager advising over the course of fall 2018 to spring 2019 that ATB would work cooperatively with Schendel to restructure its loan commitments;

- Schendel believing, in late February 2019, that its account with ATB was still in the hands of the account manager i.e. not under the effective control of ATB's special-credit group i.e. ATB did not make plain to it that the special-credit group was involved;

- an early March 2019 meeting where ATB advised that it was patient, was working through the issues, and was considering parking Schendel's debt;

- at a Schendel-ATB meeting on March 13, 2019, ATB outlining restructuring steps for Schendel with a three- to six-month horizon, starting later in March, once Schendel had provided certain information to ATB;

- at the same meeting, ATB advising Schendel that "this [was] not the end", instead, was part of the process and restructuring;

- at that meeting, and although ATB did disclose an intention to seek a receivership if certain conditions of the three- to -six month restructuring period were not achieved, it making no mention then of an intention to issue payment demands;

- ATB obtaining payables information requested at that meeting (understood by Schendel to assist in working through the restructuring period) and using it as evidence of Schendel's inability to carry on business; and

- later on March 13, 2019, ATB issuing demand letters and s. 244 *BIA* (intention to enforce security) notices.

23 Schendel maintains that, if it had known earlier that ATB had shifted to viewing the Schendel loans as seriously troubled, it would have taken more, and earlier, restructuring steps.

24 It also points to ATB demanding "commercially unreasonable" terms in proposed forbearance agreements (before the NOI was filed) that ultimately led nowhere.

25 On the issue of a creditor's entitlement to pursue loans in default and to enforce security to recover those loans without having to pass a "good-faith enforcement" test (i.e. beyond providing adequate notice), see, for example, *The Bank of Nova Scotia v. 1934047 Ontario Inc.* [3] and *Toronto-Dominion Bank v. Rismani* [4], as well as *Good Faith as an Organizing Principle*

in Contract Law: Bhasin v Hrynew — Two Steps Forward and One Look Back, JT Robertson, [2015] 93 Cdn Bar Rev 809 at 842-844.

26 I note as well that academic commentary on the subject of creditors acting in good faith in insolvency proceedings has not suggested good-faith testing of creditors voting on proposals or arrangements i.e. outside of the "improper purpose" (i.e. abuse of system) contexts discussed below. In "*What Does "Good Faith" Mean in Insolvency Proceedings*?" [5], the authors suggest that imposing an explicit "vote in good faith" duty on creditors may "ultimately have a paralyzing effect on negotiations, add greater litigation costs, impair efficiency, and alter the carefully calibrated balance between the rights of creditors and their insolvent debtors."

27 See also Professor Janis P. Sarra's article "*Requiring Nothing Less than Good Faith in Insolvency Proceedings*" [6], where she proposes a good-faith duty for creditors, but not to the extent of weighing voting decisions beyond "improper purpose" contexts.

28 In any case, I find that none of the identified ATB steps, alone or collectively, show an absence of good faith or show commercial unreasonableness. ATB had no duty to advise Schendel who at ATB was running or reviewing its account at any particular time. ATB was indeed working with, and funding, Schendel through a financial crunch for many months before and even after the hospital-work halt. [7] It was entitled to intensify its scrutiny of Schendel's loans and overall business condition as it did, to obtain more information via that scrutiny, and to demand payment (in light of commitment-letter defaults and, in any case, the demand character of the loans here) when it did, and to notify Schendel of its intention to enforce security per the *BIA*-prescribed notice period. ATB had no duty to forbear from enforcing its rights.

29 As for whether Schendel might have been able to pursue restructuring earlier and more effectively, and assuming that to be so, Schendel knew its own financial condition throughout. It was not incumbent on ATB to guide Schendel's rescue efforts. In any case, Schendel pointed to no material difference that earlier restructuring efforts might have made.

30 In any case, Schendel ended up filing a proposal, regardless of any perceived difficulties with ATB's conduct. That filing triggered a right for ATB (in fact, any Schendel creditor) to apply under ss. 50(12) for "deemed refusal." The narrow test (as noted) is whether the proposal is unlikely to be accepted.

31 As Schendel acknowledges, ATB is the sole occupant of the secured class, and the support of that class is necessary for proposal approval. Those are just "givens" in the circumstance here i.e. reflect ATB's position as Schendel's principal lender, its security, and the *BIA*'s treatment of secured creditors in proposals i.e. are not a function of ATB's conduct in its dealings with Schendel.

32 As for how ATB is using its veto position derived from those circumstances (i.e. to seek a "proposal deemed refused" ruling), Schendel argues that that decision is commercially unreasonable and inequitable. In support it cites cases such as *West Coast Logistics Ltd. (Re)* [8] and *Laserworks Computer Services Inc., Re* [9]

33 The Alberta Court of Appeal endorsed the *Laserworks* approach to "improper purpose" in *Promax Energy Inc. v. Lorne H. Reed & Associates Ltd.* [10]:

> [2] Counsel for the Appellant has fairly conceded that if we agree with the chambers judge on the issue of collateral or improper purpose, we would find against the Appellant on this central issue, resulting in a dismissal of the appeal. We agree with the chambers judge on this point where, relying on ***Re Laserworks Computer Services Inc***. [citation omitted], he found that *the proposal for annulment by the Appellant was conceived for a purpose not intended or contemplated by the legislation.*
>
> [3] In so concluding, the chambers judge had the advantage of thorough argument on the issues of breach of the proposal and material non-disclosure. The chambers judge acknowledged a legitimate business purpose in proposing the annulment. He

> also properly defined the purpose of the legislation: to provide the orderly and fair distribution of the property of a bankrupt. *Finally, he found that the collateral purpose was "to get out from under the royalties encumbering this production."*
>
> [4] This finding, mindful of the standard of review applicable by this Court, must result in the dismissal of the appeal. [emphasis added]

34 Those cases are distinguishable. They deal with creditors attempting to use the insolvency system for an improper purpose e.g. attempting to drive a competitor out of business or escaping from a royalty regime.

35 No evidence here showed that ATB was attempting to pursue an improper purpose, whether within the meaning of those cases or otherwise. Instead, ATB was pursuing its interests and asserting its rights *within the bounds of, and for purposes squaring with, the Canadian insolvency system* i.e. recovering its loans.

36 In *Hypnotic Clubs Inc., Re* [11] , Cumming J. held:

> The intent and policy underlying the BIA is that *creditors* should consider and *vote* upon a *proposal* advanced pursuant to a NOI as they see fit in their own *self interest*. . . .
>
> . . .
>
> . . . the underlying policy of the BIA [includes] letting creditors *vote* as they choose in respect of accepting or rejecting a *proposal* .... [emphasis added]

37 Given its secured position, the *BIA* provisions governing secured creditors and the approval of proposals, and the proposal itself, ATB is entitled to oppose the proposal and, on the basis of that opposition, seek a "deemed refused" ruling.

38 By ATB's calculations it foresees materially greater recoveries in a bankruptcy or receiver than via the proposal. The proposal trustee is currently reviewing the "bankruptcy versus proposal" outcomes and is due to report shortly on that. Schendel does not agree with ATB; it filed the proposal on the basis it would produce a more favourable outcome for all the creditors, including ATB, than bankruptcy. It points to recovery estimates showing that ATB may fare better under the proposal than its low-end estimate of receivership recovery and may even recovery (slightly) more than its high-end estimate.

39 I make no ruling on the respective anticipated recoveries i.e. what is the likely better avenue recovery-wise. I simply note that ATB believes, on reasonable, or at least defensible, or at least arguable, grounds, that it will fare better by a receivership than under the proposal i.e. ATB is not acting perversely or vindictively or otherwise than in its own economic interests i.e. it is not pursuing any ulterior purposes.

40 To summarize here, I find that ATB has been acting in good faith and in a commercially reasonable way, including in deciding to oppose the proposal and seek a "deemed refused" ruling.

Enirgi Group Corp. v. Andover Mining Corp. ***also distinguishable***

41 Schendel also cited this decision. [12] It too is distinguishable, concerning a clash between a request for more time to file a proposal and a creditor seeking to terminate the proposal proceedings. Steeves J. found that the debtor should have more time to assemble its proposal and that the creditors should wait for it i.e. not effectively vote it down "sight unseen."

42 In the current case, ATB has seen the proposal and rejects it. The wait-and-see dimension of *Andover* provides no guidance here.

Conclusion on "proposal deemed refused" application

[new para] For these reasons, I find that ATB has established that the proposal is unlikely to be approved and that, in the circumstances here, the proposal should be deemed refused.

E. Appointment of receiver

43 ATB also applied to have PwC appointed as receiver and manager of Schendel. It invokes s. 243 *BIA* and s. 13(2) of the Judicature Act. Schendel opposes.

Test for appointing a receiver

44 In *Paragon Capital Corp. v. Merchants & Traders Assurance Co.*[13], Romaine J held:

> The factors a court may consider in determining whether it is appropriate to appoint a receiver include the following:
>
> a) whether irreparable harm might be caused if no order were made, although it is not essential for a creditor to establish irreparable harm if a receiver is not appointed, particularly where the appointment of a receiver is authorized by the security documentation;
>
> b) the risk to the security holder taking into consideration the size of the debtor's equity in the assets and the need for protection or safeguarding of the assets while litigation takes place;
>
> c) the nature of the property;
>
> d) the apprehended or actual waste of the debtor's assets;
>
> e) the preservation and protection of the property pending judicial resolution;
>
> f) the balance of convenience to the parties;
>
> g) the fact that the creditor has the right to appoint a receiver under the documentation provided for the loan;
>
> h) the enforcement of rights under a security instrument where the security-holder encounters or expects to encounter difficulty with the debtor and others;
>
> i) the principle that the appointment of a receiver is extraordinary relief which should be granted cautiously and sparingly;
>
> j) the consideration of whether a court appointment is necessary to enable the receiver to carry out its' duties more efficiently;
>
> k) the effect of the order upon the parties;
>
> l) the conduct of the parties;
>
> m) the length of time that a receiver may be in place;
>
> n) the cost to the parties;
>
> o) the likelihood of maximizing return to the parties;
>
> p) the goal of facilitating the duties of the receiver.
>
> Bennett, Frank, ***Bennett on Receiverships***, 2nd edition, (1995), Thompson Canada Ltd., page 130 (cited from various cases).

> In cases where the security documentation provides for the appointment of a receiver, which is the case here with respect to the General Security Agreement and the Extension Agreement, the extraordinary nature of the remedy sought is less essential to the inquiry [authority omitted].

45 In *Murphy v. Cahill* [14], Veit J updated that factor list, noting that:

> . . . the current [2011] edition of Bennett emphasizes, in relation to the second factor, the risk to the security holder, that "*the court may not consider this factor to be important if there is no danger or jeopardy to the security holder or in other words, there is a substantial equity that will protect the security holder*". ... One factor which is not mentioned in the *Paragon* list is "the rights of the parties [to the property]". Similarly, in relation to the factor of the effect of the order on the parties, the current edition of Bennett adds "If a receiver is appointed, its effect may be devastating upon the parties and their business and, where the business has to be sold, the appointment of a receiver may have a detrimental effect upon the price". Along the same lines, in relation to the length of the order, the current edition of Bennett adds " . . . where a claimant moves for an order appointing a receiver for a short period, say six weeks, the court is reluctant to make such an appointment as it has devastating effects on the parties". Finally, the current edition of Bennett adds the following factor: "(18) the secured creditor's good faith, commercial reasonableness of the proposed appointment and any questions of equity." [emphasis added]

Arguments

46 ATB argues that appointing a receiver-manager is warranted because:

- "the debtors are unable to continue as viable entities or continue operations as
    - the Proposal is not viable;
    - the Debtors operate at a loss;
    - the Proposal will not be approved by [ATB]; and
    - the Proposal cannot, even by its own terms, be implemented;
- [ATB] is the Debtors' senior secured and fulcrum creditor;
- [ATB] has lost all confidence in management of the Debtors and does not support the Proposal;
- [ATB] has valid and serious concerns regarding the preservation and protection of the Property, especially following the determination and undeniable conclusion that the Debtors' NOI Proceedings and the Proposal are doomed to fail";
- a receiver-manager is needed to take charge of Schendel's affairs and to coordinate and manage the pursuit of Schendel's construction (and any other) receivables arising out of multiple projects and involving multiple competing parties;
- a receiver-manager will be better able to preserve, and maximize the recovery out of, Schendel's assets overall, compared to ATB enforcing via actions on its individual security elements (general security agreement, mortgage, and so on); and
- ATB's security documents contemplate the appointment of a court-appointed receiver on default;

47 Schendel opposes, arguing that:

- a receiver should be appointed only where it is "just and equitable in the circumstances";
- "jurisdiction to appoint a receiver ought to be exercised sparingly";

• per s. 66 *PPSA*, security-agreement rights "shall be exercised or discharged in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner";

• ATB has not provided evidence to support its receiver-related arguments; and

• more fundamentally, "ATB is estopped and precluded from its conduct, particularized [in its application brief and as summarized above], from seeking the appointment of a receiver. Its position is "manifestly unreasonable from a commercial perspective, and it ought not to be permitted to take further steps to enforce its security."

Applying the "appointment of receiver" factors here

48 I find that appointing a receiver and manager (collectively "receiver" below) is warranted here. I first note that many of the factors identified above do not apply here, where Schendel is now bankrupt i.e. has lost the capacity to run its affairs.

In any case, I rely on these factors:

• Schendel is a large enterprise with complex construction projects underway;

• coordinating and managing the pursuit of its receivables, including determining whether further resources should be invested to complete any unfinished projects, requires the expertise and resources of an experienced receiver-manager;

• recovery that way is likely to be more efficient and effective than via enforcing ATB's individual security elements;

• ATB's security documents contemplate the Court appointing a receiver-manager on Schendel's default;

• Schendel has defaulted, and to the extent that ATB is almost certain to experience a shortfall;

• ATB's affidavit evidence plainly outlines the extent of Schendel's default, the state of its various projects, and the complex nature of the work required to complete, collect or otherwise harvest its receivables; and

• as for Schendel's fundamental objection, I have already found that ATB's conduct does not reflect commercial unreasonableness or an absence of good faith.

F. Conclusion

49 Schendel has worked extremely hard to find a lifeline that would allow it to make peace with ATB and continue in business. Unfortunately, those efforts did not succeed.

50 Canadian insolvency law recognizes that, in circumstances where a proposal or arrangement is likely doomed to fail, a veto creditor or group of creditors can accelerate the restructuring process to recognize that reality.

51 That applies here. ATB has established that Schendel's proposal is unlikely to be approved and that, in the circumstances, a "deemed refused" order is warranted, and also that a receiver-manager should be appointed.

52 ATB has nominated PwC to serve as receiver-manager. Schendel did not propose anyone else.

53 ATB seeks PwC's appointment on what it described as the template, or standard, receiver-manager order. I have reviewed the draft order attached to ATB's application and find it to be in order.

54 I note that, under section 33 of the draft order, "any interested party may apply to this Court to vary or amend this Order on not less than 7 days' notice to the Receiver . . . "

G. Closing note

55 I thank all counsel for their very helpful briefs and submissions.

56 On a final house-keeping note, I grant the order sought by Ms. Fisher in her July 17, 2019 email (concerning the sealing of a certain affidavit).

Application granted.

Footnotes

1 2005 NBQB 394 (N.B. Q.B.) at paras 36-43

2 2009 BCSC 145 (B.C. S.C.) at paras 31 and 32

3 2018 ONSC 4669 (Ont. S.C.J.) at paras 13-15

4 2015 BCSC 596 (B.C. S.C.) at paras 31-37

5 Rogers, LA, Sieradzki D, and Kanter M, Journal of Insolvency in Canada, Vol 4 [2015] 55 at 77

6 2014 Annual Review of Insolvency Law (ed Janis P Sarra)

7 Affidavit of Alex Corbett filed April 4, 2019, paras 31-41

8 2017 BCSC 1970 (B.C. S.C.)

9 1998 NSCA 42 (N.S. C.A.)

10 2002 ABCA 239 (Alta. C.A.)

11 2010 ONSC 2987 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) at paras 33 and 36

12 2013 BCSC 1833 (B.C. S.C.)

13 2002 ABQB 430 (Alta. Q.B.) at paras 26-32

14 2013 ABQB 335 (Alta. Q.B.) at para 71

Tab 4

2010 BCSC 477
British Columbia Supreme Court [In Chambers]

Textron Financial Canada Ltd. v. Chetwynd Motels Ltd.

2010 CarswellBC 855, 2010 BCSC 477, [2010] B.C.W.L.D. 4567, [2010] B.C.W.L.D. 4568, [2010] B.C.J. No. 635, 67 C.B.R. (5th) 97, 91 C.P.C. (6th) 171

Textron Financial Canada Limited (Plaintiff) and Chetwynd Motels Ltd., Northern Hotels Limited Partnership, Northern Hotels GP Ltd., Pomeroy Enterprises Ltd., 711970 Alberta Ltd., William Robert Pomeroy and Carrie Langstroth (Defendants)

Willcock J.

Heard: February 10, 2010
Judgment: April 9, 2010
Docket: Vancouver S100268

Counsel: W.E.J. Skelly, B. La Borie for Plaintiff
A. Brown for Defendants

Headnote

Debtors and creditors --- Receivers — Appointment — General principles

Defendants C Ltd. and NHLP built, owned, and operated hotel — Plaintiff lent money to C Ltd. for development and construction of hotel on terms in loan agreement — C Ltd. executed promissory note — Other transactions were executed as additional security — Default occurred — Plaintiff demanded payment from C Ltd. and NHLP, issued notice of intention to enforce security under s. 244 of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, and made demand upon defendant guarantors — Plaintiff brought action — Plaintiff brought application for, inter alia, order appointing receiver — Application granted in part — Just and convenient to grant receivership order — As parties stipulated in their contracts that plaintiff would be entitled to appoint receiver or apply for court-appointed receiver in event of default, relief sought not extraordinary — Defendants owed plaintiff significant sum, and had not reduced principal debt — No dispute as to amount of debt, nor that defendants were in default — No imminent prospect of repayment of principal from operations — There had not been full disclosure of defendants' refinancing plans — Interim plan to make partial payments would not indemnify plaintiff against interest accumulating in interim — No assurance interim payments could be made — There was risk to plaintiff's equity and doubt regarding prospect of recovery of principal — Defendants' plans did not provide for indemnity to plaintiff for losses incurred on ongoing basis — There was inadequate provision to minimize irreparable losses lender would incur — No persuasive evidence appointment of receiver would cause defendants undue hardship — Plaintiff should not have to leave its interests in hands of defendants.

Debtors and creditors --- Receivers — Order appointing receiver

Defendants C Ltd. and NHLP built, owned, and operated hotel — Plaintiff, commercial lender, lent money to C Ltd. for development and construction of hotel on terms in loan agreement — C Ltd. executed promissory note — Other transactions were executed as additional security — Default occurred — Plaintiff made demand upon C Ltd. and NHLP for payment, and issued notice of intention to enforce security under provisions of s. 244 of Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act — Demand was also made upon defendant guarantors — Plaintiff brought action — Plaintiff brought application for order appointing receiver, and that receiver have conduct of sale of hotel, subject to court approval — Application granted in part — Balancing rights of parties, it was just and convenient to grant receivership order — Order appointing receiver would not authorize receiver to have

conduct of sale of hotel — As conduct of sale precluded redemption, order sought was inconsistent with affording defendants redemption period — Special circumstances did not exist such that plaintiff should have order for sale before judgment and consideration of appropriate redemption period — It was not clear that value of security was diminishing — To contrary, there was some evidence that profitability and therefore value of hotel was likely to increase in interim — Some net income was being generated from operations — Receiver would be authorized to engage only in such sales as would occur in ordinary course of business of hotel.

***Willcock J.*:**

Introduction

1 Textron Financial Canada Limited ("Textron") applies pursuant to Rules 12, 44, 51A and 57 of the *Rules of Court*, the *Law and Equity Act*, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 253, and the *Personal Property Security Act*, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 359, for an order appointing a receiver/manager of all of the assets, undertakings and properties of Chetwynd Motels Ltd. ("Chetwynd") and Northern Hotels Limited Partnership ("NHLP"), and certain property of the other defendants located at 5200 North Access Road, Chetwynd British Columbia, on District Lot 398 of Peace River District Plans 9830, 13879 and 27449 (the "Lands"). In particular Textron seeks an order empowering the receiver to sell an 87-suite hotel known as Pomeroy Inn Chetwynd (the "Hotel") built on the Lands.

Background

2 Textron is a commercial lender. Chetwynd, Northern Hotels GP Ltd. ("Northern Hotels"), Pomeroy Enterprises Ltd. ("Pomeroy") and 711970 Alberta Ltd. ("711970") are companies incorporated in Alberta. Chetwynd, Northern Hotels and Pomeroy are extraprovincially registered in British Columbia. NHLP is an Alberta limited partnership, extraprovincially registered in British Columbia.

3 Chetwynd and NHLP built, own and operate the Hotel.

4 Textron lent money to Chetwynd for the development and construction of the Hotel on the following terms, set out in a loan agreement dated January 31, 2007 (the "Loan Agreement"):

> (a) Textron provided a construction short-term loan facility of up to the principal amount of $7,500,000;
>
> (b) interest accrued on the principal amount outstanding at the Bank of Canada 30-day banker acceptance rate plus 2.85%; and
>
> (c) in the event of default, Textron would be entitled to a prepayment charge of 3% of the outstanding principal together with costs of collection, including solicitor fees and disbursements.

5 On January 31, 2007 Chetwynd executed a promissory note by which it promised to pay on demand the lesser of the principal sum of $7.5 million plus interest or the unpaid principal balance on all advances. As additional security the following were executed on the same date:

> (a) a mortgage from Chetwynd to Textron, registered against the Lands (the "Mortgage");
>
> (b) an assignment of rents from Chetwynd to Textron, also registered against the Lands;
>
> (c) a trust agreement between Chetwynd, NHLP and Textron, whereby NHLP, as beneficial owner of the Lands, granted a mortgage and charge to Textron of all of its real or personal property interests in the Land;
>
> (d) a general security agreement from Chetwynd and NHLP granting a security interest in favour of Textron over the undertaking of Chetwynd and NHLP (the "General Security Agreement");
>
> (e) a guarantee and postponement of claims from NHLP to Textron;

(f) a guarantee from Pomeroy and William Robert Pomeroy (the "Pomeroy guarantors") of two thirds of the amount outstanding to Textron under the Loan Agreement, to a maximum of $5,000,000, and a postponement of claims in favour of Textron;

(g) a guarantee from 711970 and Carrie Langstroth (the "Langstroth guarantors") of one third of the amount outstanding to Textron under the Loan Agreement, to a maximum of $2,500,000, and a postponement of claims in favour of Textron; and

(h) a general security agreement from Pomeroy and 711970 in favour of Textron which granted a security interest in favour of Textron over the undertaking and assets of Pomeroy and 711970 (the "Collateral General Security Agreement").

6 By May 1, 2007 Textron had advanced the entirety of the loan to Chetwynd. The Hotel was substantially complete by May 18, 2007.

7 The Loan Agreement required Chetwynd to make monthly payments of interest only for a period of 12 months from substantial completion. Thereafter Chetwynd was to make monthly payments of principal and interest based on a 25-year amortization period. Chetwynd agreed to maintain a debt service coverage ratio of not less than 0.30.

8 For the months from September to December 2009, Chetwynd failed to make required payments of principal and interest. Chetwynd did not maintain the debt service coverage ratio and failed to provide the financial reporting that was called for under the Loan Agreement. By September 30, 2009 Chetwynd's debt service ratio was 0.47.

9 On November 10, 2009, Textron made demand upon Chetwynd and NHLP for payment of $7,509,585.54, the amount then said to be owing, and issued a notice of intention to enforce security pursuant to the provisions of s. 244 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3. A demand was also made upon the guarantors. On November 24, 2008, Textron notified Chetwynd that it was in default of the Loan Agreement in that it had failed to meet the debt service coverage ratio. Textron then required Chetwynd to remedy its default. Chetwynd failed to do so.

10 The General Security Agreement provides that in the case of default, Textron is entitled to appoint a receiver, by court order or otherwise, over the undertaking and personal property of Chetwynd and NHLP. The Mortgage provides that in the event of default, Textron is entitled to appoint a receiver by court order or otherwise over the Lands. The Collateral General Security Agreement also provides that in the event of default, Textron is entitled to appoint a receiver, by court order or otherwise, over the interests of the guarantors in the Lands or Hotel.

11 On January 13, 2010, this action was commenced by Textron. The relief sought in the writ of summons includes:

(1) declaration that Textron is the holder of a fixed and specific charge against all of the undertaking, property and assets of Chetwynd and NHLP, and the assets of Pomeroy and 711970 in relation to the Lands and the Hotel;

(2) judgment against Chetwynd, NHLP and Northern Hotels in the amount of $7,509,585.54 to November 9, 2009 and interest thereon at the rate set out in the security agreements;

(3) judgment against the Pomeroy guarantors in the amount of $5,000,000 to November 10, 2009 plus costs and interest thereafter;

(4) judgment against the Langstroth guarantors in the amount of $2,500,000 as of November 10, 2009 plus all other applicable costs and interests;

(5) appointment of a receiver or receiver/manager over the Lands and over all of the undertaking, property and assets of Chetwynd and NHLP and over the undertaking, property and assets of Pomeroy and 711970 in relation to the Lands and the Hotel; and

(6) an order that the Lands and the assets secured by Textron be sold free and clear of the right, title and interest of the defendants or an order that the receiver appointed shall sell the Lands and assets subject to further court order.

12 William Pomeroy describes himself as the president of a group of companies referred to as the "Pomeroy Group". The group operates and manages hotels and restaurants in British Columbia and Alberta, including the Hotel, the Pomeroy Inn Chetwynd. Mr. Pomeroy has produced financial reports and month-to-month statistics on the operations of the Hotel for the year prior to December 2009, inclusive, as well as the 2010 budget for the Hotel with comparable 2009 results.

13 It is Mr. Pomeroy's evidence that the Hotel is operating at a slightly better than break-even basis, excluding its financing costs. It has been meeting and is expected to meet its ongoing obligations other than financing expenses. The property is fully insured and the owners are prepared to make regular disclosure of financial information to the plaintiff.

14 Mr. Pomeroy deposes that when the Hotel was developed, the local economy was robust as a result of the health of local resource-extraction industries but the market has since been severely impacted by economic factors, including the closure of a sawmill; the closure of a pulp mill; the suspension of operations at a local coal mine; a dramatic decrease in natural gas prices; and the discontinuance of the operations of a local wind farm. According to Mr. Pomeroy, a reduction in occupancy rates and gross revenues has rendered NHLP unable to make monthly payments on its loan. He cannot say when he expects the business to become more profitable, but believes that in the long term the Hotel will be successful.

15 Mr. Pomeroy deposes that the "Pomeroy Group" is currently in negotiations with lenders to refinance and restructure some of its operations, including the Hotel. He says the restructuring "can be well underway toward completion within the next six months". In his opinion the appointment of a receiver "could have a serious negative impact on our ability to carry out the restructuring".

16 The budget and financial statement produced by Mr. Pomeroy indicate that annual revenue to December 2009 amounted to approximately $1.7 million. After deducting non-financial expenses, the Hotel earned net operating income of $202,000. After depreciation and amortization, interest and financial expenses, the Hotel suffered a loss of $1.45 million. The budget for 2010 will see the Hotel generating net operating income of $457,000 before depreciation, amortization, interest and finance expenses. Interest and financing expenses alone are anticipated to be $489,000. If it meets its budget, the Hotel will not be able to pay all interest and financing expenses. After depreciation, amortization and the interest and principal payments on its loan, the Hotel, on its own budget, will show a net loss of $1.12 million. That budget calls for revenue of $1.96 million compared to 2009 revenue of $1.69 million. The significant increase in revenue is based upon significantly higher projected revenue in the summer and fall of 2010.

17 Chetwynd proposes to make an immediate payment to Textron in the amount of $20,000, and to pay all interest accruing to Textron on a monthly basis, approximately $20,000 per month, while the Pomeroy Group is pursuing restructuring.

18 Textron regards the 2010 budget forecast as optimistic. Textron is of the view that based on actual and projected results, it will not be possible for Chetwynd to raise sufficient funds by refinancing or selling the Hotel to satisfy the outstanding debt to Textron. Although Mr. Pomeroy deposes to attempts to refinance or restructure the operation, there is no assurance that Textron will be paid in full in the event refinancing is obtained, and Textron has not received details of the proposed refinancing from Chetwynd.

Issues

19 The following issues arise on this application:

1. whether a receiver should be appointed; and, if so

2. whether the receiver should have conduct of sale of the undertaking and property of the Hotel prior to judgment and without a redemption period.

20 The first question requires consideration of the test to be applied on an application for the appointment of a receiver. The parties say the law in this regard is unsettled. The plaintiff says that a receiver should be appointed on the application of a creditor as a matter of course in every case where there has clearly been default unless there is a "compelling commercial reason" to delay the appointment. The defendants say that the statutory requirement that it be just and convenient that the order be made requires a balancing of interests in every case and that the significant detriment to a debtor arising from the appointment of a receiver should lead the court to require the applicant to establish that the balance of convenience favours the appointment.

Applicable Law

Court-Appointed Receivers

21 Section 39(1) of *The Law and Equity Act* describes the jurisdiction to appoint receivers, generally, in terms of justice and convenience:

> 39(1) An injunction or an order in the nature of *mandamus* may be granted or a receiver or receiver manager appointed by an interlocutory order of the court in all cases in which it appears to the court to be just or convenient that the order should be made.

22 Section 66 of *The Personal Property Security Act*, in addition to the court's general jurisdiction, authorizes the appointment of receivers on the application of interested persons in the event of default under security agreements governed by the provisions of that *Act.*

23 The *Rules of Court* provide the appointment may be on terms:

> 47(1) The court may appoint a receiver in any proceeding either unconditionally or on terms, whether or not the appointment of a receiver was included in the relief claimed by the applicant.

24 In *Red Burrito Ltd. v. Hussain*, 2007 BCSC 1277 (B.C. S.C.), D. Smith J. (as she then was) said at para. 47: "It is well-established that the party seeking an appointment of a receiver by the court must satisfy the court that it is just and convenient to do so: see *Korion Investments Corp. v. Vancouver Trade Mart Inc.* [citation deleted]."

25 The plaintiff says a mortgagee is entitled to the appointment of receiver or a receiver/manager as a matter of course when a mortgage is in default. The plaintiff says it is just and convenient to give effect to the intentions of the parties reflected in the security agreements. This was the approach adopted by McDonald J. in *Citibank Canada v. Calgary Auto Centre* (1989), 58 D.L.R. (4th) 447 (Alta. Q.B.), citing from Price and Trussler, *Mortgage Actions in Alberta* (1985) at 309:

> Unless the mortgagor can point to reasons why the appointment of a receiver will prejudice his position, it is difficult to see why the mortgagee should not be entitled to a receiver, regardless of the equity position. The fact that there may be sufficient to pay the mortgage out if the property is ultimately sold is of little comfort to the mortgagee, who is faced with the prospect of no regular monthly return on his investment on which he may be budgeting, particularly where he holds the mortgage in trust for an investor. In addition, in considering what is "just and equitable" the Court must surely have regard to the mortgage covenant, which normally contains an express covenant agreeing to the appointment of a receiver in the event of default, and to the fact that although the mortgagor is receiving the rents, he is pocketing them or diverting them to other investments instead of paying the mortgage on the property as he has covenanted to do. In weighing the equities in this fashion, it is difficult to come down on the side of the defaulting mortgagor/landlord. Instead, it is "just and equitable" that a receiver be appointed.

26 This judgment was cited with approval by Burnyeat J. in *United Savings Credit Union v. F & R Brokers Inc.*, 2003 BCSC 640, 15 B.C.L.R. (4th) 347 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) (followed in *Ross v. Ross Mining Ltd.*, 2009 YKSC 55 (Y.T. S.C.)). In that case, the Court held that upon default being proven the court should accede to an application for a court-appointed receiver except in rare circumstances where a mortgagor or subsequent charge holder can show compelling commercial or other reason why such an order ought not to be made. The onus will always be on the mortgagor or subsequent charge holder in that regard.

27 In *United Saving*, the first mortgagee applied to appoint a receiver of commercial property being operated as a hotel. There was a mortgage on the land only and no security instrument expressly authorizing the appointment of a receiver of the hotel business. The application was opposed by a second mortgagee. The judgment does not expressly describe the equity in the property but the court found it unlikely that the owner had remaining equity to protect. There were significant unpaid taxes and only some rents were being collected by the second mortgagee under an assignment. The balance of the rents were either not being paid or were being paid to the owners. There was no evidence that any rents were being expended for the benefit of the property or for the benefit of anyone with equity in the property. There was evidence of "a very real danger" that the property would be subject to a cease and desist order from the City and there had been a number of judgments registered against the property.

28 The Court was of the view the English line of authorities, of which in *Player v. Crompton & Co.*, [1914] 1 Ch. 954 (Eng. Ch. Div.); *Truman & Co. v. Redgrave* (1881), 18 Ch. 547 (Eng. Ch. Div.); and *Pratchett v. Drew*, [1924] 1 Ch. 280 (Eng. Ch. Div.) were said to be representative, were consistent in stating that a receiver will be appointed as a matter of course or a "mere matter of course" once default under a mortgage is established. Those authorities were said to have been adopted and followed in British Columbia in *Eaton Bay Trust Co. v. Motherlode Developments Ltd.* (1984), 50 B.C.L.R. 149, 50 C.B.R. (N.S.) 247 (B.C. S.C.); and *Royal Trust Corp. of Canada v. Exeter Properties Ltd.*, [1985] B.C.J. No. 942 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]), where receivers were appointed without proof of jeopardy.

29 Mr. Justice Burnyeat expressed the view that the decision of Huddart J.(as she then was) in *Korion Investments Corp. v. Vancouver Trade Mart Inc.*, [1993] B.C.J. No. 2352 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]), discussed below, to the effect that a receiver should not be appointed as a matter of course, should be limited to its facts. He observed that the long-established English practice did not appear to have been brought to the attention of the Court in *Korion* and there appear to have been very good reasons in the *Korion* case why the appointment of a receiver should not have been made.

30 Mr. Justice Burnyeat held, at paras. 15-17:

> In accordance with the English decisions and the decisions in *Motherlode* and *Exeter*, I am satisfied that, unless the mortgagor or charge holder can show that extraordinary circumstances are present, the appointment of a Receiver or Receiver Manager at the instigation of a foreclosing mortgagee should be made as a matter of course if the mortgagee can show default under the mortgage.
>
> The Court should not force a mortgagee to become a mortgagee in possession in order to exercise the rights of possession available to it under the mortgage. As well, where the mortgagor has provided an express covenant agreeing to the appointment of a Receiver or a Receiver Manager in the event of default, the Court should not ordinarily interfere with the contract between the parties. Also, it would be inappropriate for the Court to countenance a situation where default in payments continues while the mortgagor or some subsequent mortgagee has the benefit of the income which is available from a property charged by a mortgage ranking in priority ahead of the interests of those having the benefit of the income.
>
> A mortgagee is entitled to the appointment of a Receiver or Receiver Manager as a matter of course when the mortgage is in default. The Court should only exercise its discretion not to make such an appointment in those rare occasions where a mortgagor or subsequent charge holder can show compelling commercial or other reason why such an order ought not to be made. The onus will always be on the mortgagor or subsequent charge holder in that regard.

31 The British Columbia cases referred to in *United Saving* are not unambiguous in their adoption of the rule that a receiver should be appointed as a matter of course. In *Eaton Bay Trust*, the Court noted, at p. 151:

> In practice the appointment of a receiver in a mortgage proceeding is frequently made without proof of jeopardy (*Kerr on Receivers*, 15th ed. (1978),pp. 6, 30; *Re Crompton & Co., Player v. Crompton & Co.*,[1914] 1 Ch. 954).

32 The Court did, however, express some reservations with respect to the adequacy of the material and the order appears to have been granted principally because it was unopposed, all parties having been served.

33 As Taylor J. noted in *Royal Bank v. Cal Glass Ltd.* (1978), 94 D.L.R. (3d) 84 (B.C. S.C.) at p. 351 [*Cal Glass*]: "While receivers are appointed in some types of action almost as a matter of course, this may largely be due to the fact that other parties do not object." In that case, the order appointing a receiver/manager on a debenture was not granted. There was opposition and the applicant did not discharge the onus of establishing the justice and convenience of a court appointment, having already instrument-appointed a receiver.

34 The defendants say that the decision in the *United Saving* should not be followed, or should be closely restricted to its facts. They say the requirement in the *Law and Equity Act* that appointment be just and convenient is inconsistent with any presumption and no order should be made "as a matter of course". The defendants say that other remedies short of receivership should first be considered: [*Cal Glass*; *Eaton Bay Trust*; *Royal Trust Corp.*; *Korion*; *Maple Trade Finance Inc. v. CY Oriental Holdings Ltd.*, 2009 BCSC 1527 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]); *Paragon Capital Corp. v. Merchants & Traders Assurance Co.*, 2002 ABQB 430, 46 C.B.R. (4th) 95 (Alta. Q.B.); and *BG International Ltd. v. Canadian Superior Energy Inc.*, 2009 ABCA 127, 53 C.B.R. (5th) 161 (Alta. C.A.).

35 As noted above, *Eaton Bay Trust* dismisses the requirement that there be jeopardy before the appointment but does place significant weight upon the exercise of the court's discretion in granting the order. [*Cal Glass* is of little assistance to the defendants as the principal issue in that case was whether the court should come to the assistance of a bank with an instrument-appointed receiver where the respondent did not seek the discharge of the receiver, but simply sought to have the receiver continue to act at his peril. The issue before me is more clearly and explicitly addressed in *Korion* and *Maple Trade Finance*.

36 In *Korion*, the application for a court-appointed receiver was brought by a second mortgagee after judgment. The circumstances of the case were somewhat unusual in that there was apparently sufficient equity in the property to protect the applicant's interests. The mortgagor's property had an assessed market value of $13,600,000. The first mortgage securing a debt of $3,000,000 was in good standing. Korion's judgment was for $908,053.53. It had the right to appoint a receiver by instrument but, as in the case at bar, sought a court-appointed receiver-manager to avoid conflict. On its application, Korion did not adduce evidence to support its submission that the appointment of a receiver-manager was necessary or desirable. Rather, it simply asserted its right to enjoy the profits from its property. The Court held at paras. 7-8:

> ... In *AcmeTrack Ltd. v. Nor East Industries Ltd.*, (1983), 62 N.S.R. (2d) 358, Nathanson J. held that an affidavit supporting an application to appoint a receiver must state facts from which the court may draw a conclusion as to the necessity or advisability of appointing a receiver. I agree.
>
> Courts have appointed post-judgment receivers for two main purposes: (i) to enable persons who possess rights over property to obtain the benefit of those rights where ordinary legal remedies are defective: *Sign-O-Lite Plastics Ltd. v. MacDonald Drugs (Cranbrook) Ltd.* (1980), 24 B.C.L.R. 172 at 174 (S.C.) and *Graybriar Industries Ltd. v. South West Marine Estates Ltd.* (1988), 21 B.C.L.R. 256 at 258 (S.C.); and (ii) to preserve property from some danger which threatens it: *Kerr on Receivers*, 17th ed. 1989, at 5-6 and 116; *N.E.C. Corp. v. Steintron International Electronics Ltd.* (1985), 67 B.C.L.R. 191 at 194-195; *HMW-Bennett & Wright Contractors Ltd. v. BMV Investments Ltd.* (1991), 7 C.B.R. (3d) 216 at 224 (Sask. Q.B.); *Canadian Commercial Bank v. Gemcraft Ltd.* (1985), 3 C.P.C. (2d) 13 at 14 (Ont. S.C.) and *First Investors Corp Ltd. v. 237208 Alta. Ltd.* (1982), 20 Sask. R. 335 at 341 (Q.B.).

37 The Court held there was no evidence that "ordinary legal remedies" were insufficient to preserve the property pending realization and there was no threat or danger to the property.

38 The Court considered the applicant's argument that in cases where the appointment is made under a statutory provision "the appointment is made as a matter of course as soon as the applicant's right is established, and it is unnecessary to allege any danger to the property; for the appointment of a receiver is necessary to enable the applicant to obtain that to which he is entitled." Huddart J. dismissed that proposition at para. 12:

> I have some difficulty with the proposition that the appointment of a receiver after the order nisi will usually be appropriate. The appointment by a court of a receiver and particularly of a receiver-manager says to the world, including potential

investors, that the mortgagor is not reliable, not capable of managing its affairs, not only in the opinion of the mortgagee, but also in the opinion of the court. That is a large presumption for a court to make when it is considering whether need or convenience or fairness dictates an equitable remedy even if the contract at issue permits such an appointment by instrument.

39 The Court accepted the respondent's submission that the appointment of a receiver would jeopardize its operations and attempts to obtain refinancing. Significantly, the respondent was paying the applicant the full amount of monthly interest accruing on its loan and proposed to continue doing so. On weighing the evidence, the Court exercised its discretion against granting the order sought.

40 In *Maple Trade Finance*, the plaintiff sought an order for the appointment of a receiver and manager following default by the defendant on a loan upon which the outstanding balance was $5.7 million. The defendant did not dispute the default. It was prepared to make payments of $4 million in instalments and to have the dispute with respect to the interest payable on the loan dealt with as a discreet issue.

41 The defendant had executed a general security agreement in favour of the plaintiff granting security over all of the defendant's present and after-acquired property. The general security agreement provided for the appointment of a receiver or application for court-appointed receiver in the event of default. Although the authorities cited to the Court are not referred to in the oral reasons for judgment of Masuhara J. (therefore there is no explicit consideration of *United Saving*), the Court does note that the applicant relied upon authorities to the effect that it ought not ordinarily interfere with an express covenant agreeing to the appointment of a receiver in the event of default. Further, the applicant submitted:

42 The parties had agreed the plaintiff may seek the appointment of a receiver in the event of a default;

43 The defendant owed a significant sum of money;

44 There appeared not to be a dispute with the fact of the size of the indebtedness;

45 The defendant was in default;

46 The resignation of the defendant's board and its recent delisting from the TSX exchange evidenced a need to ensure that the defendant's assets are preserved for the plaintiff's benefit;

47 There were concerns with respect to the financial statements of the defendant; and

48 The defendant did not indicate what steps were being taken to address the prospects for early repayment of the defendant's indebtedness.

49 The respondent proposed to pay all the outstanding principal of the debt in four equal monthly instalments over a short period and consented to the immediate appointment of a receiver in the event of default in making such payments. The position of the defendant was that there was no evidence of jeopardy to the plaintiff's security.

50 Mr. Justice Masuhara held:

There are a number of factors that figure in the determination of whether it is appropriate to appoint a receiver. In *Bennett on Receivership*, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1999), at p. 130, a list of such factors is set out as follows:

> a) whether irreparable harm might be caused if no order were made, although it is not essential for a creditor to establish irreparable harm if a receiver is not appointed, particularly where the appointment of a receiver is authorized by the security documentation;
>
> b) the risk to the security holder taking into consideration the size of the debtor's equity in the assets and the need for protection or safeguarding of the assets while litigation takes place;

c) the nature of the property;

d) the apprehended or actual waste of the debtor's assets;

e) the preservation and protection of the property pending judicial resolution;

f) the balance of convenience to the parties;

g) the fact that the creditor has the right to appoint a receiver under the documentation provided for the loan;

h) the enforcement of rights under a security instrument where the security-holder encounters or expects to encounter difficulty with the debtor and others;

i) the principle that the appointment of a receiver is extraordinary relief which should be granted cautiously and sparingly;

j) the consideration of whether a court appointment is necessary to enable the receiver to carry out its' duties more efficiently;

k) the effect of the order upon the parties;

l) the conduct of the parties;

m) the length of time that a receiver may be in place;

n) the cost to the parties;

o) the likelihood of maximizing return to the parties;

p) the goal of facilitating the duties of the receiver.

51 Weighing these factors, Masuhara J. dismissed the application for the appointment of a receiver. The Court enjoined the defendant from disposing of assets, ordered the defendant repay the principal and non-default interest on a schedule, to provide financial statements to the plaintiff and to deliver certain shares as security for the debt. Upon default in payment, a receiver would immediately be appointed on the terms of the application. Leave was given to renew the application for appointment of a receiver in the event of any material adverse change in circumstances.

52 The criteria described in *Bennett on Receivership*, 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1999) ("Bennett") set out by Masuhara J. have been applied in Alberta subsequent to the decision in *Citibank Canada* to which Burnyeat J. referred in *United Saving*. In *Paragon*, the Court of Queen's Bench considered an appeal from an *ex parte* order appointing a receiver. Upon concluding that the *ex parte* order ought not to have been issued the Court went on to consider the appointment of a receiver *de novo*. At para. 27 the Court outlined the factors that may be considered on an application (those set out in Bennett) and then added, at paras. 28 and 31:

> In cases where the security documentation provides for the appointment of a receiver, which is the case here with respect to the General Security Agreement and the Extension Agreement, the extraordinary nature of the remedy sought is less essential to the inquiry: *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek*, [1996] O.J. No. 5088(Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]), paragraph 12.
>
> . . . . .
>
> The balance of convenience in these circumstances rests with *Paragon*, which is owed nearly $3 million. There is no plan to repay any of this indebtedness, and no persuasive evidence that the appointment would cause undue hardship to the defendants. As stated by Ground J. in *Swiss Bank Corp. (Canada) v. Odyssey Industries Inc.*, [1995] O.J. No. 144 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at paragraph 31, the appointment of a receiver always causes some hardship to a debtor who

loses control of its assets and risks their sale. Undue hardship that would prevent the appointment of a receiver must be more than this usual unfortunate consequence. Here, any proposed sale of an asset by the receiver must be brought before the court for approval and its propriety and necessity will be fully canvassed on its merits.

53 The Alberta Court of Appeal has more recently applied the criteria described in Bennett and commented on the extent to which there should be consideration of the hardship arising from the appointment of a receiver. In *BG International*, at para. 17, the Court held:

> [T]he chambers judge must carefully balance the rights of both the applicant and the respondent. The mere appointment of a receiver can have devastating effects. The respondent referred us to the statement in *Swiss Bank Corp. (Canada) v. Odyssey Industries Inc.* (1995), 30 C.B.R. (3d) 49 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) at para. 31:
>
> > ... With respect to the hardship to Odyssey and Weston should a receiver be appointed, I am unable to find any evidence of undue or extreme hardship. Obviously the appointment of a receiver always causes hardship to the debtor in that the debtor loses control of its assets and business and may risk having its assets and business sold. The situation in this case is no different.
>
> This quotation does not reflect the law of Alberta. Under the *Judicature Act*, it must be "just and convenient" to grant a receivership order. Justice and convenience can only be established by considering and balancing the position of both parties. The onus is on the applicant. The respondent does not have to prove any special hardship, much less "undue hardship" to resist such an application. The effect of the mere granting of the receivership order must always be considered, and if possible a remedy short of receivership should be used.

54 In restating the rule that the onus rests upon the applicant in every case to discharge the burden of establishing that the balance of convenience favours the appointment of a receiver, the Alberta Court of Appeal appears now to have rejected the presumption described by McDonald J. in *Citibank Canada*.

55 In light of these authorities, I conclude that the statutory requirement that the appointment of a receiver be just and convenient does not permit or require me to begin my assessment of the material with the presumption that the plaintiff is entitled to a court-appointed receiver unless the defendant can demonstrate a compelling commercial or other reason why the order should not be made. Of the considered judgments on the issue from this Court, I prefer the approach taken by Masuhara J. in *Maple Trade Finance*. That approach permits the court, when it is appropriate to do so, to place considerable weight upon the fact that the creditor has the right to instrument-appoint a receiver. It also permits the court to engage in that analysis described by Taylor J. in [*Cal Glass* when considering whether the applicant has established that it is appropriate and necessary for the court to lend its aid to a party who may appoint a receiver without a court order.

Order for Sale Before Judgment

56 Section 15 of *The Law and Equity Act* describes the jurisdiction to grant an order for sale before judgment:

> 15 The court may, before or after judgment in a proceeding
>
> > (a) by a mortgagee, for the foreclosure of the equity of redemption in mortgaged property, or
> >
> > (b) by a vendor of land, where a claim for the cancellation of the agreement is made, with or without a claim for the forfeiture of money paid on account of the purchase price,
>
> on the application of a person who has an interest in the property or land, direct a sale of the property or land on the terms the court considers just.

57 A party foreclosing on a mortgage must afford the borrower an opportunity to redeem the property in all but exceptional circumstances. In *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Mrazek* (1985), 64 B.C.L.R. 282 (B.C. C.A.), the Court considered an appeal from an order granting the foreclosing bank immediate and exclusive right to sell a mortgagor's property, with the proviso that the order

would not be entered for one month and the mortgagor would have the right to redeem the property prior to court approval of the sale. The Court, referring to *Devany v. Brackpool* (1981), 31 B.C.L.R. 256 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) and *Canlan Investment Corp. v. Gibbons* (1983), 42 B.C.L.R. 199 (B.C. S.C.), held that the law is clear that an immediate order for sale or an immediate order absolute can only be made on proof by the mortgagee of exceptional circumstances, because the mortgagor loses the right to redeem and is personally liable for the shortfall, if any, on the sale. The court will look to the amount of the shortfall, whether the asset is wasting and whether the market is worsening, among other factors, in determining whether the circumstances are exceptional.

58 In *Devany*, the petitioners sought an immediate order for sale without having obtained judgment or an order *nisi* of foreclosure. They took the position that the *Rules of Court* permit an application for sale of secured property before or after judgment. In response to the concern that the respondents would lose their right to redeem, the petitioners took the position that the respondents could seek an order permitting them to redeem the property at the hearing of the application to approve the sale. Mr. Justice Taylor said the following at p. 258 in describing the applicant's position:

> That would, of course, tend to defeat a fundamental rule of law which has become very well established in England and in this province in proceedings for the realization of mortgage security. The equitable principle on which the courts have long proceeded is that a mortgagor in default shall not lose his land without first having a clear opportunity to redeem.

59 With respect to the suggestion that redemption be considered at the application to approve a sale, Taylor J. held (at p. 259): "I think it would leave the mortgagors in a state of uncertainty as to how and when they may redeem which significantly impairs their equity of redemption." Assuming, for the purposes of argument, that an order for sale could be granted before an order *nisi* of foreclosure, he held:

> But I am satisfied that the granting of an order for sale at that stage would be as much a matter of discretion as the granting of an order for sale after decree nisi and I do not accept the proposition that a mortgagee who thus obtained an order for sale in lieu of a decree nisi would be relieved of the normal obligation to account and the setting of a period within which the mortgagor may redeem.

60 The court could only contemplate departure from the normal requirements to account for the amount which must be paid and establish an appropriate redemption period - where the applicant could establish a "very special reason" for doing so.

61 The right to redeem is inconsistent with the granting of an order for sale to the mortgagee: *Canlan*, citing *Pope v. Roberts* (1979), 10 B.C.L.R. 50 (B.C. C.A.) and *First Western Capital Ltd. v. Wardle*, [1982] B.C.J. No. 770 (B.C. S.C.).

62 In *Canlan*, the petitioner had not brought a foreclosure petition on for hearing but applied for and obtained an order declaring a mortgage to be in default and an order for sale. An application came on before Van Der Hoop L.J.S.C. for approval of the sale. The court held:

> In this file, the order for sale was sought and obtained against principle and authority. At the time the order was given no accounting was made and no time for redemption fixed, no judgment had been given on the personal covenant, and there was no evidence that the security of the applicant was in jeopardy.

63 That being the general rule in foreclosure actions, the question before me is whether the receiver of a business ought to be empowered to sell the real property of that business without affording the debtor an opportunity to redeem. The plaintiff says the receiver acquires the full range of powers to acquire and dispose of assets formerly enjoyed by the debtor, including the power to sell real estate in the ordinary course of business in order to discharge corporate debt.

64 The defendants say that the power to appoint a receiver is a remedy commonly afforded by security instruments and, at least where the debtor's principal asset is real estate, the lender cannot be permitted to use the power to appoint a receiver as a means of avoiding the usual redemption period.

65 There is the further question, in this case, whether that power ought to be granted to the receiver before judgment. The defendants say that neither the plaintiff nor a receiver should be entitled to offer the property for sale until after the plaintiff has been granted judgment and a redemption period has expired. In support of this proposition, the defendant relies on *South West Marine Estates Ltd. v. Bank of British Columbia* (1985), 65 B.C.L.R. 328 (B.C. C.A.) at para. 21; *Royal Bank v. Astor Hotel Ltd.* (1986), 3 B.C.L.R. (2d) 252, 62 C.B.R. (N.S.) 257 (B.C. C.A.) [*Astor Hotel*], at para. 47; and *First Pacific Credit Union v. Grimwood Sports Inc.* (1984), 16 D.L.R. (4th) 181, 59 B.C.L.R. 145 (B.C. C.A.).

66 There appears to be no doubt that if a party seeks a court-appointed receiver, the powers to be granted to the receiver are in the discretion of the court regardless of the broad powers which the parties might have consented to grant the receiver by contract. Bennett notes, at p. 244: "The court has the discretion to grant the receiver the power of sale even thought the security instrument contains a power of sale." The author there expresses the view that the security holder should justify to the court as to why a power of sale is required. At p. 244 he notes: "In fact the receiver should have no authority to sell the debtor's assets out of the ordinary course of business until the security holder obtains judgment against the debtor".

67 At p. 234:

> While the court has the power to authorize a sale at any time, the security holder should have judgment against the debtor before the court authorizes a sale of the debtor's business, especially where real estate is involved. In real estate matters, the debtor would normally be entitled to a redemption period.

68 Further, Bennett notes at p. 245:

> In the case of real property the court generally protects the debtor's equity of redemption for a period of time before it authorizes a sale. Where there are no meritorious defences, the security holder should obtain judgment first and then give the debtor an opportunity to redeem before the assets are sold.

69 In support of that proposition, Bennett cites the cases to which I have been referred to by the defendant: *First Pacific*; *Vista Homes Ltd. v. Taplow Financial Ltd.* (1985), 64 B.C.L.R. 291, 56 C.B.R. (N.S.) 225 (B.C. S.C.); and *Astor Hotel*.

70 In *First Pacific*, Esson J.A. describes the appropriate role of a receiver appointed under a debenture. He considers the application for sale at p. 153:

> What seems often to be lost sight of is that there is no necessary connection between the appointment of a receiver-manager and the remedy of a sale; and that it is the plaintiff, i.e. the debenture holder, not the receiver manager who seeks the remedy. It is the plaintiff who has the right and opportunity to prosecute the action and it is the plaintiff who, if judgment is granted in his favour, is given the remedy of sale. The order for sale before judgment is an extraordinary remedy which should be granted only in special circumstances.

71 At p. 154 he added:

> In many cases, orders have been made giving to the receiver-manager at the outset power to offer assets for sale subject to court approval. The power to make such an order as a matter of course is, in my view, doubtful. There is power to make such an order in an application expressly raising the issue whether there should be a sale before judgment. Such a power is given by Rule 43(2) upon a finding by the court that "there eventually must be a sale". The power under s. 16 of the *Law and Equity Act* to order a sale before judgment may apply in some debenture holders' actions. There may be other sources of jurisdiction but I know of none that authorizes an order for sale before judgment as a matter of course.

72 In *Vista Homes*, McLachlin J. (as she then was), considered an application brought by a court-appointed receiver with a power to sell assets for an order for conduct of sale of a property held in joint tenancy by the debtor and another company. The application was dismissed as premature. The court held at p. 294:

> The creditor at whose instance the receiver manager was appointed is not entitled to realize on the debt which it alleges to be owing before judgment by having the receiver manager sell the alleged debtor's property. It follows that there should not be a sale before judgment unless special circumstances are made out: *First Pac. Credit Union*
>
> [citation omitted].

73 In *Astor Hotel*, the Court appointed a receiver under a debenture on September 18, 1985 and granted the receiver exclusive conduct of sale effective November 10, 1985. On the application for leave to appeal that order it was argued that the order for conduct of sale should not have been made without an accounting of the debt and a redemption period. The application for leave was dismissed on the basis that the chambers judge, by delaying the power of sale for two months had implicitly recognized and afforded to the debtor a redemption period. Taggart J.A. cited, apparently with approval *First Pacific*, *Vista Homes*, *Bank of Montreal v. Appcon Ltd.* (1981), 33 O.R. (2d) 97, 123 D.L.R. (3d) 394 (Ont. H.C.); *Royal Bank v. Camex Canada Corp.* (1985), 63 B.C.L.R. 125 (B.C. S.C.); and *South West Marine Estates Ltd. v. Bank of British Columbia* (1985), 65 B.C.L.R. 328 (B.C. C.A.). The latter two cases were cited as authority for the proposition that "the trend is to treat the issues arising in mortgage foreclosure proceedings and in debenture holders' actions in similar ways".

74 In considering the plaintiff's application I bear in mind that there may be advantages to all parties in giving a receiver the conduct of sale of real property, Among those are the factors considered in by Burnyeat J. in *United Saving*, at paras. 32-34, in granting the receiver power to offer the hotel for sale in that case.

Discussion

Appointment of a Receiver

75 The parties in this case stipulated in their contracts that the plaintiff would be entitled to appoint a receiver or to apply for a court-appointed receiver in the event of default. The relief sought by the plaintiff is not, therefore, extraordinary.

76 The defendants owe a significant sum of money to the plaintiff and have not reduced the principal debt since inception of the loan. There does not appear to be a dispute with respect to the amount of the debt. Nor does there appear to be a dispute that the defendants are in default.

77 There is no imminent prospect of repayment of principal from operations. There is some evidence of refinancing efforts but there is no suggestion that those efforts will lead to repayment of even the principal loan in its entirety.

78 There has not been full disclosure of the defendants' refinancing plans. The plaintiff has not been involved in refinancing efforts and has not received particulars of the proposed plan.

79 The interim plan to make partial payments to the plaintiff will not indemnify the plaintiff against interest accumulating on the principal and arrears in the interim.

80 If payments are to come from operating revenues, the defendants estimates of those revenues are optimistic and there is no assurance that those interim payments can be made.

81 In the case at bar, unlike *Korion* and *Maple Trade Finance*, there is a real risk to the plaintiff's equity and real doubt with respect to the prospect of recovery of principal. The defendants' plans do not provide for indemnity to the plaintiff for the losses incurred on an ongoing basis. There is inadequate provision to minimize the irreparable losses that will be incurred by the lender.

82 The defendants say that it would not be just and equitable to appoint a receiver in the circumstances of this case. The defendants say that the overriding consideration for the court is the protection and preservation of the property pending judgment and that operation of the hotel by experienced managers will minimize interim losses and maximize the potential sale value. They say they can most effectively market the property while operating it without any risk or further jeopardy to the plaintiff. The defendants say the appointment of a receiver will be detrimental to all parties.

83 The defendants further say appointment of a receiver will so damage the hotel's reputation that its value will be substantially affected. There is, however, no persuasive evidence that the appointment would cause undue hardship to the defendants. I conclude, as did the Court in *Royal Trust Corp.*, that it would be naive to think that those with whom the defendants do business would be unaware of the foreclosure proceedings presently underway.

84 The defendants seek to have the reins of the debtor company while the risk of profit and loss in the interim remains almost entirely in the hands of the plaintiff. The liability of the guarantors is limited. While there does not appear to be any basis to conclude that the asset will be wasted, the budget does call for management fees to be paid by the defendant to related companies owned by the Pomeroy Group. The Pomeroy Group operates other hotels and businesses. There is some risk to the plaintiff in permitting the defendants to manage the operations of the Hotel when it may be in the defendants' interests to earn their profits elsewhere. The Plaintiff is suffering losses in the interim. I am of the view that it should not be required to leave its interests in the hands of the defendants.

85 Balancing the rights of the parties I find it is just and convenient to grant a receivership order.

Order for Sale

86 The plaintiff does not seek an order permitting the receiver to receive to sell the real property without court approval but, rather seeks the conduct of sale, subject to court approval. The order sought by the plaintiff would require court approval of transactions with a value in excess of $200,000 and aggregate transactions in excess of $500,000. As conduct of sale precludes redemption, the order sought by the plaintiff is inconsistent with affording the defendants a redemption period.

87 The defendant says that it is in the best position to refinance or market the Hotel and that there is no reason why it should not be afforded the usual redemption period when the plaintiff has not obtained judgment.

88 It is acknowledged that business operations of the Hotel will generate insufficient revenue to permit Chetwynd and NHLP to pay interest as it accrues on the loan. The defendants will certainly make no headway in repaying the arrears that have accumulated to date. The plaintiff says there is no reasonable prospect that refinancing will make the plaintiff whole. It seeks to protect its interest by selling the assets that are the subject of the security.

89 I cannot find on the evidence that such special circumstances exist that the plaintiff should have an order for sale before judgment and consideration of an appropriate redemption period. It is not clear that the value of the security is diminishing. To the contrary there is some evidence that the profitability and therefore the value of the Hotel is likely to increase in the interim. Some net income is being generated from operations. The order appointing the receiver shall not therefore authorize the receiver to have conduct of the sale of the Hotel. The receiver will be authorized to engage only in such sales as would occur in the ordinary course of business of the Hotel.

90 The plaintiff shall have leave to renew the application for conduct of sale in the event of a material change in circumstances, in the event the receiver discovers a financial situation substantially different from that known to the plaintiff on this application or on obtaining judgment.

91 The form of the order appointing the receiver, subject to the limitation set out in these reasons, will be in the form provided to the Court by the plaintiff on the application.

92 The parties have leave to apply for further directions if necessary.

Application granted in part.

Tab 5

2014 NSSC 128
Nova Scotia Supreme Court

Enterprise Cape Breton Corp. v. Crown Jewel Resort Ranch Inc.

2014 CarswellNS 263, 2014 NSSC 128, 1084 A.P.R. 108, 12
C.B.R. (6th) 181, 239 A.C.W.S. (3d) 363, 343 N.S.R. (2d) 108

Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation, a body corporate, incorporated pursuant to the Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation Act, enacted as Part II to the Government Organization Act, Atlantic Canada, 1987, R.S., 1985, c. 41 (4th Supp.) ("ECBC"), Applicant v. Crown Jewel Resort Ranch, Inc., a body corporate Incorporated under the laws of Nova Scotia ("Crown Jewel") And I.N.K. Real Estate Inc., a body corporate incorporated Under the laws of Nova Scotia ("I.N.K."), Together the Respondents

Frank Edwards J.

Heard: March 5, 2014
Judgment: April 10, 2014
Docket: SYDJC 423486

Counsel: Robert Risk for Applicant
Nahman Korem for Respondent, Companies

Headnote

Debtors and creditors --- Receivers — Appointment — Application for appointment — General principles

Respondent was indebted to applicant for mortgage and loans — Respondents defaulted on payments — Two principals of respondent were embroiled in divorce proceedings and resort ceased to function — Applicant decided not to enforce security until divorce outcome was known — Respondents were in serious arrears on loans — Applicant sought order appointing MGM as receiver and manager of all assets of respondents — Respondents objected asserting mortgage was not valid, one of companies was capable of making payments and it was not just and convenient to appoint receiver — Application granted; receiver appointed — Respondents' obligations and applicant's rights under mortgage remained in full force and effect — Mortgage was properly executed and duly recorded — Mortgage was given as security for promissory note — Applicant's lawyer was satisfied with promissory note and authorized applicant to disburse funds — There was realistic prospect that respondents would not ever be able to address their debts — Applicant extended respondents every opportunity to turn business around — Business became insolvent and was not in operation for some time — Applicant had no option but to enforce security — Respondents did not make any reasonable progress in obtaining alternate financing with view to paying out applicant's indebtedness — Other than cost of receiver there was no existing or imminent harm beyond potential future risk of receiver obtaining court approval of improvident sale — It was premature to argue irreparable harm.

***Frank Edwards J.*:**

1 The applicant is applying for an order appointing Greg MacKenzie of MacKenzie, Gillis, MacDougall Inc. ("MGM") as receiver and manager of all of the undertakings, property and assets of Crown Jewel and I.N.K. pursuant to Section 243(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, and/or Section 43(9) of the *Judicature Act*, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 240

2 *Grounds for Order:* The applicant is applying for the order on the following grounds:

1. A General Security Agreement made between Crown Jewel Resort Ranch, Inc. and the Cape Breton Growth Fund Corporation dated on or about February 3, 2005 and registered in the Nova Scotia Personal Property Registry as Registration No. 9213736 on February 8, 2005, as amended by Registration No. 21915103 on October 11, 2013.

2. A Mortgage made between I.N.K. Real Estate Inc. and the Cape Breton Growth Fund Corporation dated February 4, 2005 registered at the Victoria County Registry of Deeds on February 8, 2005 as Document No. 81337157 (PID Nos. 85017614, 85079127 and 85155281), said Mortgage having been assigned to Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation pursuant to a General Conveyance, Assignment and Assumption of Liabilities Agreement dated March 31, 2008 and registered at the Victoria County Registry of Deeds on May 30, 2008 as Document No. 90774226;

3. A General Security Agreement made between I.N.K. Real Estate Inc. and the Cape Breton Growth Fund Corporation dated on or about February 3, 2005 and registered in the Nova Scotia Personal Property Registry as Registration No. 9213692 on February 8, 2005, as amended by Registration No. 13924725 on May 23, 2008 (together with the above the "Security")

4. The Respondent Companies (RC's) have defaulted on their payments and failed to honour their obligations pursuant to a Letter of Offer made between Crown Jewel, I.N.K. and ECBC dated on or about October 2, 2003 with respect to Project No. 8600338-1 (the "Letter of Offer").

5. The total amount of indebtedness secured by the Security is $226,134.00 as at October 8, 2013 together with overdue interest on arrears in the amount of $1,738.19 and interest thereafter at a per diem rate of $37.17.

6. The RC's were provided with respective Notices of Intention to Enforce Security pursuant to section 244 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* on October 24, 2013.

7. Greg MacKenzie of MGM has agreed to act as the court-appointed receiver and manager of all of the undertakings, property and assets of both Crown Jewel and I.N.K. and the Applicant consents to his appointment.

8. The Applicant, ECBC relies on Section 243(1) of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3, which reads:

> 243. (1) Subject to subsection (1.1), on application by a secured creditor, a court may appoint a receiver to do any or all of the following if it considers it to be just or convenient to do so:
>
> (a) take possession of all or substantially all of the inventory, accounts receivable or other property of an insolvent person or bankrupt that was acquired for or used in relation to a business carried on by the insolvent person or bankrupt;
>
> (b) exercise any control that the court considers advisable over that property and over the insolvent person's or bankrupt's business; or
>
> (c) take any other action that the court considers advisable.

9. The Applicant, ECBC relies on Section 43(9) of the *Judicature Act*, R.S.N.S. 1989, c. 240, which reads:

> 43. (9) A mandamus or an injunction may be granted or a receiver appointed by an interlocutory order of the Supreme Court, in all cases in which it appears to the Supreme Court to be just or convenient that such order should be made, and any such order may be made either unconditionally or upon such terms and conditions as the Supreme Court thinks just, and if an injunction is asked, either before or at or after the hearing of any cause or matter, to prevent any threatened or apprehended waste or trespass, such injunction may be granted if the Supreme Court thinks fit, whether the person against whom such injunction is sought is, or is not, in possession under any claim of title or otherwise or, if out of possession, does or does not claim a right to do the act sought

to be restrained, under any colour of title, and whether the estates claimed by both or by either of the parties are legal or equitable.

3 *Background:* The RC's had obtained financing from the Cape Breton Growth Fund Corporation (CBGF), the Atlantic Canada Opportunity Agency (ACOA), and the Applicant, Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation (ECBC).

4 ECBC succeeded CBGF when the latter wound up in 2008. ECBC delivers and administers all programs offered by ACOA.

5 The RC's' intent was to establish an upscale, four-season, fly-in active vacation resort near Baddeck, Nova Scotia. Operations commenced in 2006 but struggled financially from the outset. The financial problems multiplied when the two principals in the RC's, Nahman Korem (Korem) and Iris Kedmi (Kedmi) became embroiled in protracted divorce proceedings. These continued between 2010 and December, 2012 when the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal dismissed Kedmi's appeal. The resort essentially ceased to function as of the start of the domestic trouble between Korem and Kedmi in 2010.

6 By October 8, 2013, the RC's were in serious arrears on their loans. By that date, the total amount of indebtedness was as follows:

1. *ECBC Secured Letter of Offer:* $226,134.00 with overdue interest on arrears of $1,738.19 plus interest of $37.17 per day.

2. *ECBC Unsecured Letter of Offer:* $268,254.86 with overdue interest on arrears of $1,738.19 plus interest of $44.10 per day.

3. *ACOA Unsecured Loan:* $256,642.00 plus arrears of $4,425.80.

7 Throughout the period of 2005-2009 the RC's were able to make their regular scheduled payments on the ACOA Unsecured Loan, having repaid approximately $234,360.00 of the initial $500,000.00 loan disbursement. (Lane affidavit para. 22)

8 The RC's have, however, paid only approximately $6,000.00 toward the outstanding principal on the ACOA Unsecured Loan since 2009. Further, no repayments at all have been made on this loan within the 12 month period from December of 2012 to December of 2013. (Lane Affidavit para. 23)

9 With respect to both the ECBC Secured and Unsecured Letters of Offer, the RC's have to date made only a combined repayment in the approximate amount of $9,235.00. As noted above, these loans are in significant arrears. Furthermore, overdue interest is due and owing and is accruing daily. (Lane affidavit para. 24)

10 The Applicant gave the RC's Notices of Intention to Enforce Security on October 24, 2013. Korem knew by November 2013 at the latest that ECBC intended to apply to have a receiver/manager appointed by the Court. A General Security Agreement given to CBGF/ECBC by the RC's provided for the appointment of a private receiver upon default.

11 Despite the fact that the loans were already overdue, ECBC took a hands-off approach during the divorce proceedings. Korem and Kedmi were making competing claims regarding the assets of the RC's. ECBC thus decided not to enforce its security until the divorce outcome was known. After dismissal of the Kedmi Appeal in December, 2012, Korem became the effective owner of all the assets and liabilities of the RC's.

12 Korem insists that ECBC is partially responsible for the present situation because it allowed Kedmi to liquidate some of the assets. I reject any such notion. During the 2010 - 2012 period, the resort was clearly in survival mode. The two principals were locked in a particularly acrimonious marital dispute. The resort was generating no revenue. Kedmi was living on the resort property and was assuring ECBC that she was doing her best to maintain it.

13 It was in that context that ECBC allowed Kedmi to liquidate some assets that were not essential to the survival of the resort. ECBC also allowed her to liquidate assets which in fact had actually become liabilities. These included the horses which were very expensive to maintain but had no foreseeable prospect of generating revenue. Korem's grievance with ECBC is misplaced.

14 Korem now rests his hopes of financial recovery on the possibility of operating a timber cutting business. He presented ECBC with an appraisal of the timber resources on the resort property. The appraisal indicated that the value of the standing timber was 1.5 to 2 million dollars less harvesting costs.

15 ECBC gave Korem permission to do some limited wood harvesting but insisted upon the presentation of a business plan by July, 2013. The business plan Korem provided did not address how the RC's intended to service the ECBC and ACOA debts. Nor did it indicate how the RC's would finance the start-up of the timber business.

16 In October, 2013, ECBC again reviewed proposals put forward by Korem. Incidentally, ECBC learned that property taxes for the resort were $80,000.00 in arrears (Korem says it's now $75,000.00) and that a tax sale was imminent. ECBC decided it was time to apply to have a Receiver/Manager appointed.

17 *RC's' Objections to Appointment of Receiver/Manager*: Korem acted for the RC's without legal counsel. He put forward three objections to the appointment of a Receiver/Manager:

1. That the Mortgage dated February 4, 2005 is not valid;

2. That I.N.K. Real Estate Inc. is capable of making payments;

3. That it is not "just and convenient" to appoint a receiver.

18 I will deal with the objections in turn:

19 *1. The Mortgage is Valid:* It was properly executed by Korem and was duly recorded. Its repayment terms reflect those agreed to by Korem when he signed as president of I.N.K. Real Estate Inc. on October 2, 2003. Those repayment terms were subsequently modified (in I.N.K.'s favor) on March 23, 2005 and October 30, 2010. On both occasions, Korem signed. (See Lane Affidavit Tabs A & B).

20 The Mortgage was given as security for a Promissory Note dated January 21, 2005. Korem's objection seems to be based upon his view that ECBC's counsel at the time questioned the promissory note. On the contrary, the record shows that the lawyer was satisfied with the promissory note and authorized ECBC to disburse funds.

21 The RC's' obligations and ECBC's rights under the Mortgage remain in full force and effect.

22 *2. The RC's are not Capable of Making Payments:* As an aside, Korem seeks to claim that he cannot speak for Crown Jewel Resort Ranch Inc. (CJRR) because Kedmi still owns that company. At the same time Korem acknowledges that all CJRR's assets and liabilities have been transferred to him. Korem is the effective principal of both companies.

23 To service their debts to ECBC and ACOA, the RC's would have to make monthly payments of just under $19,000.00 per month. (To say nothing of the arrears). As noted they are also in substantial arrears regarding property taxes ($75,000.00) and owe contractor D.W. Matheson about $35,000.00.

24 Korem has provided no details to show how he can finance the start-up of the timber business. By his own estimate, he would need one to two years just to pay off the ECBC Secured debt. He give no indication of how much longer it would take to pay off the Unsecured debts. Korem has been given ample opportunity to seek re-financing with another lender. He admits that commercial lenders will not go near him. There is no realistic prospect that the RC's will ever be able to address their debts.

25 *It is Just and Convenient that a Receiver/Manager be Appointed*: What follows, I adopt, in large measure from the Applicant's Brief.

26 In *The 2013-2014 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, Lloyd W. Houlden, Geoffrey B. Morawetz & Janis P. Sarra (Carswell:Toronto, Ontario 2013-2014) the authors set out at p. 1018 the factors I consider in determining whether it is appropriate to appoint a receiver. These are:

(a) whether irreparable harm might be caused if no order were made, although it is not essential for a creditor to establish irreparable harm if a receiver is not appointed;

(b) the risk to the security holder taking into consideration the size of the debtor's equity in the assets and the need for protection or safeguarding of the assets while litigation takes place;

(c) the nature of the property;

(d) the apprehended or actual waste of the debtor's assets;

(e) the preservation and protection of the property pending judicial resolution;

(f) the balance of convenience to the parties;

(g) the fact that the creditor has the right to appoint a receiver under the documentation provided for in the loan;

(h) the enforcement of rights under a security instrument where the security holder encounters or expects to encounter difficulty with the debtor and others;

(i) the principle that the appointment of a receiver is extraordinary relief that should be granted cautiously and sparingly;

(j) the consideration of whether a court appointment is necessary to enable the receiver to carry out its duties more efficiently;

(k) the effect of the order on the parties;

(l) the conduct of the parties;

(m) the length of time that a receiver may be in place;

(n) the cost to the parties;

(o) the likelihood of maximizing return to the parties; and

(p) the goal of facilitating the duties of the receiver.

27 The authors further note that a court can, when it is appropriate to do so, place considerable weight on the fact that the creditor has the right to instrument - appoint a receiver. In *Bank of Montreal v. Sherco Properties Inc.*, 2013 ONSC 7023 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) the court granted the application of the Bank of Montreal for the court-appointment of a receiver over the assets of Sherco Properties Inc., finding at paragraph 42 that:

> [42] Where the security instrument governing the relationship between the debtor and the secured creditor provides for a right to appoint a receiver upon default, this has the effect of relaxing the burden on the applicant seeking to have the receiver appointed. While the appointment of a receiver is generally regarded as an extraordinary equitable remedy, courts do not regard the nature of the remedy as extraordinary or equitable where the relevant security document permits the appointment of a receiver. This is because the applicant is merely seeking to enforce a term of an agreement that was assented to by both parties. See **Textron Financial Canada Limited v. Chetwynd Motels Limited**, 2010 BCSC 477; Freure Village, supra; **Canadian Tire Corp. v. Healy,** 2011 ONSC 4616 and **Bank of Montreal v. Carnivale National Leasing Ltd**. and **Carnivale Automobile Ltd.**, 2011 ONSC 1007.

28 The court in *Bank of Montreal v. Sherco Properties Inc.* offered the following reasons for its decision at paragraph 47 below:

> [47] I have reached this conclusion for the following reasons:

(a) the terms of the security held by the Bank in respect of Sherco and Farm permit the appointment of a receiver;

(b) the terms of the mortgages permit the appointment of a receiver upon default;

(c) the value of the security continues to erode as interest and tax arrears continue to accrue;

(d) Mr. Sherk contends that, with his assistance and knowledge, the Bank will get the highest and most value from the sale of the lands. It has been demonstrated over the past two years that Mr. Sherk has not been able to accomplish a refinancing or a sale.

29 As noted at paragraph 33 of the Affidavit of Steve Lane, the General Security Agreement entered into by Crown Jewel provides ECBC with the specific authority to appoint by instrument a receiver or receiver and manager of the assets of the company upon default. The RC's are in default of the obligations owed to ECBC pursuant to the Secured Letter of Offer as referenced in paragraph 4 of the Affidavit of Steve Lane.

30 Certain other factors to be considered in determining whether it is just and convenient to appoint a receiver are particularly relevant to the case at Bar. These are:

(b) the risk to the security holder taking into consideration the size of the debtor's equity in the assets and the need for protection or safeguarding of the assets while litigation takes place;

31 Mr. Lane states at paragraphs 50 and 51 of his Affidavit that the RC's owe outstanding property taxes to Victoria County, Cape Breton in the approximate amount of $80,000.00 as of October, 2013 and that, failing payment, Victoria County intends to put the lands up for tax sale in March of 2014. Permitting this situation to continue will undoubtedly place ECBC's security interest at risk.

32 Paragraphs 58 and 59 of the Affidavit of Steve Lane sets out the concerns ECBC has with the alleged lease agreements entered into by Korem. Clearly Korem did not have, on behalf of the RC's, any authority to enter into these lease agreements without the consent of ECBC. Further, the lease agreements appear to have been made by the RC's under a different business name, notwithstanding the fact that this entity has no legal standing. Clearly the RC's can no longer be entrusted with protecting and safeguarding their assets and the actions they have taken with respect to these alleged lease agreements clearly places ECBC's security interest at risk.

(d) the apprehended or actual waste of the debtor's assets;

33 It is apparent that Korem intends to continue with timber harvesting on the lands of the RC's that are subject to the ECBC security interest. Although limited timber harvesting was permitted by ECBC while Korem attempted to resolve the outstanding matrimonial property dispute, ECBC is understandably not confident that Korem will seek such consent in future. Given what appears to be an increasingly desperate financial situation of the RC's, ECBC holds a reasonable apprehension that the assets of the RC's, and in particular the timber resources, may be depleted or wasted.

(e) the preservation and protection of the property pending judicial resolution;

34 Crown Jewel Resort is no longer in operation and has been closed down for quite some time. ECBC remains concerned as to whether the assets of the resort are being adequately preserved and protected. For instance, ECBC has no way of ensuring that Korem will continue to properly maintain the resort property. Further, ECBC is concerned as to whether the assets of the resort will be properly insured on a continuing basis.

(g) the fact that the creditor has the right to appoint a receiver under the documentation provided for in the loan;

35 As noted above, ECBC has the right to appoint a receiver by instrument under the General Security Agreement entered into by the Respondent, Crown Jewel. ECBC advised the RC's of its intention to appoint a private receiver with respect to this matter during the November 20, 2013 negotiation referenced at paragraph 53 of Mr. Lane's Affidavit.

(j) the consideration of whether a court appointment is necessary to enable the receiver to carry out its duties more efficiently;

36 In *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek* (1996), 40 C.B.R. (3d) 274 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) granted the motion for appointment by the court of a receiver-manager, holding at paragraph 13:

> [13] Here I am satisfied on balance it is just and convenient for the order sought to be made. The Defendants have been attempting to refinance the properties for 1 $^{1}/_{2}$ years without success, although a letter from Mutual Trust dated yesterday suggests (again) the possibility of a refinancing in the near future. The Bank and the debtors are deadlocked and I infer from the history and evidence that the Bank's attempts to enforce its security privately will only lead to more litigation. Indeed, the debtor's solicitors themselves refer to the prospect of "costly, protracted and unproductive" litigation in a letter dated March 21st of this year, should the Bank seek to pursue its remedies. More significantly, the parties cannot agree on the proper approach to be taken to marketing the properties which everyone agrees must be sold. Should it be on a unit by unit conversion condominium basis (as the debtor proposes) or on an en bloc basis as the Bank would prefer? A Court appointed receiver with a mandate to develop a marketing plan can resolve that impasse, subject to the Court's approval, whereas a privately appointed receiver in all likelihood could not, at least without further litigious skirmishing. In the end, I am satisfied the interests of the debtors themselves, along with those of the creditors (and the tenants, who will be caught in the middle) and the orderly disposition of the property are all better served by the appointment of the receiver-manager as requested.

37 Mr. Lane, at paragraph 60 of his Affidavit, notes the concerns ECBC has with the ability of MGM to carry out its duties. It is clear from the email stream of correspondences referenced at paragraph 59 of the Affidavit that Korem intends to set up as many road blocks as he can with respect to both the appointment of the receiver and the subsequent carrying out of its duties. As in *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek* above, it appears inevitable that Korem will continue to bring costly, protracted and unproductive litigation against both ECBC and its privately appointed receiver. Further, it appears clear that Korem will not agree on the proper approach to be taken to marketing and selling the assets of the RC's subject to the ECBC security interest. Certainly any such attempts to dispose of the property by the privately appointed receiver would be met with further litigious skirmishing.

(l) the conduct of the parties;

38 It is clear from a reading of Mr. Lane's Affidavit that ECBC has extended the RC's with every opportunity to turn the resort business around. Unfortunately, the business became insolvent and has not been in operation for some time. Ultimately, ECBC had no option other than to enforce its security in an attempt to recover some of the losses it incurred in relation to the loans granted to the RC's. Despite the personal investment Korem has made in the resort, as well as the arduous and extremely adversarial divorce proceedings with Kedmi in regard to the assets of the RC's, Korem has not, despite being given ample opportunity to do so, made any reasonable progress in obtaining alternate financing with a view to paying out the ECBC indebtedness. Further, Korem has yet to provide ECBC with a meaningful business plan outlining the timely repayment of the ECBC debt.

(o) the likelihood of maximizing return to the parties;

39 The most practical and prudent approach to maximizing the return to the parties, including the unsecured debt, would be to proceed with a sale of the resort as soon as possible. In the interim, it remains open to Korem, while the receiver is in place, to obtain alternate financing with a view to paying out the ECBC debt.

40 The authors of *The 2013-2014 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* comment at page 1018 that there is an important distinction between the duties and obligations of a receiver and manager privately appointed under the provisions of a security document and those of a receiver and manager appointed by court order. A privately appointed receiver and manager is not acting in a fiduciary capacity; it need only ensure that a fair sale is conducted of the assets covered by the security documents and that a proper accounting is made to the debtor. A court-appointed receiver and manager, on the other hand, is an officer of the Court and acts in a fiduciary capacity with respect to all interested parties. Further, a court-appointed receiver derives its powers and authority wholly from the order of the court appointing it. It is not subject to the control and direction of the parties who had it appointed, or of anyone, except the Court. Given the significant unsecured debt owed to both ECBC and the Atlantic Canada Opportunity Agency, as set out at paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Affidavit of Steve Lane, a court-appointed receiver will more adequately and appropriately consider the interests of these, as well as potentially other, unsecured creditors and therefore the appointment by way of a court order is more appropriate in these particular circumstances.

41 The appointment of a receiver is, generally speaking, an extraordinary relief that should be granted cautiously and sparingly. However, in Houlden, Morawetz and Sarra at p. 1024 below:

> The court has held that while generally, the appointment of a receiver is an extraordinary remedy, where the security instrument permits the appointment of a private receiver, and/or contemplates the secured creditor seeking a court-appointed receiver, and where the circumstances of default justify the appointment of a private receiver, the "extraordinary" nature of the remedy sought is less essential to the inquiry. Rather, the "just or convenient" question becomes one of the court determining whether or not it is more in the interests of all concerned to have the receiver appointed by the court: **Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek** (1996), 1996 CarswellOnt 2328, 40 C.B.R. (3d) 274 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List].

42 Finally, the authors note at p. 1024 of *The 2013-2014 Annotated Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* that the court's appointment of a receiver does not necessarily dictate the financial end of the debtor. In *Romspen Investment Corp. v. 1514904 Ontario Ltd.*, 2010 CarswellOnt 2951, 67 C.B.R. (5th) 231 (Ont. S.C.J.) the court commented at paragraph 32:

> [32] The court's appointment of the Receiver does not dictate the end of this development nor the financial end necessarily of the Debtors. Some receiverships are terminated upon presentment of an acceptable plan of refinancing or after a sale of some but not all assets. Time will be necessary for the Receiver to determine value and appropriately market the subject properties. During this time, the Debtors are entitled to continue to seek out prospective lenders or identify potential purchasers, with the qualification that they cannot usurp the role of the Receiver. Other than the cost of the Receiver, there is no existing or imminent harm beyond the potential future risk of the Receiver obtaining court approval of an improvident sale. Market value versus a proposed sale price will form the very argument on the approval motion. It is premature to argue irreparable harm at this time.

Conclusion

43 I therefore order the appointment of Greg MacKenzie of MacKenzie, Gillis, MacDougall Inc. as the receiver and/or manager of all of the undertakings, property and assets of the RC's, Crown Jewel Resort Ranch, Inc. and I.N.K. Real Estate Inc. The Applicant shall also have its costs in the amount of $1500.00 payable forthwith.

Application granted; receiver appointed.

Tab 6

2013 ONSC 7023
Ontario Superior Court of Justice [Commercial List]

Bank of Montreal v. Sherco Properties Inc.

2013 CarswellOnt 16848, 2013 ONSC 7023, 235 A.C.W.S. (3d) 682

Bank of Montreal, Applicant and Sherco Properties Inc., Sherk Farm Limited, Cosher Properties Inc., and Donald Sherk, Respondents

Morawetz J.

Heard: November 4, 2013
Judgment: December 3, 2013
Docket: CV-13-10244-00CL

Counsel: S.D. Thom, for Applicant
R.B. Moldaver, Q.C., for Respondents

Subject: Insolvency; Corporate and Commercial; Civil Practice and Procedure; Property
Related Abridgment Classifications
Bankruptcy and insolvency
IV Receivers
IV.1 Appointment
Debtors and creditors
VII Receivers
VII.3 Appointment
VII.3.b Application for appointment
VII.3.b.ii Person entitled to make application
VII.3.b.ii.C Mortgagee
Headnote
Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Receivers — Appointment
S Inc. was principal debtor in connection with series of loan facilities extended by bank — Both S Inc., as principal debtor, and S Ltd., as guarantor, had granted general security agreements to bank in respect of indebtedness of S Inc. — S and defendant C Inc. had each executed guarantees of indebtedness of S Inc. as well as providing other security — Money had been provided to S Inc. to fund property development project — Bank did not intend to provide further funds for project and defendants had been unable to find alternative funding or sell properties to repay bank — Interest was accruing and property taxes for properties were in arrears — Application by bank for appointment of receiver in respect of S Inc. and S Ltd., both of which were owned by defendant S; bank also sought receivership order in respect of two residential properties owned by S pursuant to receivership clauses in mortgages held by bank — Application granted — Terms of security held by bank in respect of S Inc. and S Ltd. permitted appointment of receiver — Terms of mortgages permitted appointment of receiver upon default — Value of security continued to erode as interest and tax arrears continued to accrue — S had been unable to accomplish refinancing or sale of properties — It was appropriate to appoint receiver to arrange sale of properties.
Debtors and creditors --- Receivers — Appointment — Application for appointment — Person entitled to make application — Mortgagee
S Inc. was principal debtor in connection with series of loan facilities extended by bank — Both S Inc., as principal debtor, and S Ltd., as guarantor, had granted general security agreements to bank in respect of indebtedness of S Inc. — S and defendant C Inc. had each executed guarantees of indebtedness of S Inc. as well as providing other security — Money had been provided to S Inc. to fund property development project — Bank did not intend to provide further funds for project and defendants had been unable to find alternative funding or sell properties to repay bank — Interest was accruing and property taxes for properties

were in arrears — Application by bank for appointment of receiver in respect of S Inc. and S Ltd., both of which were owned by defendant S; bank also sought receivership order in respect of two residential properties owned by S pursuant to receivership clauses in mortgages held by bank — Application granted — Terms of security held by bank in respect of S Inc. and S Ltd. permitted appointment of receiver — Terms of mortgages permitted appointment of receiver upon default — Value of security continued to erode as interest and tax arrears continued to accrue — S had been unable to accomplish refinancing or sale of properties — It was appropriate to appoint receiver to arrange sale of properties.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Morawetz J.*:

Bank of Montreal v. Carnival National Leasing Ltd. (2011), 74 C.B.R. (5th) 300, 2011 ONSC 1007, 2011 CarswellOnt 896 (Ont. S.C.J.) — referred to

Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek (1996), 1996 CarswellOnt 2328, 40 C.B.R. (3d) 274 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Bank of Nova Scotia v. Sullivan Investments Ltd. (1982), 1982 CarswellSask 452, 21 Sask. R. 14 (Sask. Q.B.) — considered

Canadian Tire Corp. v. Healy (2011), 2011 ONSC 4616, 2011 CarswellOnt 7430, 81 C.B.R. (5th) 142 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Royal Bank v. White Cross Properties Ltd. (1984), 34 Sask. R. 315, 1984 CarswellSask 33, 53 C.B.R. (N.S.) 96 (Sask. Q.B.) — considered

Textron Financial Canada Ltd. v. Chetwynd Motels Ltd. (2010), 67 C.B.R. (5th) 97, 91 C.P.C. (6th) 171, 2010 CarswellBC 855, 2010 BCSC 477 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3

s. 243(1) — considered

s. 244 — referred to

Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43

s. 101 — considered

APPLICATION by bank for appointment of receiver in respect of S Inc. and S Ltd., both of which were owned by defendant S; APPLICATION by bank for receivership order in respect of two residential properties owned by S pursuant to receivership clauses in mortgages held by bank.

***Morawetz J.*:**

1 This application is brought by Bank of Montreal (the "Bank") and seeks the appointment of a receiver in respect of Sherco Properties Inc. ("Sherco") and Sherk Farm Limited ("Farm"), both of which are owned by the respondent, Mr. Donald Sherk. The Bank also seeks a receivership order in respect of two residential properties owned by Mr. Sherk pursuant to receivership clauses in the mortgages held by the Bank in respect of same.

Background

2 Sherco is the principal debtor in connection with a series of loan facilities extended by the Bank. Both Sherco, as principal debtor, and Farm, as guarantor, have granted general security agreements to the Bank in respect of the indebtedness of Sherco. Mr. Sherk and Cosher Properties Inc. ("Cosher") have each executed guarantees of the indebtedness of Sherco as well as providing other security.

3 The Bank takes the position that, as of September 9, 2013, Sherco was indebted to the Bank pursuant to the credit facilities in the amount of $2,619,669.95, together with outstanding interest, fees and costs, all accrued daily to the date of payment (the "Indebtedness").

4 The respondents do not directly challenge the amount of the Indebtedness, other than to state that the debt of Sherco was settled in August 2013 at $2,300,000 and that the additional costs added in for legals, appraisals and receivership are unreasonable and not in accord with the terms of the credit facility.

5 Sherco is a developer and sub-divider of real property in Ontario and carries on business in Midland, Ontario. Mr. Sherk is listed as the sole officer and director of Sherco, Farm and Cosher.

6 Pursuant to the credit facility letter, Sherco has granted to the Bank security over all of its personal property pursuant to a general security agreement dated September 21, 2006 (the "GSA").

7 In addition, Sherco granted to the Bank a demand $6,500,000 first mortgage over lands known municipally as the Bellisle Heights Subdivision. The mortgage provides for the appointment of a receiver and manager in the event of default.

8 As additional security, Mr. Sherk granted the Bank a $5,263,000 guarantee, dated November 22, 2007 (the "Sherk Guarantee"). Mr. Sherk also granted two separate and independent collateral demand mortgages in support of his guarantee, each in the principal amount of $275,000, over real property known as 317 and 325 Estate Court, Midland, Ontario (collectively with the Sherk Guarantee, the "Sherk Guarantor Security"). Each mortgage also contains an appointment of receiver and manager provision in the event of default.

9 Farm also granted the guarantee of the Sherco Indebtedness and delivered to the Bank a $5,263,000 guarantee dated November 22, 2007 ("Farm Guarantee"). Farm also granted a general security agreement ("Farm GSA") to the Bank dated September 21, 2006.

10 Cosher, as security for the Sherco obligations to the Bank, granted a $770,000 guarantee to the Bank dated November 22, 2007 (the "Cosher Guarantee").

11 In November 2007, Cosher also granted to the Bank, as security for its guarantee, an assignment of a mortgage granted to Cosher by its mortgagor, Coland Developments Corporation. The respondents challenge the amounts outstanding under this mortgage.

The Bellisle Project

12 The Bank advanced Sherco the funds in connection with Sherco's development of Phase 1 of a property development in Penetanguishene known as the Bellisle Heights Subdivision (the "Bellisle Project").

13 The Bellisle Project was to be developed in four proposed phases. After Phase I was completed, there was a significant shortfall of funds which were to repay the Bank. The Bank contends that, as a result, it had concerns about the financial prospects of the Bellisle Project and Sherco's ability to repay the Bank from future proceeds of the sale of presently undeveloped land over which the Bank holds security.

14 In January 2011, the Bank advised Mr. Sherk that it was not willing to fund the development of any further phases of the Bellisle Project and that alternative funding for Phase II and all subsequent phases should be sourced by Sherco. This position was apparently reiterated on a number of occasions.

15 At the present time, neither alternative funding nor sale of properties sufficient to repay the Bank has materialized.

16 Over much of this period, since August 2012, Sherco has failed to make interest payments to the Bank. The Bank takes the position, which is unchallenged, that Sherco has been in default of its obligations for over 14 months.

17 As of September 9, 2013, interest arrears total approximately $124,346.79.

18 In addition, realty taxes in respect of those properties secured by Bank mortgages have fallen into arrears. The Bank contends that this is another breach of the agreements it has with Sherco. Current property tax arrears over the Estate Court properties mortgaged to the Bank amount to:

(a) 317 Estate Court: $50,721.52;

(b) 325 Estate Court: $59,596.49.

19 The Bank takes the position that Sherco and Mr. Sherk have been afforded an abundance of time to secure alternative financing and that the financial risk of permitting Sherco this time has been borne by the Bank, to the prejudice of its secured position. The Bank acknowledges that Sherco has made efforts to secure alternative financing, but take the position that Sherco has not been able to source financing which would repay the Indebtedness in full. The Bank also contends that all proposals put forth by Sherco to date have involved either the Bank being required to accept a lesser amount than the total indebtedness, or accept payment on a deferred basis.

20 On May 31, 2013, the Bank demanded payment from Sherco of all amounts then outstanding under the credit facilities, together with interest, fees and costs, and issued a Notice of Intention to Enforce Security ("NITES") to Sherco pursuant to s. 244 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act* (the "BIA").

21 On the same day, the Bank also demanded payment from:

(a) Mr. Sherk, pursuant to the Sherk Guarantee, and also issued NITES;

(b) Farm, pursuant to the Farm Guarantee, all amounts outstanding by Sherco, and also issued NITES; and

(c) Cosher, pursuant to the Cosher Guarantee in the amount of $700,000.

22 The Bank acknowledges that, in spring 2013, discussions took place regarding a proposed financing of Phase IIa (*i.e.* only a portion of Phase II) from Desjardins ("Desjardins Financing"). The terms of the financing proposed by Desjardins were not agreeable to the Bank, as Desjardins required the discharge of the Bank's mortgage over the entire Phase II lands (including the undeveloped Phase IIb). The Bank contends that, while it was prepared to consider a postponement of its mortgage to Desjardins, it was not prepared to consider an outright discharge.

23 The Bank had other concerns with the Desjardins proposal including:

(a) the $800,000 to be advanced by Desjardins was insufficient to pay off the Indebtedness;

(b) the remaining realty tax arrears;

(c) Sherco continued not to pay its monthly interests;

(d) there was no plan put forward as to how the balance of the Indebtedness would be paid; and

(e) the Bank was concerned about servicing issues regarding the phases of development.

24 Sherco continued to search for further sources of alternative financing including negotiations with First Source Mortgage Corporation. However, the Bank indicated that the First Source Letter of Intent did not represent a firm mortgage commitment from First Source and there had been no waiver of the conditions contained in the Letter of Intent.

25 The Bank contends it worked together with Sherco through July 2013 in an attempt to reach a deal that would (i) permit the financing to proceed, while (ii) allowing the Bank sufficient comfort and to retain adequate security. On August 1, 2013, the parties agreed upon how to proceed. The terms were set out in a Forbearance Agreement (the "August Forbearance") which was sent to Sherco's counsel and accepted by Sherco.

26 The parties appear to have differing versions with respect to whether the August Forbearance was "put in place". However, I do accept that issues arose with the performance of the August Forbearance and, as noted by counsel to the Bank, in part, these issues related to requirements on the part of First Source which were not acceptable to the Bank and which First Source ultimately did not waive.

27 Negotiations continued and on August 13, 2013 and it appeared that the parties were very close to concluding a deal under which Sherco would pay $2,300,000 in exchange for a complete release. However, the $2,300,000 payment (the "Cash Payout") did not materialize.

Positions of the Parties

28 Counsel to the Bank submits that the Bank is entitled under the terms of its security to appoint a receiver upon default. The Bank is of the view that it has been more than generous in providing Mr. Sherk with the opportunity to either sell the secured properties and repay the Bank or obtain alternative financing to continue with the development of the Bellisle Project. Neither has happened.

29 In response to the contention of Mr. Sherk that he is best positioned to sell the properties in question, the Bank points out that he has already attempted to sell both the Bellisle Property and the Estate Court properties without success.

30 The Bank also takes the position that it has lost confidence in Mr. Sherk. Of particular concern, are the following:

(a) after permitting Mr. Sherk to access the Cosher mortgage proceeds, the Bank contends that it subsequently learned that Mr. Sherk used these funds for non-permitted purposes. There is no allegation that Mr. Sherk used the funds in an improper manner, but rather that he reallocated the payments within the corporate group;

(b) Mr. Sherk has failed to make good on his promises when agreements between the Bank and Sherco have been reached;

(c) Mr. Sherk has allowed realty taxes to erode the Bank's security; and

(d) Mr. Sherk has allowed large amounts of unpaid interest to accrue.

31 The Bank also contends that it is entitled to appoint a receiver under the terms of its security and, due to the loss of confidence in Mr. Sherk, the Bank wishes that the sale process be controlled by an independent court-supervised receiver.

32 From the standpoint of Sherco, counsel submits that there is no evidence of any urgency to appoint a receiver.

33 Counsel also points out that the main security is unserviced land suitable for subdivision, that the land is vacant and that there is no resistance to the Bank's enforcement.

34 Counsel also submits that the other main security, a matrimonial home and another which is vacant, have some equity and there is no resistance to vacant possession.

35 In short, counsel contends that there is nothing that should attract additional court costs and receiver and counsel fees, all to the detriment of the guarantors. There is no active business to conduct or supervise, nor is there income or a need to preserve or protect.

36 From the standpoint of the respondents, the issue is whether a court-appointed receiver or receiver manager should be appointed on this record. Counsel points out that the Bank has the right to go into possession for default, foreclose, seek a sale or appoint a private receiver or receiver manager. Counsel contends that there are no compelling reasons to permit the receivership appointment.

37 Counsel also submits that the Bank grounds its application in the delay that has occurred over the last many months, but that delay was mutual and could have, and should have, resulted in a settlement.

Law

38 The statutory provisions relied upon by the Bank provide that a receiver may be appointed where it is "just or convenient" to do so.

39 Section 243(1) of the BIA provides that, on application by a secured creditor, a court may appoint a receiver to do any or all of the following if it considers to be just or convenient to do so:

> (a) take possession of all or substantially all of the inventory, accounts receivable or other property of an insolvent person or bankrupt that was acquired for or used in relation to a business carried on by the insolvent person or bankrupt;
>
> (b) exercise any control that the court considers advisable over that property and over the insolvent person's or bankrupt's business; or
>
> (c) take any other action that the court considers advisable.

40 Section 101 of the *Courts of Justice Act* states:

> In the Superior Court of Justice, an interlocutory injunction or mandatory order may be granted or a receiver or a receiver and manager may be appointed by an interlocutory order, where it appears to a judge of the court to be just or convenient to do so.

41 In determining whether it is just or convenient to appoint a receiver under both statutes, a court must have regard to all of the circumstances of the case, particularly the nature of the property and the rights and interests of all parties in relation to the property. See *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek* (1996), 40 C.B.R. (3d) 274 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]).

42 Where the security instrument governing the relationship between the debtor and the secured creditor provides for a right to appoint a receiver upon default, this has the effect of relaxing the burden on the applicant seeking to have the receiver appointed. While the appointment of a receiver is generally regarded as an extraordinary equitable remedy, courts do not regard the nature of the remedy as extraordinary or equitable where the relevant security document permits the appointment of a receiver. This is because the applicant is merely seeking to enforce a term of an agreement that was assented to by both parties. See *Textron Financial Canada Ltd. v. Chetwynd Motels Ltd.*, 2010 BCSC 477 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]); *Freure Village*, *supra*; *Canadian Tire Corp. v. Healy*, 2011 ONSC 4616 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) and *Bank of Montreal v. Carnival National Leasing Ltd.*, 2011 ONSC 1007 (Ont. S.C.J.).

43 Counsel to the respondents contends that this situation should be governed by *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Sullivan Investments Ltd.* (1982), 21 Sask. R. 14 (Sask. Q.B.) where Estey J. (as he then was) reasoned as follows:

> ...that where a security agreement provides for the appointment of a receiver manager the court will not intercede and grant an application to appoint a receiver manager unless it is shown to be necessary for the receiver manager to more efficiently carry out its work and duty.

44 Similar comments were stated in *Royal Bank v. White Cross Properties Ltd.* (1984), 53 C.B.R. (N.S.) 96 (Sask. Q.B.).

45 Counsel to the respondents contends that there is nothing in the material before the courts to demonstrate that the appointment is just or convenient or a threat to the contractual remedies.

46 Having reviewed the record and, hearing submissions, I cannot give effect to the position put forth by the respondents, except with respect to the matrimonial home.

47 I have reached this conclusion for the following reasons:

(a) the terms of the security held by the Bank in respect of Sherco and Farm permit the appointment of a receiver;

(b) the terms of the mortgages permit the appointment of a receiver upon default;

(c) the value of the security continues to erode as interest and tax arrears continue to accrue;

(d) Mr. Sherk contends that, with his assistance and knowledge, the Bank will get the highest and most value from the sale of the lands. It has been demonstrated over the past two years that Mr. Sherk has not been able to accomplish a refinancing or a sale.

48 In my view the time has come to turn the sales process over to an independent court officer. The security documents provide for this remedy. The involvement in the process of the court officer will minimize the fallout of litigation between the parties, which could result in a further delay and protracted post-transaction litigation.

49 In the event the properties become subject to a proposed sale by the receiver, and Mr. Sherk takes issue with the manner of their sale or the price obtained, he will have the full opportunity to object to the approval of the sale.

50 I am satisfied that it is both just and convenient and efficient for the Bellisle Project lands to be marketed and sold by a receiver. I am also satisfied that the same receiver can also manage the sale of the vacant Estates Court property.

51 However, I have not been persuaded that it is necessary to appoint a receiver over the matrimonial property occupied by Mr. Sherk. The involvement of a receiver over the matrimonial home in these circumstances is potentially far more invasive than necessary. With respect to the property, it is open for the Bank to pursue its remedies pursuant to the mortgage, including power of sale and foreclosure.

52 In the result, I have concluded that it is both just and convenient to appoint Albert Gelman Inc. as receiver in respect of:

(a) Sherco;

(b) Farm; and

(c) 317 Estates Court

53 The application in respect of Sherco, Farm and 317 Estates Court entities is granted.

54 The receivership order does not extend to the matrimonial home of 325 Estate Court. However, the Bank is free to pursue its other contractual remedies in respect of this property.

55 The Bank is also entitled to its costs on this application.

Application granted.

End of Document

Tab 7

1984 CarswellOnt 3555
Ontario Supreme Court [High Court of Justice]

Cardinal Insurance Co. v. Mendez Holdings (Canada) Co.

1984 CarswellOnt 3555, 26 A.C.W.S. (2d) 190

Cardinal Insurance Company, by its liquidator, the superintendent of Insurance, Plaintiff and Mendez Holdings (Canada) Limited, Inscan Services Limited, Antony Mendez, Seven Hills Holdings Limited, and 489262 Ontario Limited, Defendants

Gray J.

Judgment: June 26, 1984
Docket: None given.

Counsel: J. A. Campion, K. M. McLoughlin, for the Plaintiff
T. G. Heintzman, Q.C., for the Defendant Inscan Service Limited

Headnote
Labour and employment law

***Gray J.*:**

1 This is an application made on behalf of the Plaintiff, Cardinal Insurance Company, by its liquidator, the Superintendent of Insurance for an order that Price Waterhouse Limited be appointed as Receiver and Manager of the Defendant Inscan Services Limited. The draft order filed was in part in this form:

> ... and it is hereby appointed Receiver and Manager without security herein of the property, assets, business and undertakings of the Defendant Inscan Services Limited for the purposes of collecting, preserving, protecting and realizing upon the said property, assets, business and undertaking until the trial or other final disposition of this action and to collect, get in and receive the debts due and outstanding and other assets, property and effects belonging to the business carried on in the name of Inscan Services Limited, and to receive the proceeds of trust and other accounts in the name of Inscan Services Limited ....

2 The application is brought under Section 19(1) of the *Judicature Act*, R.S.O. 1980, c. 223, which reads as follows:

> 19 (1) A mandamus or an injunction may be granted or a receiver maybe appointed by an interlocutory Order of the Court in all cases in which it appears to the Court to be just or convenient that the Order should be made, and any such Order may be made either unconditionally or upon such terms and conditions as the Court considers just, and if an injunction is asked, either before, or at, or after the hearing of any cause or matter, to prevent any threatened or apprehended waste or trespass, the injunction may be granted, whether the person against whom it is sought is or is not in possession under any claim of title or otherwise, or, if out of possession, does or does not claim a right to do the act sought to be restrained under a colour of title, and whether the estates claimed by both or either of the parties are legal or equitable.

3 Reference willlater be made to the facts including a management agreement between Cardinal and Inscan. One of the provisions of the agreement was that Inscan should have power to issue insurance policies binding Cardinal which in April, 1979, was registered to underwrite property, automobile and liability insurance and should have authority to settle and adjust claims made in respect of such policies and should collect premiums payable in respect of such policies. In the sequence of relevant events, it will become apparent that an important point of contention as between Cardinal and Inscan revolves around

the accounts receivable which were owed to Inscan on Cardinal policies from sub-agents of Inscan. These accounts receivable will hereafter be referred to as "receivables" and it is claimed that these receivables are in danger of becoming uncollectible.

4 From August 5, 1982, to the present time, Cardinal has taken some steps to collect its outstanding receivables but ran into the same difficulty that Inscan experienced in 1980 and thereafter, due to the agents taking the position that the receivables involve Inscan and Cardinal and that they would not pay only one person. There are undoubtedly different reasons for nonpayment by the various agents across Canada and these may be clarified when the facts are summarized.

5 Counsel for the Plaintiff, applicant, in opening advised me that the object to be sought in the appointment of an interim receiver for the safeguarding of property was well illustrated by a passage to be found in *Kerr On Receivers* (15 e ed. p. 5), stated thus:

> A Receiver can only be properly appointed for the purpose of getting in and holding or securing funds or other property, which the Court at the trial, or in the course of the action, will have the means of distributing amongst, or making over to, the persons or person entitled thereto. The object sought by such appointment is therefore the safeguarding of property for the benefit of those entitled to it. There are two main classes of cases in which the appointment is made: (1) to enable persons who possess rights over property to obtain the benefit of those rights and to preserve the property pending realization, where ordinary legal remedies are defective; and (2) to preserve property from some danger which threatens it.

6 Counsel for the Plaintiff took the position that the present situation fell under (2) supra, and that the premiums collected by Inscan were under the provisions of paragraph 3 of the management agreement to be held in trust for Cardinal pending remittance. He also claimed that there was a second trust by reason of the provisions of Section 359(1) of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1980, c. 218:

> 359. — (1) An agent or broker who acts in negotiating, or renewing or continuing a contract of insurance, other than life insurance, with a licensed insurer, and who receives any money or substitute for money as a premium for such a contract from the insured, shall be deemed to hold such premium in trust for the insurer, and, if he fails to pay the premium over to the insurer within fifteen days after written demand made upon him therefor, less his commission and any deductions to which, by the written consent of the company, he is entitled, such failure is prima facie evidence that he has used or applied the premium for a purpose other than paying it over to the insurer.

7 There was also a further submission that a Receiver should be appointed because of five allegations of fraud which were set forth in the Statement of Claim delivered by the Plaintiff May 22, 1984, when threatened by a motion to dismiss this action for want of prosecution, the writ having been issued August 30, 1983.

8 The parties' positions will become clearer as we proceed but to understand the ground upon which issue has been joined, it would be beneficial even before the facts are summarized to record the seven submissions of counsel on behalf of Inscan as to why an interim receiver should *not* be appointed. I propose to put these submissions as they were stated by counsel on behalf of Inscan:

> I. The court should apply the general rule that a receiver should not be appointed before judgment so as to prejudge the case between the parties.
>
> II. The appointment of a receiver is an equitable remedy and accordingly, the appointment should not be made where the applicant is the cause of the problem it seeks to remedy and where the applicant has delayed for over two years in the enforcement of remedies.
>
> III. What the Plaintiff applicant seeks is an active position and not the passive holding of Inscan's assets.
>
> IV. The tests that should be met should be at least as stringent as those applicable on an application for a Mareva type injunction and the applicant cannot meet those tests.

V. The plaintiff applicant is not seeking the appointment of an impartial receiver but is really asking to have itself appointed receiver.

VI. The appointment of the receiver is designed to ensure that Inscan's corporate existence is imperilled.

VII. The alleged reason for the appointment is unnecessary. There is no evidence that Cardinal and Inscan cannot collect these receivables. There is no evidence that Inscan has been asked to collect these receivables and has refused to take action.

The Facts:

9 It must be remembered that this is an interlocutory application and that my knowledge of the relevant facts comes from the statements of counsel, the supporting affidavit material and the documents referred to therein, the cross-examination on certain affidavits, the examination of a witness and the allegations set forth in the Statement of Claim. The Statement of Defence has not yet been delivered.

10 I hope to mention only the facts that are relevant to this application as distinct from those which are relevant to the action itself.

11 In August, 1980, Mendez Holdings (controlled by Antony Mendez and his family) purchased controlling interest in Inscan and Mr. Mendez was president of Cardinal, Inscan and Mendez Holdings. A management agreement was signed November 7, 1980, effective July 1, 1980, with Inscan as the manager. Reference has already been made to paragraph 3 of this agreement by which the net premiums collected by the manager are to be held in trust for Cardinal pending remittance. The agreement made provision for other matters but Inscan was to be paid a commission equal to 20 (of the premiums and Inscan was to issue the policies and collect the accounts due from sub-agents. The 20 (commission was to be split so that the sub-agent received 8 $^{1}/_{2}$% (and Inscan received 11 $^{1}/_{2}$%.

12 Paragraph 7 of this agreement dealt with termination upon notice of not less than three months. Paragraph 7(f) reads in part as follows:

> Upon termination of the agency, the Manager shall within a reasonable time thereafter deliver to the company all property of the company, copies of policies, and endorsements and all claims records and shall in no way thereafter without the prior written consent of the company use the company's name or imply any connection with it.

13 In the fall of 1981, all of the business of Inscan related only to Cardinal and they were under 100% common ownership. Mr. Mendez, on September 30, 1981, purported to terminate the management agreement.

14 Paragraph 20 of the Statement of Claim reads as follows:

> In or about December, 1981, the Superintendent became aware that all reinsurance treaties between Cardinal and the Canadian Union Insurance Company (a company incorporated under the laws of Canada) were void ab initio as far as The Canadian Union Insurance Company was concerned. As a result of the lack of reinsurance treaties, there was an asset deficiency in Cardinal for the period ending November 30, 1981, of $1,700,000 and an asset deficiency in Cardinal under the provisions of section 103(1) of the Act of $2,400,000.

15 This is, of course, an allegation in a pleading but it seems to be agreed that the policy holders were at risk because of Cardinal's lack of reinsurance.

16 It is alleged that as of January 1, 1982, Inscan had no business and no employees, the employees having been transferred to Cardinal. on January 4, 1982, another agreement emerges, known as the "Book of Business Agreement". The Respondent's Statement of Fact and Law (paragraph 3) refers to this agreement thus:

> ... Under the Book of Business Agreement, Inscan turned over its book of business with its sub-agents to Cardinal. In consideration of this turnover, Inscan was to receive a commission from Cardinal during 1982, 1983 and 1984, in 1982 the minimum quarterly commission to be paid by Cardinal to Inscan was $150,000. In the event of the agreement being terminated, Cardinal agreed to pay Inscan a gross premium upon the minimum commissions which would have been earned by Inscan, which premium would total $1,000,000 .....

17 This agreement is dated four days after the notice of termination of the management agreement. The Plaintiff asks what was there to sell in the Book of Business Agreement since Cardinal owned all rights to everything once there was termination of the management agreement? The Plaintiff further claims that this was not an arms length agreement and that it is null and void because of fraud. Five allegations of fraud are made concerning this agreement. Inscan maintains the position that it owns the receivables which are the subject of this application. This position is taken because Cardinal has not paid under the Book of Business Agreement. The question is asked why has Inscan not acted to collect the receivables; it being alleged that 11 $^{1}/_{2}$% of them belong to Inscan, the remaining amount being alleged to be the subject of the trust.

18 This was the state of affairs as between Inscan and Cardinal when the Superintendent of Insurance was ordered by the Minister of State (Finance) to take control of the assets of Cardinal, pursuant to the provisions of the *Canada and British Insurance Companies Act*, on February 19, 1982. Mr. Ronaldson, the Accountant for Inscan testified that the receivables were uncollectible from this latter date. on March 12, 1982, a valuation of Inscan was done by Mr. Ronaldson. Considerable argument was directed to me concerning these financial statements and the certification of inter-company accounts between Inscan and Cardinal.

19 On March 15, 1982, there was a "certification" of inter-company accounts between Inscan and Cardinal. Counsel for the Plaintiff both took strong exception to description of this statement as being a certification since he alleged that Mr. Ronaldson merely took into account Inscan's portfolio income as of December, 1981, and applied a multiplier. I am not going to review in any detail the work of Mr. Ronaldson. Suffice it to say that the March 17, 1982, statement of account from Inscan to Cardinal before including the $1,100,000 obligation alleged to be owing by Cardinal to Inscan showed Inscan owing a net amount of $586,864 to Cardinal and after including the amount of $1,100,000 aforesaid, the statement of account showed Cardinal owing Inscan $531,136.

20 From March 15 to June 30, 1982, only $17,000 was collected of the outstanding receivables by Inscan and Cardinal under the direction of Mr. Mendez.

21 On May 19, 1982, the Department of Insurance delivered a letter to the Bank of Montreal requesting that certain monies not be released without the approval of the Department of Insurance. Shortly thereafter, the Attorney General of Canada commenced an action in this court against Inscan and its bankers the Bank of Montreal, claiming the sum of $1,807,201 as being due by Inscan to Cardinal pursuant to the management agreement. This action was discontinued on March 22, 1984. Reference will be made later to the remaining litigation.

22 On June 3, 1982, the Superintendent wrote to the various debtors of Inscan demanding that they pay to Cardinal any amounts still uncollected and owing to Inscan and stating that if such funds were paid to Inscan, the remitters of the monies would be additionally liable to Cardinal for any amounts so remitted. In the result, it is said that the debtors did not pay since Cardinal couldn't give a release and since the Superintendent's letter had the effect of threatening them with double liability.

23 A second inter-company account was delivered on June 11, 1982. Inscan placed $600,000 in a special account with the Bank of Montreal to satisfy any obligations it might have to the Plaintiff and had placed its general funds, amounting to more than $100,000 in a separate account with that bank.

24 On July 30, 1982, Mr. Justice White, pursuant to the application of the Attorney General of Canada acting on behalf of the Superintendent, granted an order winding up Cardinal with Price Waterhouse Limited being appointed liquidator as agent for the Superintendent.

On August 5, 1982, Price Waterhouse Limited received some records from Inscan but it is claimed these are incomplete and unreliable. Inscan claims possession was taken of Inscan's business and financial records. Cardinal has taken some steps to collect the receivables but ran into the same difficulty Inscan experienced. Three black volumes of documents were put forward to evidence the attempts made on Cardinal's behalf to collect.

25 On September 28, 1982, Cardinal and the Superintendent commenced a second action against Inscan and the Bank of Montreal, claiming the same amount of $1,807,201 as claimed in the Attorney General of Canada's action to which reference was previously made.

26 This present action, we are involved with, commenced on August 30, 1983, claiming an accounting of damages for breach of the management agreement and for an accounting of the benefits alleged to be owed by Inscan by reason of the January 4, 1982, agreement.

27 From November, 1982, to April, 1984, there have been lengthy settlement discussions between the parties and letters passing between Counsel. I am not going into these matters except to note that they dealt with numerous things, including the possibility of consolidation of the actions, the possible personnel to attempt collection of the receivables and the possibility of arbitration.

28 One might wonder why I have, in this interlocutory application, dealt with the facts in such detail. The point is that without this factual background, it is virtually impossible to decide the matter in issue in this application.

29 The most orderly method of dealing with the matter in issue would be to consider seven submissions referred to on page 5 of these reasons with the assistance of the submissions of both counsel. They were previously numbered and I will follow that order also..

I. No receiver should be appointed before judgment

30 Under section 19(1) of the *Judicature Act*, "a mandamus or an injuction may be granted or a receiver appointed by an interlocutory order of the court in all cases in which it appears to be just and convenient that the order should be made." Numerous authorities were cited to me to support the proposition that the courts have generally refused to exercise jurisdiction to protect a creditor before judgment. I do not quarrel with this proposition supported for the most part by early cases such as *Latimer V. Aylesbury* (1878) 9 C.L.D. 385 and *McCall v. Canadian Farmers Mutual Insurance Co*. (1882) 18 C.L.D. 117.

31 In my view, this is not a case of prejudgment. The receivables are trust monies upon collection and what is required is Inscan's name for purposes of suit. There would *prima facie* be a right to an accounting and there would seen to be no valid argument to dispute the existence of a trust. I do not accept the statement that the applicant has no legal or equitable interest in the receivables. The monies if, and when received, will be held pending the adjudication of the parties' rights.

Kerr on Receivers (15th ed. p. 14) makes reference to the fact that "misconduct" can be a related consideration on the application for the appointment of a receiver. I find that such a related consideration is not to be found in our situation. First because the allegations against Inscan have yet to be proved and secondly, because Inscan has not done anything for the past two years.

32 The conclusion I reach is that I am not prepared to deny the application on this first submission.

II. The equitable remedy being sought should be denied because the applicant is the cause of the problem and has been guilty of delay in the enforcement of remedies.

33 The authorities cited by counsel for the respondents *are Kerr on Receivers*, *supra*, p. 7 and *Owen v. Homan* (1853) 4 H. L.C. 996. Again, I do not quarrel with this proposition but I ask myself whether the winding up of Cardinal or the correspondence with the debtors were in reality, the "cause of the problem" so far as the collection of the receivables was concerned.

34 I do not think that these two things were "the cause of the problem" and the alleged delay over the past two years has been explained by the number of counsel involved and the various subjects with which they were confronted. These subjects included many more than just the collection of the receivables. I would not exercise my discretion against the applicant on this second submission.

III. The court should only appoint a passive agent.

35 The receiver appointed by the Court has no right to actively carry on the business of the company of which he is appointed receiver but only the passive right to receive in and hold the monies due to that company; *Evans v. Coventry* (1854) 3 Drew. 75.

36 The answer to this third submission is that the appointment is sought not of a general receiver but that of a limited receiver. It was for this reason that paragraph 1 of the draft order sought was reproduced on page I of these reasons.

IV. The stringent tests applied in the Mareva injuction situation should apply.

37 These tests or conditions were set forth in *Third Chandris Shipping Corp. v. Unimarine SA* [1979) 2 All E.R. 972 at 984-985.

38 I am urged to hold that in the present situation, the applicant does not have a strong *prima facie* case, that there is no danger here of the assets going outside the jurisdiction, that nothing Inscan is doing in endangering the receivables and that the requisite undertaking as to damages has not been given.

39 I entertain doubts as to whether the Mareva injunction test is required. The argument may be made that the receivables may have in a position in one point of time where Inscan was the primary creditor but there is a very, very strong argument that the monies are those of Cardinal in any event because of the trust situation and the fact that Cardinal had a majority interest in them.

40 Notwithstanding the strong submissions of Counsel for the respondents on this fourth submission, I am not prepared to refuse the application on this ground. I will deal later with the undertaking as to damages.

V. The applicant is not seeking the appointment of an impartial receiver.

41 I am confronted with the allegation that Price Waterhouse Limited would not be an impartial receiver. The receiver, being a court appointee, must be impartial and I have no evidence before me to support the allegation of partiality.

VI. The appointment will ensure that Inscan cannot defend this action.

42 What is said in this connection is that there is $186,460 which Inscan claims as its own funds which are on deposit with the Bank of Montreal and which will not be available for its use.

43 I have some difficulty understanding this submission. The ability of Inscan to defend the action doesn't arise from the collection of the receivables. I am advised that Inscan at present doesn't have the employees, assets, documentation or present knowledge of the situation to proceed against the receivables.

VII. The alleged reason for the appointment is unnecessary.

44 I was informed that Inscan would take certain action. I have seen no evidence of this and it would appear that Inscan is not able to do this. I was urged to refuse the application so that that would cause the Superintendent to co-operate with Inscan. In the light of the factual situation I detailed at such length previously, I am unable to comprehend why the refusal to appoint would guarantee co-operation.

45 What this boils down to is a question of whether on the applicable law, a limited receivership should be appointed. The collection of these monies from the agents is what we are concerned with and as time passes, it becomes much more difficult.

A person must be appointed who can sue in the names of Cardinal and Inscan and who can give the appropriate settlement documents.

46 It is not proposed that the monies be used pending the outcome of the action itself. The monies collected heretofore have gone into a trust account at the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce.

47 I have put out of my mind the allegation of fraud made in the Statement of Claim and likewise, I have not become involved in a consideration of the inadequacy of the financial documents prepared by Mr. Ronaldson. By the same token, so far as the settlement discussions were concerned, I have not examined them and am not prepared to decide whether or not they were reasonable.

48 The important statement of law is that found *in Kerr on Receivables*, *supra*, page 7:

> If the Court is satisfied upon the materials it has before it that the party who makes the application has established a good prima facie title, and that the property the subject-matter of the proceedings will be in danger if left until the trial in the possession or under the control of the party against whom the Receiver is asked for or, at least, that there is reason to apprehend that the party who makes the application will be in a worse situation if the appointment of a Receiver be delayed, the appointment of a receiver is almost a matter of course. If there is no danger to the property, and no fact is in evidence to show the necessity or expediency of appointing a Receiver, a Receiver will not be appointed.

49 I find that the applicant with the trust situation has made out a strong *prima facie* case, that the property in question, the receivables are in peril and that the balance of convenience for a variety of reasons, rests with the applicant.

50 The order will go for the appointment of the receiver as sought in the Notice of Motion. The form of the order and the question of costs may be spoken to if counsel cannot agree.

51 So far as the undertaking as to damages is concerned, I note that counsel for the applicant was prepared to give the undertaking on the part of Cardinal. This company is not insolvent since it was the subject of a winding up order of Mr. Justice White on July 30, 1982. 1 do not know what damages can be sustained as a result of this order when the receivables are going to be collected and held separately until the lawsuit ends. There is still the $600,000 held by the Bank of Montreal. My present inclination is to also order that this order should issue if the Superintendent gives the requisite undertaking as to damages. If there is difficulty in this regard, this is a further subject on which I may be spoken to.

Tab 8

2020 MBQB 58, 2020 CarswellMan 174, 317 A.C.W.S. (3d) 238, 79 C.B.R. (6th) 44

2020 MBQB 58
Manitoba Court of Queen's Bench

White Oak Commercial Finance, LLC v. Nygård Holdings (USA) Limited et al.

2020 CarswellMan 174, 2020 MBQB 58, 317 A.C.W.S. (3d) 238, 79 C.B.R. (6th) 44

IN THE MATTER OF: THE APPOINTMENT OF A RECEIVER PURSUANT TO SECTION 243 OF THE BANKRUPTCY AND INSOLVENCY ACT, R.S.C. C. B-3, AS AMENDED, AND SECTION 55 OF THE COURT OF QUEEN'S BENCH ACT, C.C.S.M., C. C280, AS AMENDED

WHITE OAK COMMERCIAL FINANCE, LLC (Applicant) and NYGÅRD HOLDINGS (USA) LIMITED, NYGÅRD INC., FASHION VENTURES, INC., NYGÅRD NY RETAIL, LLC, 4093879 CANADA LTD., 4093887 CANADA LTD., NYGÅRD INTERNATIONAL PARTNERSHIP, NYGÅRD PROPERTIES LTD., AND NYGÅRD ENTERPRISES LTD. (Respondents)

Edmond J.

Judgment: March 26, 2020
Docket: Winnipeg Centre CI 20-01-26627

Counsel: Marc Wasserman, Jeremy Dacks, Catherine Howden, Eric Blouw, for Applicant
Wayne Onchulenko, for Respondents
Bruce Taylor, Ross McFadyen, Melanie LaBossiere (articling student), for Richter Advisory Group Inc.
David Jackson, Shayne Kukulowicz, Hylton Levy, for proposal trustee, A. Farber & Partners Inc.

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
IV Receivers
IV.1 Appointment

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Receivers — Appointment
WC LLC, lender, advanced funds to N Group to fund their payroll — Funding was advanced by WC LLC because N Group had not confirmed that sufficient funds were deposited in corporate account — N Group did not deposit necessary payroll funds, and WC LLC funded payroll to ensure that employee payroll was not interrupted during crucial time frame — New evidence was received, which included that N Group provided no indication of how they intended to fund payroll, that WC LLC had responded to N Groups funding request, but that N Group did not respond to WWC LLC's proposal — WC LLC brought application for R LLP to be appointed as receiver — Application granted — Further evidence satisfactorily showed that N Group had not been acting in good faith and with due diligence — As result of N Group failing to provide accurate and timely information to proposal trustee and WC LLC, proposal proceedings were untenable — Further, N Group had no plan to continue to fund its operations and no other lender had stepped up to provide necessary financing to pay out WC LLC — It was fundamental, for purpose of proposal process to continue, that N Group cooperate with proposal trustee and this had not occurred — Unilateral closing of its retail stores, distribution centres and website, without consulting with WC LLC or proposal trustee, was in breach of Credit Agreement and court order.

Table of Authorities

Cases considered by *Edmond J.*:

Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek (1996), 40 C.B.R. (3d) 274, 1996 CarswellOnt 2328 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Callidus Capital Corp. v. Carcap Inc. (2012), 2012 ONSC 163, 2012 CarswellOnt 480, 84 C.B.R. (5th) 300 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Dondeb Inc., Re (2012), 2012 ONSC 6087, 2012 CarswellOnt 15528, 97 C.B.R. (5th) 264 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — followed

Romspen Investment Corp. v. 6711162 Canada Inc. (2014), 2014 ONSC 2781, 2014 CarswellOnt 5836, 13 C.B.R. (6th) 136, 35 C.L.R. (4th) 167, 2 P.P.S.A.C. (4th) 332 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) — referred to

Textron Financial Canada Ltd. v. Chetwynd Motels Ltd. (2010), 2010 BCSC 477, 2010 CarswellBC 855, 67 C.B.R. (5th) 97, 91 C.P.C. (6th) 171 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]) — referred to

7451190 Manitoba Ltd v. CWB Maxium Financial Inc et al (2019), 2019 MBCA 95, 2019 CarswellMan 772 (Man. C.A.) — referred to

Statutes considered:

Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-3
Generally — referred to

s. 50.4 [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — referred to

s. 50.4(11) [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 19] — referred to

s. 69(1) — considered

s. 69.4 [en. 1992, c. 27, s. 36(1)] — considered

s. 243 — pursuant to

s. 243(1) — considered

s. 244(1) — referred to

Court of Queen's Bench Act, S.M. 1988-89, c. 4
s. 55(1) — considered

APPLICATION by WC LLC for R LLP to be appointed as receiver.

***Edmond J.*:**

Introduction

1 The applicant, White Oak Commercial Finance, LLC applies pursuant to s. 243 of the *Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act*, R.S.C., 1985, c. B-3, as amended ("*BIA*") and s. 55(1) of *The Court of Queen's Bench Act*, C.C.S.M. c. C280, as amended ("*QB Act*") for the appointment of Richter Advisory Group LLP ("Richter") as receiver without security, of all assets, undertakings and properties of the respondents. On March 18, 2020, the court granted a receivership order and advised the

parties that brief reasons for decision would be delivered following the hearing. These are those reasons.

2 By way of background, this matter proceeded in court on Tuesday, March 10, 2020 and was adjourned to Thursday, March 12, 2020, to permit the respondents to file responding affidavit material. Interim orders were made to preserve the status quo pending the hearing on the merits.

3 The respondents are identified in the affidavit material as the corporate entities operating retail, wholesale and business operations of the Nygård clothing and fashion business in Canada and the USA ("Nygård Group"). As at March 12, 2020, the Nygård Group operated 169 retail stores in Canada and the USA, operated a wholesale business and employed approximately 1450 employees.

4 The respondents filed an affidavit of Greg Fenske, affirmed March 11, 2020 and a supplemental brief for the hearing that proceeded on March 12, 2020. After hearing submissions from all parties, the court reserved its decision on whether Richter should be appointed as a receiver and ordered the Nygård Group to continue to fully comply with the terms of the Credit Agreement entered into with Lenders, Second Avenue Capital Partners LLC and White Oak Commercial Finance, LLC ("Lenders") dated December 30, 2019 ("Credit Agreement") and that no Collateral (as defined in the Credit Agreement) would be disposed of outside of the ordinary course of business without the prior written consent of the applicant and the proposal trustee, A. Farber & Partners Inc.

5 During the course of the hearing on March 12, 2020, the court was advised that the Lenders advanced funds to the Nygård Group to fund their payroll due on March 12, 2020. The payroll funding was advanced by the Lenders because the Nygård Group had not confirmed that sufficient funds were deposited in the Nygård corporate account, by way of cash injection, to fund the payroll which was to be paid out by electronic fund transfer to employees. The Nygård Group had confirmed before the March 12, 2020 hearing that the payroll would be funded by way of a cash injection. Paragraph 10(a) of the proposal trustee's first report states:

> the Proposal Trustee attended on a call with representatives of the Nygard Group where the Proposal Trustee was advised that (i) funds sufficient to satisfy the payroll obligation had been deposited with the Nygard Group and evidence of such funding had been provided to Osler as required by the Winnipeg Court; (ii) the short term primary focus of the Nygard Group was to obtain funds to repay the Lenders in full so as to permit the Nygard Group to focus on a restructuring and rationalization of its business.

6 Contrary to the representations made to the proposal trustee, the Nygård Group did not deposit the necessary payroll funds. The Lenders therefore funded the payroll to ensure that the employee payroll was not interrupted during this crucial time frame. During the course of the hearing on March 12, 2020, counsel for the Nygård Group advised that an advance of payroll funding had been received and the Lenders' advance of payroll would be reimbursed from those funds.

7 The court was further advised later in the afternoon during the same hearing held March 12, 2020 that the payroll advance had been transferred from the Nygård Group bank account to a bank account of Edson's Investments Inc. The supplementary affidavit of Robert L. Dean affirmed March 17, 2020, states that Edson's Investment Inc. is an entity controlled by Mr. Nygård which is not part of the Nygård Group named as respondents in this proceeding and is not a party to the Credit Agreement.

8 The primary submission advanced by the respondents at the March 12, 2020 hearing was that the Canadian entities had filed Notices of Intention to make a Proposal in Bankruptcy ("NOIs") pursuant to s. 50.4 of the *BIA*, the stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 69(1) of the *BIA* applied and accordingly, the court should permit the proposal process to continue and stay the applicant's proceeding. Further, Nygård Group submitted that they had more than sufficient equity to pay out the Lenders in full and intended to have a proposal to do so by March 20, 2020.

9 On March 13, 2020, the court provided oral reasons for decision regarding the application and the motion made by the applicant to lift or terminate any stay of proceedings granted regarding the proposal process. To summarize, the court ordered:

a) The proper jurisdiction to hear the application and the NOI proceedings is Manitoba;

b) The NOI proceedings are not invalid or a nullity and the proposal proceedings should proceed in this court;

c) The draft cash flow statements prepared by the Nygård Group and provided to the proposal trustee must be provided to counsel for the applicant;

d) The application by the Lenders for the appointment of Richter as the receiver was adjourned until Friday, March 20, 2020;

e) The respondents were directed to continue to fully and promptly comply with all terms and provisions of the Credit Agreement and all documents ancillary thereto, and, without limitation, comply with s. 6.10 of the Credit Agreement;

f) Until further of the court, no steps would be taken by the respondents to dispense with or dispose of Collateral, as that term is defined in the Credit Agreement, other than:

i. by way of the sale of Collateral at the respondents' retail outlets in the ordinary course of business of such retail outlets; or

ii. with the advance written consent of the applicant and the proposal trustee;

g) All additional responding affidavit material must be filed in court by no later than 2:00 p.m. on Thursday, March 19, 2020;

h) In accordance with the undertaking given by counsel for the Nygård Group, the court directed the Nygård Group to return the payroll funds that were earmarked for payroll, which funds were transferred or removed from the Nygård Group corporate bank account on March 12, 2020;

i) The application was adjourned and the motion by the applicant to terminate or lift the stay of proceedings in effect pursuant to s. 69(1) of the *BIA* was denied at that time, although the court stated that the imminent necessity for appointing a receiver may change if reasonable steps were not taken by the Nygård Group to pay the outstanding indebtedness to the applicant and/or further evidence established that the Nygård Group failed to comply with the Credit Agreement during the period of the stay;

j) The respondents were given one week to cooperate with the proposal trustee in the proposal process in accordance with the *BIA* and act in good faith and with due diligence, including take reasonable steps as noted above.

New Evidence Received since March 13, 2020

10 A further affidavit affirmed by Robert L. Dean on March 17, 2020, confirmed, among other things:

a) The funds that the Nygård Group was supposed to have deposited in the Nygård Group bank account sufficient to satisfy the payroll obligation was not deposited. Funds were deposited, but then were removed or transferred out as noted above.

b) The proposal trustee forwarded a cash flow forecast to applicant's counsel during the March 12, 2020 hearing and the cash flow forecast contemplated continued funding by the Lenders despite the termination of the funding commitment.

c) A funding request from the Nygård Group included approximately $1.032 million Canadian for payroll, source deductions and rent. The Nygård Group provided no indication of how they intended to fund the payroll for the week of March 15, 2020.

d) On March 15, 2020, the Lenders responded to the Nygård Group's funding request advising they were prepared to provide funding on the following terms:

(a) The Lenders will fund the advance request (subject to review by Richter);

(b) The Nygard Group will engage a third-party liquidator to negotiate with Perry Ellis and liquidate US wholesale (and other assets immediately available for sale);

(c) The Nygard Group will confirm that the Lenders are authorized to speak to wholesale customers and Perry Ellis;

(d) The proceeds of any wholesale sale shall be immediately repaid to the Lenders;

(e) White Oak will receive a release from the Loan Parties and Peter Nygard on the same terms as White Oak previously communicated in the pay-off letter it previously provided, which shall be effective immediately;

(f) The Nygard Group will agree to remove the $20 million cap on the real estate Collateral;

(g) The Nygard Group will sign up a stalking horse (sic) bidder (with an approximately 10% deposit) with respect to the sale of the Toronto real estate, with any deal to close in 30 days (subject to a higher and better bid at auction);

(h) The Nygard Group will pay a $500,000 accommodation fee if the amounts owed to the Lenders are not repaid in full on or before March 20, 2020;

(i) The Nygard Group will agree to consent to the appointment of a receiver if the amounts owed to the Lenders are not repaid in full by March 20, 2020.

The Nygård Group did not respond to the Lenders' proposal.

e) On March 16, 2020, counsel for the applicant wrote to the proposal trustee regarding the payroll advance. On the same day, Richter wrote to the proposal trustee making inquiries about the continuing erosion of the Collateral requesting numerous updates, including:

(a) The status of discussions with Perry Ellis with respect to the U.S. wholesale inventory;

(b) The status of discussions with Great American on the potential refinancing of the Lenders' secured debt;

(c) The status of discussions with the party interested in the Toronto real property located at 1 Niagara St.;

(d) The Nygard Group's funding requirements for the current week and its plans on meeting its obligations on a go-forward basis.

(e) The return of the Late Transfer Funds that Mr. Nygard transferred out of the Nygard Group's bank account;

(f) The timing on receipt of a realistic cash flow forecast given the Nygard Group's current circumstances;

(g) The Nygard Group's plans to continue normal course operations given the closure of its Winnipeg and Toronto offices, including the potential layoff of corporate staff; and

(h) The Nygard Group's plans to curtail expenditures in the coming weeks in response to the significant decrease in retail sales.

f) The Nygård Group closed all of its distribution centres effective the evening of March 13, 2020, after courier and transportation companies refused to provide go forward service without guarantee of payment.

g) On March 17, 2020, the applicant received a copy of an e-mail from the Nygård Group indicating that the Nygård Group would be immediately shutting down its retail stores and website due to the recent COVID-19 outbreak. The e-

mail made numerous additional representations about the Lenders' actions, which the Lenders submit are false and materially impact the Lenders' ability to realize on their Collateral.

h) The Nygård Group did not consult with the applicant, Richter or the proposal trustee regarding the potential closure of the retail stores and their business operations.

i) The Lenders have no faith that proper procedures to protect their Collateral will be undertaken by the Nygård Group.

11 On March 17, 2020, the proposal trustee issued its second report. The report confirms the following:

a) The proposal trustee requested that Nygård Group and management provide the proposal trustee with information respecting:

> (a) the status of the reimbursement of the Payroll Funding;
>
> (b) the status of funding for ongoing operations during for the week ending March 20, 2020;
>
> (c) the cash flows and the underlying assumptions., drafts of which were prepared by each of the members of the Nygard Group and provided to the Proposal Trustee on the evening of Wednesday, March 11, 2020 and the four wall forecasts provided on Sunday March 16, 2020;
>
> (d) the status of operations of the Nygard Group including measures being taken in response to the Covid-19 crisis (i.e. whether or not the stores and/ or distribution centres are to remain open);
>
> (e) financial information relating to the Nygard Group's operations;
>
> (f) electronic contact information for all employees of the Nygard Group (or access to internal email system) to provide the statutory required notices of the NOI proceedings; and
>
> (g) the status of refinancing efforts of the Nygard Group.

b) Despite repeated requests for information, limited information was provided to the proposal trustee as established in the e-mails sent by the proposal trustee attached as Exhibits B and C to the second report.

c) The proposal trustee received information from the Nygård Group regarding efforts to sell real property located at 1 Niagara Street in Toronto, Ontario (the "Toronto Property"). The potential purchaser indicated that the offer to purchase is confidential. The proposal trustee advised the Nygård Group that it is not in a position to advise the court or stakeholders that the offer is fair or reasonable.

d) The proposal trustee received a copy of a notice entitled "Nygård closing 180 retail stores". The proposal trustee was not consulted in advance of the notice.

e) The second report concludes:

> 20. Based on the foregoing, the Proposal Trustee is not in a position to advise that the Nygard Group is acting with good faith or due diligence at this time.
>
> 21. The Proposal Trustee also notes that each of the members of the Nygard Group are required under the BIA to file cash flows by no later than Thursday, March 19, 2020 and such cash flows must be submitted to the OSB with a report from the Proposal Trustee on the reasonableness of the assumptions contained therein. The Proposal Trustee has not been provided with sufficient information to assess the draft cash flows provided and is of the view that it will not be in a position to file the required report on the reasonableness of the assumptions as required by the BIA.

12 Two affidavits affirmed by Greg Fenske, on March 18, 2020, were received by the court. The second affidavit is a confidential affidavit regarding the potential sale of the Toronto Property and the sale of certain inventory.

13 The first affidavit responds to the affidavit of Mr. Dean affirmed March 17, 2020 and can be summarized as follows:

a) An explanation is provided as to why the Nygård Group was unable to fund payroll. The Nygård Group requisitioned $1 million U.S. from an account at Stifel and the funds never made it into Nygård's Canadian bank accounts.

b) Nygård Group obtained a loan from Edson's Investments Inc. in the amount of $500,000 U.S. to fund payroll. These funds were returned or transferred back to Edson's Investments Inc. when the applicant provided the funds for payroll on March 12, 2020. While Mr. Fenske states the Nygård Group will receive funds from Stifel, as at March 18, 2020, no funds were received.

c) Nygård Group did advise the Lenders of the funds that were required to pay bills in accordance with the Credit Agreement.

d) The estimated payroll for the week of March 15, 2020, is $900,000 Canadian and "that will be funded by the Nygård Group resources". (it is unclear what that term refers to and if it is an entity, it is not a named respondent)

e) The Nygård Group received a verbal offer from Perry Ellis to purchase one-half of the inventory in the U.S. The amount is disclosed in the confidential affidavit.

f) While a proposal to pay out the Lenders was to be received from Great American Capital, no proposal was received and the Nygård Group has moved on to having discussions with other Lenders to pay out the secured debt. No concrete proposal was presented.

g) The offer to purchase the Toronto Property dated March 16, 2020 from New York Brand Studio Inc., in Trust, was attached as Exhibit B to Mr. Fenske's affidavit and the purchase price is redacted. The confidential affidavit discloses the purchase price and the amount is substantially different from the purchase price that was included in the earlier affidavit affirmed by Mr. Fenske on March 12, 2020.

h) Nygård Group states that cash will be coming in from the sale of assets until the stores are reopened.

i) Nygård Group unilaterally laid off 1370 employees and provides reasons for closing the offices and stores for the safety of the employees and customers as a result of the COVID-19 virus. Nygård Group confirms that the Lenders and the proposal trustee were not consulted prior to making the decisions.

j) The Nygård Group plans to sell real property and generate $25.4 million and pay $20 million to the applicant pursuant to the Lenders' security.

k) Mr. Nygård will divest ownership and all Nygård Group of companies will continue under different ownership allowing the purchasers to move forward with the current employees of the Nygård Group.

l) The affidavit provides information regarding the steps taken by Nygård Group to market the sale of assets. Mr. Fenske states that the consideration to be paid under the purchase and sale agreement of the Toronto Property "... is reasonable and fair and is substantially higher than a liquidation value of the Nygård Group of companies assets in a Bankruptcy or Receivership." (See para. 29 of the affidavit of Greg Fenske affirmed March 18, 2020)

m) The proceeds from the sale of the Toronto Property and sale of inventory is to be paid to the applicant with the remainder of the monies, if any, to go to the proposal trustee to make a proposal to pay the remaining creditors.

n) The respondents seek an administrative charge to pay the proposal trustee and counsel for the proposal trustee.

o) Although no motion was filed, the respondents seek an extension of time of 30 days for the Nygård Group to make a proposal in bankruptcy.

p) Mr. Fenske states "... the Nygård Group of companies has acted, and is acting, in good faith and with due diligence in the proposal proceedings to date." (See para. 38 of the affidavit of Greg Fenske affirmed March 18, 2020)

Analysis and Decision

14 The starting point for analysis is to determine whether the applicant has met the test for appointing a receiver pursuant to s. 243 of the *BIA*. Section 243(1) of the *BIA* and s. 55(1) of the *QB Act* provide that a receiver may be appointed on application by a secured creditor, where it is "just or convenient" to do so. Such an order may authorize the receiver to:

243(1)

. . . . .

(a) take possession of all or substantially all of the inventory, accounts receivable or other property of an insolvent person or bankrupt that was acquired for or used in relation to a business carried on by the insolvent person or bankrupt;

(b) exercise any control that the court considers advisable over that property and over the insolvent person's or bankrupt's business; or

(c) take any other action that the court considers advisable.

15 On February 26, 2020, the applicant sent a notice of intention to enforce security as required pursuant to s. 244(1) of the *BIA*.

16 I am satisfied on the basis of my review of all of the evidence, that it is just and convenient to appoint a receiver in the circumstances. I considered the factors outlined in the various authorities including:

a) Whether irreparable harm may be caused if no order is made, although such a requirement is not essential where, as in this case, the appointment of a receiver is authorized by the security documentation including the Credit Agreement. In this case, I am satisfied that irreparable harm may be caused if no order is made due to the various steps that have been taken by the Nygård Group as I will outline below;

b) The risk to the Lenders taking into consideration the Nygård Group equity in the assets and the need for protection or safeguarding of the assets;

c) The nature of the property, including real property and inventory and the potential that the value of the inventory is being materially impacted by steps taken by the Nygård Group.

d) The balance of convenience to the parties which, in my view, favours the appointment of the receiver to ensure the assets are protected, marketed in an appropriate manner to secure the highest market value and to take reasonable steps to ensure that employees of the Nygård Group are protected.

e) The fact that the applicant has the right to appoint a receiver under the Credit Agreement.

f) The principle that the appointment of a receiver is extraordinary relief which should be granted cautiously and sparingly. The evidence satisfies me that the appointment of a receiver is necessary, just and convenient in the circumstances.

g) I also considered the effect of the order on the parties, the conduct of the parties, the length of time that the receiver may be in place, the cost to the parties and the likelihood of maximizing return to the parties. All of these factors favour appointing a receiver in the circumstances. (See *Bank of Nova Scotia v. Freure Village on Clair Creek*, 1996 CanLII 8258, [1996] O.J. No. 5088 (Ont. Gen. Div. [Commercial List]); *Callidus Capital Corp. v. Carcap Inc.*, 2012 ONSC 163, [2012] O.J. No. 62 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Romspen Investment Corp. v. 6711162 Canada Inc.*, 2014 ONSC 2781, [2014] O.J. No. 2146 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]); *Textron Financial Canada Ltd. v. Chetwynd Motels*

Ltd., 2010 BCSC 477, [2010] B.C.J. No. 635 (B.C. S.C. [In Chambers]); and *7451190 Manitoba Ltd v. CWB Maxium Financial Inc et al*, 2019 MBCA 95, [2019] M.J. No. 246 (Man. C.A.) (QL))

17 I previously found, as outlined in my reasons for decision given March 13, 2020, that the evidence filed presented a "... strong basis and rationale for the applicant to be concerned about the stability of the Nygård Group and in my view justifies the applicant taking steps to enforce its security and seek immediate repayment of the outstanding indebtedness. The Dean affidavit outlines in considerable detail the breaches of the Credit Agreement. (Exhibit D to Mr. Dean's affidavit) and the reason why the applicant has lost all confidence and faith in the Nygård Group complying with the governing Credit Agreement."

18 Had the Canadian Nygård entities not filed the NOIs, I would have had no hesitation in granting the receivership order last week. As explained in my reasons for decision delivered March 13, 2020:

> The proposal provisions of the *BIA* permit insolvent persons to avoid or postpone bankruptcy by complying with the provisions by appointing a proposal trustee and making a proposal to all creditors, including secured creditors. The proposal trustee must review Nygård Group cashflow statements and the proposal for their reasonableness and file reports in court. The proposal trustee monitors the debtors and must report regarding any material adverse change to creditors without delay after receiving information regarding any changes, which adds transparency to the proposal process.
>
> The proposal trustee is an officer of the court and must impartially represent the interests of creditors. If the proposal trustee knows of dispositions, transfers of property or steps taken by the debtor that are material, the proposal trustee must disclose that information to creditors so that they may take such action as they deem appropriate.
>
> It is necessary for the court to weigh the interests of all creditors in the proposal process and the interests of the primary secured party, the applicant. I am satisfied that it is in the best interests of all of the creditors to permit the respondents to restructure and make a viable proposal to the creditors pursuant to the proposal process.
>
> That said, I am not satisfied that Nygård Group has been dealing with its lenders in good faith and the appropriate action to take is to impose deadlines on the Nygård Group to satisfy the statements made in the Fenske affidavit and made orally by the respondents' counsel in court yesterday.
>
> In my view, it is premature to terminate or lift the 30 day stay period, particularly in light of the representations that the Nygård Group has made to this court. I am not satisfied that there is no viable proposal that can be made by the respondents as submitted by the applicant.
>
> The evidence filed by the respondents suggests that a viable proposal may be made to creditors and to the applicant. While there is evidence that the respondents have not acted in good faith and with due diligence in their dealings with the applicant, I direct that the respondents must continue to comply with the terms and conditions of the credit agreement and ancillary documents pending receipt of the outcome of the negotiations that are presently being undertaken to pay out the indebtedness of the applicant by March 20, 2020.
>
> I am not satisfied that the applicant will be materially prejudiced by the continuing operation of the stay of proceedings, so long as the respondents are making good faith efforts to continue to operate the Nygård Group business in the best interests of all stakeholders, including making arrangements to continue to meet the payroll and pay its employees and taking immediate steps to finalize financing to pay the outstanding indebtedness of the applicant by March 20, 2020.
>
> In the meantime, over the course of the next week, the respondents are ordered and directed to provide RAG ongoing access to financial information by virtue of the inspection rights under the credit agreement. The Nygård Group must not dispose of any assets or transfer shares or transfer funds deposited in the corporate bank accounts to other bank accounts other than in the ordinary course of business without consent of the proposal trustee, the applicant and RAG.
>
> If necessary, the court will make a determination if there is a dispute about a step proposed to be taken by the Nygård Group. In other words, all business of the Nygård Group, including transactions, shall continue in the ordinary course of business and in accordance with the strict terms of the credit agreement.

19 The further evidence that has been filed since March 13, 2020, satisfies me that the Nygård Group has not been acting in good faith and with due diligence. I am also satisfied that the Nygård Group cannot be left as a debtor in possession and the proposal process cannot continue. The second report from the proposal trustee states that the proposal trustee is not in a position to advise that the Nygård Group is acting with good faith or due diligence at this time. Further, the proposal trustee was not provided with sufficient information to assess the draft cash flows provided and is not in a position to file the required report on the reasonableness of the assumptions as required by the *BIA*.

20 As a result of the Nygård Group failing to provide accurate and timely information to the proposal trustee and the Lenders, the proposal proceedings are untenable. Further, the Nygård Group has no plan to continue to fund its operations and no other lender has stepped up to provide the necessary financing to pay out the Lenders.

21 The closure of the retail stores, distribution centres and website without consulting the Lenders and the proposal trustee is a serious concern that directly affects the ability of the Nygård Group to continue to operate and for the applicant to realize on the Collateral.

22 I agree with the applicant that the Nygård Group has provided no information to the Lenders about:

a) What has happened to the employees and specifically how they have been dealt with;

b) How the retail stores are being secured and locked down;

c) How the inventory located in the stores is being dealt with, if at all;

d) What is happening with the Nygård Group wholesale customers; or

e) How the Nygård Group is planning to sell its inventory other than the reference to the Perry Ellis potential offer.

23 It is fundamental for the proposal process to continue that the Nygård Group cooperate with the proposal trustee and that the proposal trustee be in a position to state specifically that the parties subject to the proposal proceeding have been acting in good faith and with due diligence. As noted above, that has not occurred.

24 In addition to the foregoing, the Nygård Group has failed to comply with orders made by this court and undertakings given by their counsel. Specifically, and contrary to their counsel's representations in court on March 12, 2020, the Nygård Group has failed to return the payroll funds to the Nygård Group's bank account and repay the applicant the payroll advance. The explanation provided in the affidavit of Mr. Fenske affirmed March 18, 2020 is inconsistent with what the court was advised on March 12, 2020.

25 The Nygård Group was directed pursuant to orders made by the court on March 12 and 13, 2020, to continue to comply with the Credit Agreement. The unilateral closing of its retail stores, distribution centres and website without consulting with the Lenders or the proposal trustee is in breach of the Credit Agreement and the court order. I also find that it is a material adverse change to the creditors which placed the proposal trustee in the position of not being able to comply with its duties under the *BIA*.

26 I agree with the applicant that in light of the events that have occurred since March 12, 2020, the appointment of Richter was urgently required and Richter was appointed as receiver effective March 18, 2020.

27 Richter is in the best position to assess the reasonableness of the offers to purchase the real estate and make a motion to court with evidence seeking approval. The evidence filed by the Nygård Group is insufficient to assess the reasonableness of the sale of the Toronto Property and the real estate located in Winnipeg. The proposal trustee stated at para. 15 of the second report that it is not in a position to advise the court or stakeholders that the offer respecting the Toronto Property is fair and reasonable.

28 The events that occurred since orders were made on March 12 and 13, 2020, are material developments that have caused or had the potential to cause a material prejudice to the Lenders and to the Nygård Group's business, creditors and

stakeholders.

29 The adjournment of the receivership application on March 13, 2020 and allowing the proposal proceedings to continue with the oversight of the proposal trustee was not granting the Nygård Group a licence to operate with impunity. The court's decision on March 13, 2020, was to allow the respondents a limited period of time to make good faith efforts to repay the debt owing to the Lenders and to fully cooperate with the proposal trustee.

30 I am satisfied that the appropriate course of action is to lift the stay of proceedings that was granted pursuant to s. 69(1) of the *BIA*. The court has jurisdiction pursuant to s. 69.4 of the *BIA* to lift the stay in circumstances in which the court is satisfied:

> **69.4**
>
> . . . . .
>
> (a) that the creditor or person is likely to be materially prejudiced by the continued operation of those sections; or
>
> (b) that it is equitable on other grounds to make such a declaration.

31 In my view, both of these requirements have been satisfied in this case. I agree that the Lenders will suffer a material prejudice if the receivership is not granted. While I accept that the shutdown of the retail operations may have been appropriate and necessitated by the COVID-19 virus, the closure of the business, distribution centres and website, without any consultation with the Lenders and the proposal trustee is prejudicial. The proposal trustee and the Lenders require the ability to oversee the preservation of the Collateral including the inventory and to maintain continuity with employees. The notice sent out by the Nygård Group was inappropriate, referring to unrelated matters and alleging misrepresentations regarding the actions of the Lenders. Regrettably, the notice sent to employees and customers did not achieve certainty regarding the Nygård Group business operations at this difficult time during the COVID-19 pandemic. Instead, it blamed others for the financial difficulties and caused greater uncertainty and instability in the Nygård Group business operations.

32 Acting in good faith and with due diligence is required for a debtor to remain in possession and to seek the protection of the *BIA* under the proposal process. The lack of good faith by the Nygård Group together with its failure to comply with the previous court orders, satisfies me that the stay must be lifted and the receiver must be appointed to take control of the respondents' business and provide experienced and effective oversight. This is not only in the interests of the Lenders, but it is in the interests of all stakeholders.

33 While the court has the authority pursuant to s. 50.4(11) of the *BIA* to terminate the 30-day period on the basis that the criteria set forth in that sub-section has been met, I agree that terminating the 30-day period is not what is required at this time.

34 Once Richter takes control of the assets and the business, Richter will be able to assess the respondents' business and make a recommendation to the court and the other stakeholders. The applicant requested that the court order the proposal proceedings commenced by the NOIs be stayed until further order of the court. That order was granted on March 18, 2020.

35 A similar approach was taken by the Ontario Superior court in *Dondeb Inc., Re*, 2012 ONSC 6087, [2012] O.J. No. 5853 (Ont. S.C.J. [Commercial List]) and, in my view, that approach is equally applicable in this case.

Conclusion

36 The court grants a stay of the proposal proceedings commenced by the NOIs until further order of the court. The court also grants a receivership order appointing Richter as the receiver in accordance with a draft order that was reviewed in court on March 18, 2020.

37 Richter will be funded by the Lenders in accordance with the term sheet attached as Schedule B to the receivership order and will be subject to the oversight and jurisdiction of this court.

Application granted.

End of Document

Tab 9

2003 CarswellOnt 5794
Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Karataglidis, Re

2003 CarswellOnt 5794, 47 C.B.R. (4th) 246

In the Matter of the Banrkuptcy of Konstantinos Karataglidis of the City of Scarborough, in the Province of Ontario, unemployed

Registrar Sproat

Judgment: November 13, 2003
Docket: 31-268286

Counsel: Ms A. Mahdavian for Sdrakas
Mr. C. Papadopolous for Bankrupt
Mr. and Mrs. Dragatsikis for themselves

Subject: Civil Practice and Procedure; Insolvency

Related Abridgment Classifications

Bankruptcy and insolvency
XVII Practice and procedure in courts
XVII.8 Costs
XVII.8.d Award of costs
XVII.8.d.i General principles
Bankruptcy and insolvency
XVII Practice and procedure in courts
XVII.9 Miscellaneous
Civil practice and procedure
XIV Practice on interlocutory motions and applications
XIV.6 Conduct of hearing
XIV.6.a Adjournments

Headnote

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Practice and procedure in courts — Practice in miscellaneous proceedings

Despite their inability to speak English, Ds appeared at motions without benefit of translator and requested adjournment to permit them to properly retain and instruct counsel — Creditor and bankrupt opposed adjournment — Request was denied as it was unreasonable and was motivated by intent to delay final disposition of matter — While proceeding with matter might impair their ability to oppose and respond, Ds had sufficient opportunity to retain and instruct counsel — Assessment proceeded — Creditor sought $82,722.38 in relation to motions — Judge assessed and fixed costs of $15,000 as against bankrupt and $67,000 as against Ds.

Bankruptcy and insolvency --- Practice and procedure in courts — Costs — Award of costs — General principles

Despite their inability to speak English, Ds appeared at motions without benefit of translator and requested adjournment to permit them to properly retain and instruct counsel — Creditor and bankrupt opposed adjournment — Request was denied as it was unreasonable and was motivated by intent to delay final disposition of matter — While proceeding with matter might impair their ability to oppose and respond, Ds had sufficient opportunity to retain and instruct counsel — Assessment proceeded — Creditor sought $82,722.38 in relation to motions — Judge assessed and fixed costs of $15,000 as against bankrupt and $67,000 as against Ds.

Civil practice and procedure --- Practice on interlocutory motions and applications — Conduct of hearing — Adjournments

Despite their inability to speak English, Ds appeared at motions without benefit of translator and requested adjournment to permit them to properly retain and instruct counsel — Creditor and bankrupt opposed adjournment — Request was denied as it was unreasonable and was motivated by intent to delay final disposition of matter — While proceeding with matter might impair their ability to oppose and respond, Ds had sufficient opportunity to retain and instruct counsel — Assessment proceeded — Creditor sought $82,722.38 in relation to motions — Judge assessed and fixed costs of $15,000 as against bankrupt and $67,000 as against Ds.

RULING on adjournment and costs.

***Registrar Sproat*:**

1 The Dragatsikis' appear today requesting an adjournment to permit them to properly retain/instruct counsel. The request is opposed by the Sdrakas' and the bankrupt's counsel. In my view and exercising my discretion in relation to such matters, the request is denied. I am cognizant that proceeding today may or will impair the Dragatsikis' ability to oppose/respond but, in my view, they have had more than a sufficient opportunity to retain and instruct counsel. In addition, they do not speak/understand English and have chosen to attend without the benefit of even a translator, perhaps with the expectation that that alone would prompt an adjournment. In my view, the request is unreasonable and cannot be granted as it is motivated by an intent to delay the final disposition of the matter. I note that Dragatsikis' have not either themselves or thru their "counsel" provided any date to which this matter may be adjourned and, in my view, this suggests further unwarranted delay.

Endorsement as between Sdrakas and the Bankrupt:

2 The creditor, George Sdrakas, seeks $82,722.38 in relation to these motions. I am satisfied that the figure put forth today at $15,000 inclusive of GST is reasonable and, accordingly, as against the bankrupt, I assess and fix costs at that amount.

Endorsement as to costs as against Mr. & Mrs. Dragatsikis, for themselves:

3 Upon the commencement of the assessment as against the Dragatsikis, it appeared that they desired a Mr. Sigaris to testify or prove their attempts to contact Ms. Mahdavian and to advise of the inconvenience to them of today's hearing.

4 Having heard submissions on the issue of the adjournment and ruled on the request, I did not hear from Mr. Sigaris and the assessment proceeded.

5 The Sdrakas' request for costs of $67,000, taking into account that portion already ordered as against the bankrupt, above, is in my view reasonable. There were numerous attendances on preliminary motions and scheduling matters before me. The hearing took 11 days. The issues of law and of fact, in particular were complex. This award of costs is granted on a party and party scale, notwithstanding my view that a very good case can be made for substantial indemnity of the full amount (i.e. roughly $82,000). However, I am of the view that recognition of the amount for which the bankrupt will be responsible addresses this aspect. In any event, there is little variation, in terms of dollars, as between the two bills of costs.

6 Accordingly, on a party and party basis, costs of $67,000 fixed and assessed as against the Dragatsikis.

Order accordingly.

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